Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-002
Thursday
3 January 1991

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Shevardnadze Move Tied to Disputes With Military

*PM020122091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Jan 91 Union Edition p 7*

[Article by IZVESTIYA political observer Stanislav Kondrashov: "Coachman, Do Not Drive the Horses Too Fast"]

[Text] The Year of the Horse has ended, but history continues at a gallop, although for the next 12 months, according to the oriental calendar, it has mounted the goat. For our country, both internally and externally, the main issue is that of reasonable changes at a reasonable speed.

The interaction between the internal and the external can now be detected in everything—and in the most unexpected ways. Take, for instance, last year's unusual movements and countermovements. Something on the order of 100,000 people returned to the Soviet Union, while more than one-third of a million left it for good. They returned in military uniforms—from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the former GDR. They left by land and air in civilian clothes—for Israel, the United States, Germany....

The troops are returning because the state is withdrawing within its borders. That is one of the main results of the year. And the people who seek a new home do so from fear of disaster in their old home, or else they justify their departure in those terms.

There is no more cold war, and in Europe there is no danger of a hot war, but 1990 suddenly revealed to the West a new type of Soviet threat—not soldiers in tanks, but mass emigration in search of a better life. Western Europe is hastily erecting border barriers, while the United States declares: 50,000 immigrants from the Soviet Union a year, and not a single one above that figure.

Western human rights campaigners are covered in embarrassment as they close the gates of their states against importunate Soviet citizens. Soviet citizens, the propagandists of panhuman values, are also covered in embarrassment (if they have not yet forgotten what embarrassment feels like) as they find that, in any event, in our fatherland the most important of these values has turned out to be the American dollar. It is eagerly pursued by left and right, by economic managers and by politicians, and by the diehard centrists from Moscow's cabstands.

Yes, history is proceeding at a gallop, and reeks of irony. Yes, it was a very mixed year, with society's problems present in individual destinies. In Gorbachev and Yeltsin we see the antagonisms between the center and the republics, in Ryzhkov's heart attack we see the battles over the market economy, in Shevardnadze's resignation we see the drama being played out in our new foreign policy.

I would like to say a bit about this last point, and to remind the reader that perestroyka's foreign policy is based on renunciation of political and military confrontation with the United States and the West as a whole and on the attempt to join the current of world legislative democracy and the market economy.

The first act of the drama was on a high note, a procession beneath the banners of panhuman values, when we opened ourselves up to the world, first and foremost the Western world, and the world—initially skeptical—accepted gratefully and with relief a new Soviet leadership that was ready for dialogue and compromise. The Soviet-American treaty on intermediate-range missiles, the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces by half a million men, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan—those were the chief events in Act I. This set the tone, so to speak, for all the characteristics of the new foreign policy and won for it—against the background of growing domestic problems—the reputation of being a sphere of state activity in which everything, or nearly everything, is going well.

And this was a fresh, living truth—not yet ossified into a new stereotype unable fully to reflect the movement of life. But then the second act of the drama began. The same correctly chosen direction, but events had gotten out of Moscow's control. More and more often it was necessary to pretend that the hand still rested firmly on the reins and that nothing unforeseen was happening.

Act II began in the fall of 1989, with the peaceful revolutions in East and Central Europe. In the spirit of the new terminology, this could be called the act of the fall, or collapse, of the empire. The Warsaw Pact Organization has in effect ceased to exist, and soon it will disband formally. Just over a month ago, when they signed the "Charter for a New Europe" in Paris, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze represented only the Soviet Union, while Bush and Baker acted not only in the name of the United States, but also in their accustomed capacity as leaders of the now even stronger NATO bloc. Our erstwhile allies now look only to the West for credits and for a model of a social system; they look in our direction solely to observe the collapse of economic ties. The GDR has become part of the West, disappearing within the bounds of a united Germany.

The new policy has brought both roses and thorns. More than enough has been said about the roses. So it is now permissible to concentrate on the thorns. The Soviet Union paid more dearly than anyone for the senseless confrontation with the West, especially in Europe. Now we are paying more dearly than anyone for our entry into a period of peace. Even the dismantling of the war machine, prescribed by the treaty on conventional arms in Europe, will cost us more than it costs everyone else, because we have stockpiled more unnecessary weapons than anyone else. The balance of payments is in dire straits and foreign trade is in disarray as a result of overhasty demonopolization.

Our world role is shrinking, which is, of course, a belated recognition of the fact that this cap did not fit us. The Americans, having secured their combat lines in Europe, are shipping heavy tanks from there to the Arabian sands to assert, in confrontation with Saddam Husayn, their enhanced role as the main custodian (on their own terms) of international peace.

But let us turn away from the Persian Gulf and look closer to home. Here is a recent episode from Act II. On 22 December the new Polish president, Lech Walesa, took office. In his speech he spoke about developing relations with the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania. He mentioned Russia, but he had apparently forgotten about the Soviet Union—the Soviet Union of which the Ukraine, Belorussia, and, for the time being, even Lithuania are parts. Yet Poland is our biggest immediate neighbor to the west. What does the new Polish president's forgetfulness mean? Even given his well-known anti-Sovietism, could he permit himself such unforgivable strategic forgetfulness? Or, in Walesa's view, is there no longer any need to reckon with the Soviet Union? No need to stand on ceremony, even at a solemn ceremony? These questions bring us to Act III of the drama.

What this third act will be like is hard—indeed, frightening—to predict. The centrifugal forces of the "foreign empire" accelerated the operation of centrifugal forces within, in the Union and autonomous republics. Will the Soviet Union survive as a state formation with a single foreign policy giving it great-power status? Or will the unforeseen result of the new political thinking be the emergence of a multiplicity of new states which, alone and forlorn, will have to more or less grope in the dark to find their own foreign policy paths in a cruel world that knows how to look after its own interests? These are really life and death questions. In broad terms, these were the questions that faced the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and they could be resolved by the drafting and conclusion of a Union treaty which would redistribute the balance of power between the center and the republics on the basis of new principles and endow the new Union with a new stability by means of voluntary democratic consensus. Will the sides be wise enough for this, or will the strange fervor of revanche and political ambition prevail, as they have done until now? They are meeting with increasing resistance from the majority, and I think the popularity of any populist will prove short-lived if he goes against this current among the people.

Returning to foreign policy, I must say that it was wisdom and strength that were found wanting in Act II. They were found wanting when the main question was not a question of the direction of the changes (which is correct and historically inevitable), but a question of their limits, of their reasonable speed, a speed advantageous to everyone—without which the changes become uncontrollable and unpredictable, leading to crisis, disintegration, and collapse. The wisdom of state government lies precisely in a sense of proportion, in the ability to ensure proportion in everything. But by no means was everything grasped in time; by no means was everything done to establish a *reasonable* pace, on our own terms, in light of the domestic situation in the country, and to insist on taking the risk, if necessary, of tackling difficulties with our partners in the diplomatic and military-diplomatic process.

The rhetoric about panhuman values was not always adequate to the task of the practical defense of the national interest (among Americans incidentally, the nickname "Yankee traders" is taken as a compliment). Not only in the eyes of some of the military, but in the eyes of millions of citizens, in the mass consciousness, our forced departure from East Europe and our necessary abandonment of empire (you cannot force someone to be nice) was a disorderly retreat, if not a humiliating flight, in which there was not even time to prepare housing for the troops.

For all the aura that surrounds the highest diplomatic post, a cumbersome and heavy burden fell to Shevardnadze. It was necessary through international—primarily Soviet-American—talks to dismantle in the course of a very few years the monstrous edifices erected by the Soviet supermilitarization that had grown up over the decades. It was this that formed the chief component of Stalinist and neo-Stalinist totalitarian socialism's messianic claim to world supremacy. The minister did not, of course, physically disassemble things himself; he did not blow up the medium-range missiles, of which we turned out to have several times more than the Americans; he did not prepare to destroy tens of thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery systems under the treaty on reducing conventional arms in Europe. It was not Shevardnadze, but Gorbachev who was the first to sign the treaties in question. But it was he, together with his USSR Foreign Ministry colleagues, who was involved both in difficult talks with the other side, and in equally exhausting interdepartmental battles with our own military, who would not reveal their secrets (and have not yet revealed them in full) even to their own people, even to the Foreign Ministry people, and who to this day, despite the colossal changes, have given up far from all the familiar postulates of supermilitarization. Equally great resistance was offered by the Soviet military-industrial complex, the backbone of an economy that turned its back on the consumer and its face to the arms race.

I am reluctant to believe that these are irreconcilable antagonists. Surely military men are not total strangers to common sense? And the military leadership has undergone a pretty thorough renewal. Guided by the principles that govern the whole state, the military is also in favor of achieving normal proportions in the armed forces and armaments. But their yardstick is different, the old inertia is more tenacious with them, and—most important—it is they, not the Foreign Ministry people, who have to reduce and cut—to cut into living flesh. And our military-industrial complex, unlike the diplomats or politicians, has to restructure itself not only psychologically, mentally, but first and foremost materially, and

that involves the destinies of millions of workers and the country's most advanced scientific and technical potential, which has been plunged into confusion by the dilettante approach to conversion.

Here too we come back to the key problem of what is a reasonable pace of change, a problem which will in no way be solved by people who, wittingly or otherwise, follow the custom of previous leadership generations—ruling without control, by administrative methods. There is also the problem of the Armed Forces' new and more modest place in the democratizing life of the country. Depoliticization is essential, but if it were to happen at a dizzying rate it would destabilize the Armed Forces in a crisis situation when they are called upon to serve as a most important factor for stabilization.

In our country military and foreign policy factors have always come together at the point where overall state interests intersect. In interdepartmental groups, of course, there were private backstage tussles and manly tears were shed out of sight of the world. But in the end agreed directives approved by the top leadership emerged, and Soviet diplomats took them with them when they sat down at the negotiating table with the Americans and other NATO members or, last year, with representatives of Hungary and Czechoslovakia too—on the subject of the terms and timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The gallop of history also made itself felt here, however—the gallop of history and the broadening of the field of political struggle, which has now come out into the open. And so we get People's Deputy Colonel Alksnis, trembling with unfeigned indignation, suggesting to Shevardnadze that he look into the eyes of those servicemen who, hastily withdrawn from East Europe, are now living in tent cities in the snow.

No, I do not regard him as scum or as a reactionary. But I cannot accept that the timing of the troop withdrawal was not approved by the Ministry of Defense and confirmed by the top leadership. But why did nobody mount the rostrum to share the responsibility and defend Shevardnadze? This is evidently what offended Shevardnadze and caused his patience to run out. Plus the rumors that he, Shevardnadze, was ready to send Soviet soldiers to the Persian Gulf region to pull the chestnuts out of the fire with and for the Americans.

The answer, if you think about it, is self-evident. The president needs the Army more than ever before, and he does not want the Army's patience to run out. International support is more easily secured than domestic support, and, after all, the policy is known as Gorbachev's policy, not Shevardnadze's. As for domestic support, as we saw on the last day of the congress, the political skirmish between the president and the Union legislature on the one hand, and, on the other, the Russian leadership, is assuming increasingly sharp forms. The internecine struggle over finance also seems to be sucking the sources of USSR Armed Forces funding into its vortex. Maybe it will even go as far as who is to control nuclear weapons. What is this—a new unintentional manifestation of dilettantism or a quite deliberate desire to blow everything to pieces?

...Goats are all very fine, but it is not better to stick with our own homegrown images? The still young but already wise Pushkin wrote: "That wild coachman, old father time, rides on, never dismounting."

That was only the first quarter of the 19th century, a calm patriarchal time. When life was only a "stagecoach," not the wild express of the last decade of the 20th century. But the image is classic and eternal. I would just like to add to it—as a warning—a plea from a prophetic song written approximately a year before the October revolution: "Coachman, do not drive the horses too fast..."

Churkin Briefs Media on Gulf Crisis, Israel

LD0201150991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1326 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanshchev and Igor Peskov from the USSR Foreign Ministry press center]

[Text] Moscow, 2 Jan (TASS)—Vitaliy Churkin, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, devoted his first briefing this year on current international policy matters to a number of aspects regarding the situation in the Middle East. Mentioning the decision "regarding the situation in the Persian Gulf," adopted at the end of last year by the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the Foreign Ministry representative noted that the publication of this decision as a UN Security Council document is planned. He indicated that the decision will also be handed to the UN secretary general, the chairman of the Nonaligned Movement, and to the leadership of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization. Soviet embassies abroad have been instructed to hand this document to the top state and legislative bodies of a number of countries.

Vitaliy Churkin reported at the briefing that on the eve of the new year, Aleksandr Belonogov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, received the Iraqi ambassador to the USSR, Ghafil Jasim Husayn, and handed him the text of this decision, with the request that its contents be conveyed to the Iraqi leadership and the people of that country. The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed the hope that the USSR people's deputies' appeal contained in it "would be heard," and that in this way "the peoples of this region and the whole of mankind will succeed in avoiding a tragic outcome to the crisis in the Persian Gulf."

Replying to a question on whether the Soviet Foreign Ministry has any plans to cut back its embassies in Arab countries neighboring the Persian Gulf, Vitaliy Churkin stated that Soviet embassies in Baghdad and other

countries in the region "remain, and will continue to function." "The question of our diplomats leaving the countries of the Persian Gulf is not yet being raised," he added.

Vitaliy Churkin reported at the briefing that on the eve of the new year another 233 Soviet citizens had returned to the Soviet Union from Iraq. At present about 850 Soviet citizens remain in Iraq, he said.

Vitaliy Churkin described the actions of Israeli planes, which on the night of 30 to 31 December subjected a number of settlements to the southeast of the Lebanese town of Sauda to a missile and bomb attacks, as "another illegal action by Israel, which undermines the efforts aimed at attaining national reconciliation in Lebanon, as well as a step toward strengthening the power of the central government in this country." "Similar actions by Israel toward its northern neighbor, which evoke resolute condemnation, must be ended," the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said. The action itself bears witness to the danger of preservation the Arab-Israeli conflict in its unsettled state and recalls the necessity of persistent efforts to start a peace process in the Near East as soon as possible.

Vitaliy Churkin would not comment on questions connected with the voluntary resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs. He just stressed once again that this issue will be resolved in the near future by the USSR president.

Answering a question concerning an increase in the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel in the last two weeks of 1990, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative regarded this fact as a manifestation of the policy of freedom of emigration which has been consistently carried out by the Soviet Union in recent years. He refuted the suggestion that the Soviet authorities "artificially stimulated" the departure of Jews for Israel in the closing days of last year. "Naturally, there was no such policy," he stated.

Roundup of 29 Dec Briefing

LD2912192990 Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Excerpts] The Soviet Foreign Ministry's press center has held a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists in Moscow.

Has the meeting between President Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze, expected upon the end of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, taken place? What are the results of the USSR Deputy Prime Minister Igor Belousov's visit to Iraq? These and many other questions were high on the agenda.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin has said that Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze have not met so far.

Asked about a likely date for the Japanese foreign minister's visit to Moscow, Vitaliy Churkin said that the Soviet Union suggested a new date for the visit.

[Begin Churkin recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] A date is being negotiated through diplomatic channels. At this point I can say that the visit is not going to be delayed for long. I believe that a later date for the Japanese foreign minister's visit will not interfere with timely and comprehensive preparations for President Gorbachev's visit to Japan. As is known, the visit is schedule for April next year. [passage omitted]

The next group [of Soviet citizens in Iraq] is expected to return home on 31st December. Moscow hopes to complete the evacuation of Soviet citizens from Iraq by 10 January. [end recording]

Planes to Turkey Seen as NATO 'Intervention'

PM0801102991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jan 91 Second Edition pp 1,4

[Report by correspondent V. Peresada under the "Foreign News" rubric: "Persian Gulf: Contradictory Position"]

[Text] Brussels, 2 Jan—Assessing the situation in the Persian Gulf, the EEC states believe that there is still an opportunity to avert a military confrontation with Iraq.

Consequently they intend taking urgent and direct steps. A conference of the 12 Common Market foreign ministers is being held in Luxembourg 4 January to discuss a plan of action.

This decision reflects the West Europeans' growing concern that the conflict situation is moving toward war. Two weeks ago at a similar conference in Brussels, Baghdad's proposal to open dialogue with the Common Market was rejected. As we can see, however, the EEC's approach has changed rapidly. As Belgium's LE SOIR writes, everything must be done to help establish political mutual understanding between Iraq and the United States before 15 January, which is when the ultimatum set by the UN resolution expires. The mission in question is expected to be entrusted to Luxembourg Foreign Minister J. Poos (Luxembourg assumes the EEC presidency 1 January).

The proposed settlement scheme appears highly reasonable. On the one hand the Common Market believes that the essential preliminary condition is Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait; on the other, as J. Poos has stated, once Iraqi troops are withdrawn "everything is possible." The press interpretation of this statement is unambiguous: The West Europeans are not going to object to a linkage of the Persian Gulf settlement with the convening of an international conference on the Near East, which will also discuss the Palestinian problem.

At the same time, one cannot fail to see that this course of mediation is combined with the "line of strength."

The North Atlantic alliance, where much is decided by the United States, is playing its part here. It was on Washington's "recommendation" that a meeting of NATO's Military Planning Committee, which resolved to meet Turkey's request for deployment of air force units of the "rapid response forces" on its territory, was held in Brussels today.

Compared with the armada already gathered in the Persian Gulf region this looks insignificant—just 40 warplanes. However, the dispatch of these planes signifies NATO's direct intervention as a military alliance in the confrontation with Iraq. Typically it is West European countries—Belgium, Germany, and Italy—that are the participants in the "air wing" of the alliance's mobile forces.

European Development Bank To Tie Aid to Democracy

PM0301101091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 91 Union Edition p 7

[Report by correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "European Bank Structures Are Being Set Up: Their Credits and Our Democracy"]

[Excerpts] Paris—The structures of the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are nearly complete; its purpose is to give aid to the Soviet Union and other East European countries. The selection of employees is already under way and senior positions are being filled. [passage omitted]

The president of the EBRD, Jacques Attalie, is convinced that the bank will ultimately be as effective as the Marshall Plan was in its day.

J. Attalie stresses that the EBRD is not a charitable organization. Funds will only be invested in ventures that are expected to prove profitable. In addition, it is a special bank which will also undertake consultancy work. To some extent the EBRD will also act as think tank generating ideas for East Europe.

What are the first ventures that the EBRD intends to finance? The Western press mentions helping with privatization, training managers for private enterprises, setting up private financial institutions and small and medium-sized firms, taking steps to protect the environment and in particular to clean up the Baltic Sea, constructing a railroad track for high-speed trains from Berlin to Warsaw, and modernizing the telephone network and setting up a social security system in Poland. Special attention will be paid to developing the tourist industry by making use of experience gained in Spain, which welcomes 50 million tourists annually. But no more than 10 to 15 percent of the total EBRD budget will be spent on one single project.

I should mention one final point. The provision of credit—and this is stressed by all the contributing governments—will be directly dependent on the development of democracy in East European countries. Any infringement of human rights and basic freedoms, any sign of a drift towards totalitarianism, not to mention a return to dictatorship, will inevitably lead to curtailment of EBRD financial aid.

China

General Views Pullout From Mongolia, PRC Ties

OW2912003190 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 2200 GMT 26 Dec 90

[Interview with General Semenov, commander of Transbaykal Military District, by station correspondent Garibov; place and date not given—Semenov's comments are recorded in Russian with superimposed translation into Mandarin]

[Text] [Announcer] The reporter asked: Comrade General, how is the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia going?

[Semenov] According to the agreement on troop withdrawal from Mongolia, by the end of 1990 we shall have withdrawn 75 percent of our troops. We have not only fulfilled the mission on schedule but also pulled out an extra unit. Naturally, we have also (?reduced) the withdrawn troops. I would like to point out here that we have fulfilled our mission and the Mongolian comrades did not express any dissatisfaction with it. We also have handed over housing and economic facilities to the Mongolian side. I believe that the troop withdrawal from Mongolia is of great military and political significance. The situation in the Asia and Pacific region, particularly easing Soviet-Chinese relations, has enabled us to take this positive step.

[Announcer] Touching on the border situation and contacts, the general said:

[Semenov] On the whole, the situation on the border is normal, and economic ties are developing smoothly there. From now on, we will improve our economic, military, and political ties with China, including exchanging military delegations and information on military maneuvers, and inviting Chinese soldiers to witness our war games and visit our military bases. All these will be conducive to relations between the two countries.

Near East & South Asia

Saddam Receives Supreme Soviet Delegation

LD0301110491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0916 GMT 3 Jan 91

[Text] Nicosia, 3 Jan (TASS)—According to reports that have arrived here, a delegation of members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Internationalist Soldiers which is in Baghdad at the invitation of the National Council (legislature) was received yesterday evening by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn.

The delegation, which has arrived in Iraq on a peacemaking mission, comprises USSR People's Deputies R.K. Odzhiyev, R.S. Aushev, and A.S. Kolodeznikov.

Egyptian Official Expects Partial Iraqi Pullout

PM0301093591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jan 91 Second Edition p 6

[Interview with former Egyptian presidential adviser Muhammad Isma'il by V. Belyakov in Cairo; date not given: "Is There a Way Out?"]

[Text] The National Center for Near East Studies in Cairo is an independent organization that studies current problems in the region. It is headed by eminent Egyptian diplomat and political scientist Muhammad Hafiz Isma'il, former minister of state for foreign affairs and presidential adviser on questions of national security. PRAVDA correspondent V. Belyakov talked to him about the outlook for the development of the Near East situation in the new year.

[Belyakov] First of all: Will there be a war in the Persian Gulf area?

[Isma'il] I do not think so. An analysis of Iraqi policy since its invasion of Kuwait indicates that Baghdad is aware of all the negative consequences of a war, not only for its own country but for the region and will try to avoid it.

[Belyakov] How can that be done?

[Isma'il] The most likely scenario for the development of events is a partial withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, including its capital. This will allow for the reinstatement of the former Kuwaiti Government in line with the demands of the UN Security Council resolutions. Iraq will retain Warbah and Bubiyan islands and the border oilfield of southern al-Rumaylah. Their fate will be decided at a later date through talks.

[Belyakov] Will this not be seen by many as capitulation on the part of Iraq?

[Isma'il] It is possible to do things in such a way as to avoid that. For example, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis hold an antiwar demonstration in Baghdad. The government says: The people do not want war, so to comply with this we must partially withdraw from Kuwait.

[Belyakov] What will be the future of the multinational forces in that event?

[Isma'il] They will remain. After all, a partial withdrawal will mean that the UN resolutions have still not been fully implemented. The crisis will enter a protracted phase, but nevertheless tension and the likelihood of war will decrease. Right now the Near East reminds me of a sick man with a temperature of 40 degrees. There is little chance of curing him in the new year, but his temperature could probably be reduced to, say, 38 degrees.

[Belyakov] Does this also apply to the region's main problem—the Palestinian question?

[Isma'il] Yes, I think so. It is possible not to recognize the linkage of these two problems, but an internal link undoubtedly does exist between them. It is demonstrated by the development of the situation in the Near East.

[Belyakov] So how, in your opinion, will progress in resolving the Palestinian problem be manifested?

[Isma'il] The proposal on withdrawing from the Gaza sector, which is currently under discussion in Israel, has caught our attention. It is coming from circles with an excellent knowledge of the correlation of forces in the country. Unlike the West Bank of the Jordan, Gaza, an isolated plot of land overpopulated by Palestinians, creates nothing but trouble for Israel. So that the probability that this step will be taken in the new year is relatively high.

Commentator Views U.S., Iraqi Positions on Gulf

LD3012144590 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 30 Dec 90

[Commentary by Aleksandr Pogodin]

[Text] This item is devoted to the situation in the Persian Gulf, as it is two weeks before 15 January—the deadline set by the United Nations Security Council for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. If the demand is not met, force can be used against the aggressor. The situation, our commentator Aleksandr Pogodin notes, is getting more and more explosive.

The U.S. Administration is accusing Iraq of blocking the settlement efforts. There have been reports of a decision by President George Bush that the United States should act fast and deliver a massive strike at the Iraqi troops if Iraq fails to leave Kuwait by 15 January. True, as it has been reported in a number of Arab countries, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn is looking for a third side to act as a mediator in a settlement. However there has been no indications in Iraqi official statements of an actual change or softening of its position.

Meanwhile it's Baghdad's position that determines a future course of events. So this may be just political maneuvers aimed at gaining time and securing Iraq broader support in the Arab world, and probably at undermining the resolve of the world community and splitting it.

As we can see there is less and less time left for the searches of a way out of the crisis situation in the Persian Gulf, yet the remaining time can and must be used to avert an explosion.

Latin America & Caribbean

TASS Notes Celebration in Cuba on Anniversary

LD0201154391 Moscow TASS in English 1514 GMT 2 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Kutikov]

[Text] Havana January 2 TASS—The Cuban people marked the 32nd anniversary of their victorious revolution on Tuesday [1 January]. This year it was celebrated during the difficult "special peaceful period" and regime of austerity, announced by the Cuban Government due to smaller deliveries of traditional goods from East European countries and the Soviet Union.

In spite of these difficulties, the Cuban leadership firmly adheres to the view that Cuba's social achievements and its independence can be maintained only through socialism. "This country is like a banner of socialism raised over the Western hemisphere," Cuban leader Fidel Castro said a few days ago.

No developments in Cuba have been comparable to the staggering reforms in East European countries and political and economic changes in the Soviet Union. It still denounces the market economy and believes there is no place for a multi-party system in the republic. Pluralism, it is believed in Cuba, can find expression only "within the framework of socialism".

"The policy of building socialism does not interfere with the dynamics of economic development but is based on the view that market economy mechanisms would be doomed to failure in the country," Deputy Foreign Minister Ramon Sanchez Parodi said on the eve of the celebrations.

Nevertheless, there have been certain reforms in Cuba. Many analysts believe that in drawing up its plans, the Cuban leadership is carefully analysing the reforms in the USSR and East European countries and is drawing on their experience. The structure of the Cuban Communist Party has been reformed and simplified substantially. Its apparatus is being slashed by 50 percent and the elections system is being democratised. Much hope is being pinned on local government bodies, which must be more active and concentrate their efforts on the solution of existing problems and the protection of the people's interests. The government is now taking vigorous measures to solve the food problem.

The Cuban leadership admits that the situation in the country is tense and may deteriorate in the coming years, however. The authorities are urging the population to endure the "special period" difficulties with understanding.

Cuban Physicians Treat Afghan War Veterans

PM0201125191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Vladimir Kuleshov under the rubric "Direct Line": "Afghan Veterans to Receive Medical Treatment in Cuba"]

[Text] Ashkhabad—For the first time in their lives, 25 young men from Turkmenia who returned from the Afghan war disabled have celebrated New Year in Havana.

Thanks to the efforts by Cuban physicians and a full course of treatment in one of Cuba's largest rehabilitation centers, the Afghan veterans are resuming a full life. A group of Cuban orthopedic physicians visited Ashkhabad last summer to carry out tests on participants in the Afghan war. Special attention was given to those in need of replacement arms or legs. The Cubans returned home and recently a telegram arrived from the Island of Freedom: "We await the first group of disabled Afghan veterans from Turkmenia...."

Congress of People's Deputies

Deputies Comment on Desire To Quit Supreme Soviet

91UN0060A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by S. Sokolov: "At Their Own Request"]

[Text] *More than 180 legislators have submitted their resignations from the USSR Supreme Soviet.*

Life goes on. Today the congress is rotating members of the Supreme Soviet. Will there be new people in the legislature?

During the year the Supreme Soviet has considered about 150 major and adopted 74 laws. The work was "without precedent in world legislative practice"—that is how the activity of the Supreme Soviet was evaluated by its chairman, A.I. Lukyanov. And at the same time, in spite of the esteemed lack of precedent and other honor accruing to membership in the USSR Supreme Soviet, more than 180 deputies have submitted their resignations from the Supreme Soviet because of rotation. One can understand why, for instance member of the Presidential Council Ye. Primakov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. Manayenkov, or Chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee G. Kolbin would want to leave the legislature. One can understand why dozens of enterprise directors, kolkhoz [collective farm] chairmen, and other leaders would want to leave. One can understand the step taken by poets R. Gamzatov and Yu. Drunina and writers Ch. Aytmatov and V. Belov: They had to make a choice—either art or politics. But why have resignations been submitted by people who would seem to have devoted their entire lives to politics?

Aleksey YEMELYANOV:

You know, you always get tired not so much from the work itself as from its fruitlessness. This is felt in the Supreme Soviet as nowhere else. The further we go the more obedient and controlled our legislature becomes. Throughout the entire year the Supreme Soviet has practically "consecrated" the recoil from democratization and formed an authoritarian power. This, incidentally, is what the current congress is engaged in. Strong authority is necessary, this is understandable. But even if it is necessary to strengthen the authority of the president at this time of crisis, it is not necessary to reinforce this in the Constitution. At the congress authority is essentially being given to a specific individual—M. Gorbachev. But today it is Mikhail Sergeyevich, and tomorrow suddenly.... And this person's takeover will already have been constitutionalized by the amendments to the Basic Law.

As before, ideology prevails in the legislative activity of the Supreme Soviet.

And I do not wish to be a voting machine.

Vladimir STADNIK:

I regard the work of the Supreme Soviet as unsatisfactory. Its greatest mistake is the fact that it has never, during the entire period of its existence, "noticed" the crisis events taking place in the country every day.

Our legislative activity has no rhyme or reason. Everything depends on the presidium. No priorities have been determined for the legislature's activity. Everything depends on the presidium. The attempt on the part of a group of people's deputies to somehow regulate our work ended in failure. In September, by a secret order, the president disbanded the Commission of the Supreme Soviet on Questions of the Country's Security System. Thus, operational questions of security were actually removed from the "field of vision" of the Supreme Soviet and transferred completely to the president. The rights of our legislature are disappearing before our eyes. They are being torn asunder: On the one hand in favor of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet. (For example, the presidium has been given the right to form its own decisions in the form of decrees. Or, while previously the legislature "approved" presidential appointments and discharges of members of government, according to the new procedures, it gives its "consent at the session" once and for all—ed.).

And so, happy legislative New Year, comrades!

Laptev Delivers Report on Supreme Soviet Rotation

PM2912104590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Dec 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by I.D. Laptev to the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies 26 December morning sitting in Moscow: "On the Renewal (Rotation) of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Composition"]

[Text] Esteemed people's deputies! Esteemed president! Esteemed presidium!

The Fourth Congress Preparatory Commission instructed me to report on the forthcoming renewal or rotation of the USSR Supreme Soviet's composition. This task is a completely new one for us all. In essence, today we have to set a precedent in the practice of shaping the supreme organs of state power in the USSR and their activity. It is perfectly natural that many of the questions associated with the problem of rotation are unusual.

In compliance with the rules, the Congress Secretariat submitted to you—not later than two days prior to the question's consideration, and much earlier as a matter of fact—lists giving the names of deputies leaving the Supreme Soviet and of those recommended for election to the Supreme Soviet. Here are the lists. They contain not just the names but also certain additional information concerning the approaches toward the rotation, the principles governing it, and the way it will be effected, which of course makes my own task and yours alike

much easier. I will therefore touch mainly upon some legal provisions, which must be complied with in organizing this work.

Let me remind you, comrade deputies, that the Supreme Soviet's rotation is effected on the basis of Article 111 of the USSR Constitution and several articles of our Standing Orders. It is enshrined in the Standing Orders that proposals concerning the persons who are to leave the Supreme Soviet in connection with its renewal and the people's deputies to be elected to it are formulated in advance at meetings of deputies' territorial groups. In other words, proposals on this question are submitted by Union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, oblasts, krays, and Moscow City. In this process, consideration is given to the opinions of the chambers' permanent commissions, their committees, and the deputies' groups, 17 of which —according to my calculations— were registered yesterday, as you know, and it is evident that this registration will continue.

Of course, even though these proposals and opinions are determining to a large extent, they are not final. The final say—just as on all other matters—rests with the congress. Each USSR people's deputy at the congress can participate in the discussion of candidacies, propose or criticize any candidacy, and announce his withdrawal as candidate. This is also written down in our Standing Orders.

It is well-known that the First Congress of People's Deputies elected 542 deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Under the Constitution, the Congress must annually renew up to one-fifth, in other words up to 20 percent of the composition of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. This makes a total of 108 people's deputies. I would imagine that this level of the legislature's renewal was laid down by those who elaborated the Constitution so that, while preserving continuity in the work of the Supreme Soviet and of its chambers, committees, and commissions, it could enable the largest possible number of deputies to play a direct part in its activity.

This was the approximate rotation level we actually had in mind, even though some deputies' groups proposed raising its level to 30 percent. But life has substantially amended even the boldest proposals. Today we have rotation proportions which, it seems, nobody had in mind.

Here are the specific figures. At present, applications to leave the USSR Supreme Soviet have been submitted by 183 [as published] deputies—99 from the Soviet of the Union and 85 from the Soviet of Nationalities (you have the lists of names).

What is behind these figures? Each deputy deserves to be mentioned individually, but I simply have no possibility to do so and will only say that those who have submitted applications include 77 workers from industry and agriculture (263 of whom were elected to the Supreme Soviet), 41 of whom are workers and kolkhoz [collective farm] members (out of 158); 41 workers from science, culture, public education, and health care services (out of 151); 31 soviet officials (out of 43); and six party officials (out of 44). There are 147 men (out of a total number of 442) and 37 women (out of 100).

In addition, there are eight vacancies which appeared as a result of early termination of deputies' mandates and the death of some of our comrades.

As you can see, esteemed deputies, the rotation level will have to be much higher than required by the Constitution. It is no longer 20 or 30 percent, it stands at approximately 40 percent! What should be done? The commission consulted all the republics, the deputies' groups, many deputies, and legal experts and arrived at the following opinion: Even though this high rotation level presents the Supreme Soviet with really great problems, we must nonetheless be guided by the principle of voluntariness, we must respect and accept the deputies' wishes.

Of course, the Congress Preparatory Commission thoroughly analyzed the deputies' applications. The motives advanced by deputies are completely different. Of course, the directive for mandatory annual rotation had its effect here. The huge difficulties, the tension at work, and the atmosphere of fierce criticism and self-criticism in which the Supreme Soviet had to act have also had their effect. Deputies found it very hard to cope with the huge volume of what many people found completely new information which is absolutely necessary for work on draft laws. It is also impossible to overlook questions of a strictly personal nature—the disruption of daily life which you all experience while the congress is in session and which Supreme Soviet members have experienced for many months on end, family circumstances, retirements on pension. The reasons given also included the wish to concentrate on the main job and the complexities of trying to combine it with legislative work. In other words, before submitting their applications, deputies had thoroughly considered the possibility of actively working in the Supreme Soviet.

In this context, esteemed comrade deputies, I would like to digress slightly and to unambiguously declare on behalf of the chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities and on my own behalf as chairman of the Soviet of the Union—and I hope that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet will join us in this. Each one of the people's deputies who today will cede his seat in the legislature to another deputy has played a special role in the Supreme Soviet and has held a special position in the legislature's large collective. Unfortunately, some of our voters have somehow too quickly gotten accustomed to judging activeness by appearances, and by no means all of them realize that Supreme Soviet members do not conduct their main work with newspaper correspondents or in the eye of television cameras at plenary sittings. Their main work was done in committees, commissions, and expert groups in our countless institutions. The results of their labor are embodied in the fact that we have

considered more than 150 major questions of the country's life and adopted more than 70 laws, many of which—and I wish to emphasize this—have been adopted for the first time in the USSR's history. And even if television viewers saw some deputies on their screens more frequently than others, this is no criterion by which to judge the work done by various deputies. If anything were to be used as such a criterion, it should be the report on the USSR Supreme Soviet's activity, which was distributed among you and which can, with full justification, be considered a report by each member of the Supreme Soviet.

In my view, the main contribution made by members of the USSR Supreme Soviet consists of the fact that they ensured the establishment of a new supreme organ of power—new in terms of both its constitutional status and the content of its work. They laid the foundations of the Supreme Soviet's establishment as the central mainstay institution of our statehood. People may have different attitudes toward the Supreme Soviet, it could and ought to be criticized for a lot, but nobody can any longer dispute the fact that the first Supreme Soviet "selection" made up a genuinely new Soviet legislature. It can be said without exaggeration that the contribution by each individual deputy is of invaluable significance. Each and every one of them, when he returns home, will be able to report back to his voters on his work at the Supreme Soviet with a sense of having performed his duty, to report back—and I repeat this—on our legislature's entire activity. And even though they may have met their voters less frequently than other deputies, experiencing as a result great spiritual discomfort and anxiety, they have fittingly fulfilled their mandate. I would ask the congress and its presidium to join us chairmen of the chambers in expressing sincere gratitude to our colleagues who have worked shoulder to shoulder with us in solving unusual and at times simply intractable problems.

Thus, comrade deputies, at present the number of vacant seats exceeds the constitutional norm of rotation and consequently, as I already said, we simply cannot talk about just one-fifth. We must resolve for the fourth congress the question of virtually doubling the Supreme Soviet's rotation norm. Why only for the fourth? Time alone will tell how matters will develop in the future. It is possible that there will be far fewer of such applications at the next rotation. Therefore, it is hardly necessary for us to now introduce amendments to the USSR Constitution and the congress and Supreme Soviet Standing Orders on this question. On behalf of the Congress Preparatory Commission, I submit the following proposal for your consideration: To set the quota for the current rotation on the basis of actual facts.

Especially, comrade deputies, in view of the fact that personal applications do not account for the entire volume of the rotation. Groups of deputies from some RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] regions and Moldova—I mean territorial groups—have submitted proposals that several people's deputies leave the Supreme Soviet even though these deputies themselves, as members of the Supreme Soviet, have expressed no such wish. As you know, the Standing Orders also provide for this eventuality.

In other words, we will have to consider another list of deputies, whose departure from the Supreme Soviet is proposed by territorial deputations. As of now, such proposals have been made regarding nine candidacies. Their names appear on pages 25 and 26 of the brochure which you have (List No. 2).

My sole request is to exclude from this list the names of Comrade Absamat Masaliyevich Masaliyev and Comrade Vasiliy Ivanovich Tso who, following consultations with their territories, have applied to be transferred to the first list, in other words they have submitted applications to leave the Supreme Soviet.

We also strove to study the motives behind the replacement of deputies at the initiative of territorial groups. These motives are different. The main one is a desire to introduce new blood in the legislature and elect more active deputies. Unfortunately, some of the protocols recording all the groups' decisions do not offer any serious reasons for deputies' leaving the Supreme Soviet's composition. We have already received both verbal and written representations on this account, but I must emphasize: The prime right to make proposals has been and remains vested in deputies' groups from the territories, and I would like to call on the congress to treat all their recommendations with utmost attention.

I would also ask you to give attention to the following fact: In most cases, the number of candidacies suggested for election by the republics and the regions corresponds with the number of Supreme Soviet seats falling vacant. In other words, there are five candidacies proposed by a republic to fill five vacant seats. There are, however, exceptions. For example, five candidacies have been suggested for the four seats of the Russian Federation falling vacant in the Soviet of Nationalities. Six candidacies have been suggested from Moscow City (Soviet of the Union) to fill four vacant seats. Deputies from Kirghizia have proposed six candidacies for four seats (Soviet of Nationalities). You can see this in your lists, and it will obviously all be pointed out afterwards in the relevant ballot papers.

In total, we have 209 candidacies proposed to fill the 201 seats falling vacant in the USSR Supreme Soviet, if all the proposals are taken into account. As I already said, all these candidacies were submitted by groups of deputies in republics and regions following detailed discussion. The lists provide—and this must also be noted—broad representation of people's deputies from various groups and factions. Furthermore, the proposals by groups of deputies from the republics and regions and the opinions of deputies' groups very often coincided.

I cannot fail to inform the congress that the rotation principle itself was subjected to quite sharp criticism. It was said that the procedure for the Supreme Soviet's

rotation, as it presently exists, could lead to a qualitative decline of the parliamentary corps. It was therefore proposed to adopt the method of filling vacant seats by appointment, in other words via elections to the country's Supreme Soviet by the congress without taking the territorial deputations' opinions into account. The idea of generally effecting rotation only along the lines of deputies' groups or parliamentary factions was also put forward.

In the commission's opinion, these proposals are not sufficiently justified. In order to amend the rotation procedure, for example, we would have to introduce appropriate amendments to the USSR Constitution and our Standing Orders. Only thus can our internal revolutions begin. Furthermore, the "group" or "faction" approach is simply not feasible for the time being. The point is that many deputies belong simultaneously to two, three, and even five deputies' groups. Right away, this gives some people several votes while others have just one vote, and you can understand what can happen. This is why the Congress Preparatory Commission, when considering the rotation question, advocated adherence to the principles on which the Supreme Soviet was elected. And it gained firm support from the republics and regions. This is how they declared their stance: No retreat from the territorial principle of rotation. This was, moreover, declared by all the republics and all the regions. They decided for themselves who should be nominated for the Supreme Soviet and who, in their opinion, would best assist in maintaining the efficiency potential of our legislature.

In this context, I must note that republics like the Buryat, Mari, Tuva, and Kalmyk were not at all represented on the Supreme Soviet. They did not gain a quota at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies. But now these republics, with the exception of the Kalmyk, submitted proposals for the inclusion of their candidates in the Supreme Soviet ballot papers, including the candidacy of Deputy Yuriy Martynovich Chemodanov (from the Mari Republic). As you may recall, there was much argument about him at the First Congress.

At the same time, Kuybyshev Oblast representatives proposed the inclusion of two more candidacies in the Supreme Soviet ballot paper, in addition to the one representative it already has in the legislature.

Consequently, I think that we cannot rule out the possibility of the ballot's resulting in a redistribution of deputies' seats in the legislature for the Russian Federation's regions, even though the republic deputies' conference confirmed all the quotas set by the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

What will be the result, following an analysis of the composition of deputies recommended for election to the USSR Supreme Soviet? It can be confidently assumed that the rotation will result in doubling the number of young deputies (below the age of 30 years), and in raising by 41 the number of workers in industry, construction industry, and communications, including 17 more workers, team leaders, and foremen. At the same time the number of representatives of public organizations (the Peace Fund, the Red Cross, and others) will increase by 13. Unfortunately, however, there will be fewer (12 less) agricultural workers, including eight fewer kolkhoz chairmen and sovkhoz [state farm] directors. The number of soviet officials will drop by 19, and women by six. The number of jurists and economists will remain at the former level (according to data on members leaving the Supreme Soviet).

There is another question on which we have to consult. The deputies' groups from Lithuania and Estonia have not declared their proposals on the USSR Supreme Soviet's renewal, even though two deputies from these republics (in the Soviet of Nationalities) have submitted the relevant applications. The Congress Preparatory Commission proposes the following action: To comply with the personal applications by the people's deputies and to reserve the vacant seats for these republics. My explanation for this would be that although we have no proposals on the Supreme Soviet's renewal from these republics today, they might be submitted tomorrow in accordance with these republics' constitutional right. But let the congress decide.

Thus, comrade people's deputies, first of all we have to decide our stance on the following issues.

First, we must adopt a congress resolution on accepting the personal applications by members of the USSR Supreme Soviet resigning their powers. You already have the list of those Supreme Soviet members.

Second, this is a list of nine deputies who have not expressed a desire to file applications but have been proposed for rotation by territorial deputies' groups. We need to have a secret ballot on these candidacies. Only the result of such a ballot will enable us to make a decision.

Third, we must take a stance on the list of deputies proposed for election to the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. As I already told you, it was drawn up jointly with all the republics, krays, and oblasts and you already have it.

And fourth, it is necessary to draw your attention to a procedural question.

Article 55 of the Standing Orders, which lays down the procedure for making decisions on the removal of deputies from the Supreme Soviet's composition, says that votes on this question are held in accordance with Articles 45-47 of the Standing Orders. Article 47 provides that, during elections to the Supreme Soviet, the candidates considered elected are those who gain the largest number of votes from the republic or region and more than one-half of the votes of all USSR people's deputies. We must take this provision into account and bear in mind that this principle also extends to the

procedure for making decisions on the removal of deputies from the Supreme Soviet's composition in connection with its renewal. I say this because this is not fully or accurately spelled out in Article 55.

Concluding my speech, I would like to emphasize once more the innovative nature and importance of the task we have to resolve today. The way we resolve it will be highly significant not only for the organization and holding of subsequent rotations of the USSR Supreme Soviet but also for the work of parliaments in the republics where rotation rules are legislatively enshrined and will be implemented. In this context, our approach and experience could provide a kind of experimental base on which republican organs of state power will build and improve their activity.

One last point: We already know from the first elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet that their results produce a really heated response and cannot please everyone. Now we are already at our second elections, we have accumulated a certain amount of experience. And I would very much like to call on all people's deputies to show proper respect for the will of the congress and to bear in mind that several more rotations lie ahead of us and it is not so much a question of who will be elected to the Supreme Soviet but of who will work there most efficiently at the present and possibly most complex stage for our fatherland.

Kirghiz President Interviewed on Congress Results

PM311216.8590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Dec 90 Second Edition p 2

["Lightning Interview" with Aksar Akayev, president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, by S. Oganyan under the rubric "Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow": "Askar Akayev: 'We Will Get Through the Trials Together'"]

[Text] The Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies is over. On the threshold of 1991 it adopted decisions designed to determine paths for the country's development and for a way out of the profound economic and sociopolitical crisis. Time will tell how farsighted the decisions adopted by the congress turn out to be. And now, hot on the heels of the congress, here is the very first commentary, which Aksar Akayev, president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, has agreed to make.

[Oganyan] How did you assess the productivity of the congress, Comrade President?

[Akayev] The first week of our work was taken up with debates, and it seemed that it would be difficult to expect results and constructive things from the congress. But the second week showed that the deputies were prepared to adopt important decisions—and they adopted them. I have in mind the resolution on the situation in the country, the Law on the Referendum, the Concept of the Union Treaty, and the amendments to the USSR Constitution that change the system of executive power in the country in a radical way.... All this together enables me to affirm that the congress worked very successfully and that the decisions adopted will bear fruit as early as in the coming year.

[Oganyan] You mentioned the Union treaty among the most important decisions of the congress. Could you briefly outline your republic's position on this question?

[Akayev] At our recent session, we adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty. Now we are officially called the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. Our position is unwavering and clear-cut—we support the Union. We also take account of the historical roots of our mutual relations with Russia. We became part of the Russian state in the last century. We will soon celebrate the 130th anniversary of the affiliation [prisoyedineniye]. This fact alone shows that our Kyrgyz people themselves wanted to live in union with Russia. Objective historical reasons led to this. Of course today, when deputies in the republic legislature advocated the Union, they said that the sovereignty of all the components should be really ensured in our renewed state, and that this sovereignty should have guarantees. In a word, this should be a Union of republics with equal rights.

[Oganyan] But still, the congress did not express its attitude to the sovereignty of republics....

[Akayev] That is true, there was no direct vote on this question, but nevertheless, the congress indirectly acknowledged the sovereignty of republics, by adopting a resolution on the concept of the Union treaty and the procedure for concluding it. It enshrines acknowledgment of sovereignty.... Although, I think that if the congress and the Union leadership had recognized the sovereignty of republics in a separate resolution, it would only have been to their advantage. It would have removed yet another barrier on the path to the speedy conclusion of the Union treaty.

[Oganyan] President Akayev, what is your attitude to President Gorbachev? And to the measures he is undertaking to strengthen presidential power? Will they not lead to the republic leaders having less power?

[Akayev] I fully support the reorganization of executive power and its full concentration in the president's [Gorbachev's] hands. I believe there is no other way today, otherwise we would not be able to ensure the effective implementation of the program for the stabilization of the country's economy, political stabilization, and the transition to the market, on which the USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted decisions. Without strong executive power we will not be able to achieve this. I fervently support the congress' decision on this question. This approach does not restrict the republics, or the powers of the republic presidents in any way. I believe that the demarcation of powers between the republics and the center will automatically lead to the demarcation of powers between the USSR president and the republic presidents. I hope this will be specified during the review

of the Union treaty, and this will undoubtedly put an end to the "law war" and untangle the mass of problems that face us today.

[Oganyan] How do you feel in the role of president of the republic? After all, wasn't your election a surprise to you?

[Akayev] Indeed, my election was a surprise to many people, and primarily to myself. This also determines the situation in which I am working today. As I was shown such trust by the legislature and the people, I thought that at such a critical time for the republic, I must not refuse this election, although, to be honest, I am more drawn to scientific and organizational activity. Today no one must stand aloof during the resolution of cardinal questions of economic and social development. At the republic Supreme Soviet session we implemented changes in the structure of executive power that were analogous to the congress' changes. And this is a natural vertical extension of the presidential power that has now been accepted and that reaches right down to the grass roots.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the situation which we are living through today is no harder than others we have already met in various periods of our country's history—during the civil war, during the 1930's and in the post-war years. Therefore I am looking confidently to the future and I think that we will be able to come out of this latest trial all the stronger. I do not doubt that the democratic processes developing in society will enable us in the end to embark on a new and higher stage of historical development.

Deputy Blokhin Emphasizes Need for Strong Center

91UN0588A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Dec 90 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Moldovan People's Deputy Yu.V. Blokhin by N. Garifullina; place and date not given: "Let Us Straighten Up!"]

[Text] [Garifullina] Yuriy Vitalyevich, what is your assessment of the situation in the country and at the congress? Is there a real threat of a dictatorship?

[Blokhin] To answer this question, we must recall who and which specific forces have been scaring the country with either "an iron fist," or "a military coup," and now with a dictatorship, and contrast it with, for example, the article of Klyamkin "An Iron Fist Is Needed." The main point is to grasp where a threat to perestroyka comes from. Anarchy is threatening us, and we need strong executive power and elementary order to avoid it. Look at what the voters are writing to the congress. When will the talkathon come to an end? When will the country finally have discipline and order? When will the laws apply? You know, our voters are right.

The situation in the country is critical. We need to take the most resolute measures as soon as possible. Otherwise the people will sweep us away shortly—both the left and the right, both the democrats and the conservatives, and the reactionaries who have now been added. Personally, I cannot understand this division. Why do they pin the label of conservatives on those who advocate the preservation of the Union and of the state, which should be a sacred duty of any and all people living in this state? This is also how they refer to those who demand equal rights for citizens in a multinational federated state which, incidentally, did not just appear today or yesterday, but rather has evolved over hundreds of years.

[Garifullina] Does it appear strange to you that some deputies speaking about the Union treaty at the congress pretend that the life of our Union is beginning from scratch? You see, they are still considering on what conditions a republic will join the Union. Meanwhile, the republic is already in this Union, it exists; at issue is its renewal and taking it to a qualitatively new level.

[Blokhin] This is precisely the point! When I listen to speakers, a thought occurs to me involuntarily that some of them are mainly concerned with accumulating as much power as possible. Look at how furious attacks on the center are, how the dictate of the Kremlin is denounced and so on. Something else comes to my mind. If a year ago we in Moldova, and in other republics as well, attached hopes to the center and the protection it gives, in the belief that the center holds all the levers of power, at present the center itself needs help.

By now, 15 centers have emerged in our country, and they are the ones dictating rather than the Kremlin. Have things really improved because of that? Not at all. Quite the contrary—it is much worse. There is chaos, anarchy, and disintegration in our country. The main issues have not been resolved so far. We need to delineate powers as soon as possible, and everyone should attend to his own business. Enough of belaboring the topic of "center, center...." I for one believe that the center is a necessary institution. In our multinational Union in which not 60 million, but according to the latest data, more than 80 million people live outside their national-state entities, who is going to defend their rights and interests if not the Union center? Look at the number of interethnic conflicts that have already flared up, and the number of those now smoldering, but with flames about to flare up.

Let us ask ourselves this question: Why were there no similar conflicts in Moldavia before? Because there was no division of the people into ours and theirs. The ethnic structure of the populace was taken into account in the supreme organs of power, in the government, in the organs of local government, in college admissions, and actually in resolving all issues. These issues have always been sensitive, and they attempted to resolve them discreetly and fairly. At present, this is what the policy is: The indigenous nation has priority. It enjoys all the

rights, whereas the rights of the Russian-speaking populace are infringed upon. Hence social tension and the opposition of people. This is painful and bitter.

If we are democrats indeed—and democracy means power of the people that is equal for all—let us make this our departure point. Let us ensure equal rights for the people in reality.

If the language of the indigenous nation should operate in all spheres, let us do so, but not to the detriment of the rest of the populace, not by discriminating against it. There is no alternative to parity bilingualism within the framework of our country. However, we need to qualify this immediately: What is at issue—the Soviet Union or only the independent republics? If we consider that the Union exists many issues are immediately resolved, because the Union laws and the Constitution apply. If there is a Union there will be equal rights.

[Garifullina] What is your prediction—on what other issues is struggle at the congress still in store?

[Blokhin] Actually, this issue has already been raised. I mean proposals to recognize the declarations of republic sovereignty. I believe that this is an important issue. The declarations indeed infuse with real content a form that is codified in the Constitution, and there is nothing bad about it. However, on the other hand, we should also look at the sovereignty of the Union. After all, the USSR is also a sovereign state that some people are already rather reluctant to admit, ascribing to it the role of a certain commonwealth or confederation. I, for one, am convinced that, having recognized the declarations on the sovereignty of the republics, we should adopt a declaration on the sovereignty of the USSR as well.

We would like to listen to Chairman of the Committee for Constitutional Supervision Sergey Sergeyevich Alekseyev: How has his committee worked? How has it defended the rights of USSR citizens that have been trampled upon? These are not idle questions. After all, the rights of people are violated in our country in the most egregious and inhuman manner; blood is spilled; 600,000 refugees roam the cities and villages without shelter or work—but measures are not taken! How is this to be understood?

In all honesty, I find it strange, putting it mildly, that some of our functionaries look at these facts through binoculars turned the other way around, so that human pain is reduced to the point of becoming inconspicuous. They should look through the binoculars the right way and see the trouble as it is, in its true scope, and feel it with their heart as a person feels when his loved one dies. I think that in this case we will truly decide, act, and protect.

Freedom is necessary; it has given us an opportunity to straighten up, to perceive ourselves, history, and, ultimately, the world. However, freedom cannot be confused with permissiveness and anarchy.

[Garifullina] Yuriy Vitalyevich, in the lobby of the congress there is a lively discussion of candidates for positions in the new structures of presidential power. Who do you see in the position of vice president—a new figure in our system of power?

[Blokhin] It seems to me that a man should not necessarily hold this position who has "excelled" in everything, who is popular, and whom everyone knows. Something else is more important for me: This should be a person with firm progressive positions.

[Garifullina] Are you satisfied with the nature of the discussion and the standard of arguments for their point of view by those taking the floor?

[Blokhin] Many intelligent, interesting, and thought-provoking presentations have been made that make one worry and empathize. Unfortunately, some people have lost their sense of moderation and, perhaps, responsibility. Some people are using the podium for political struggle against the CPSU, using labels and insults in the process. I disagree with it. Setting parties against each other is a way toward confrontation and toward exacerbating tensions in our society. Never mind this, but it is worse yet when some deputies make vociferous statements on certain facts without taking the trouble to verify them.

Since we are on this topic, I will touch on two publications in your newspaper. In early November, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reprinted an article from the American [as published] newspaper GUARDIAN on ties between the Interregional Group of Deputies and the CIA. In response, a group of USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies published "Statement on the Campaign of Slander Mounted on the Pages of the Newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA" in the weekly ROSSIYA. In conjunction with this, our colleague from the SOYUZ group, People's Deputy Viktor Imantovich Alksnis, made an enquiry in the USSR Supreme Soviet. He also cited specific data and referred to sources.

"The Cast of Characters," "The Same Familiar Faces," and the Alksnis presentation have so astounded me that, together with Deputy G.A. Komarov, I made inquiries at various organs. The Ministry of Defense has already responded to us. I should say that some of my doubts have been dispelled. Your readers may have also had such doubts. This is why I am making this material available to the editorial board. I hope that the newspaper will publish it and put this information in the public domain. It discusses precisely the financial and moral support from abroad for some of our internal forces. We would like the public to know what is happening here, because nothing happens for no reason at all....

Poltoranin TV Interview on Congress Detailed

91UN0579A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report on television interview with M.N. Poltoranin, USSR people's deputy and RSFSR minister of the press and mass information, by B. Kurkova; place and date not given: "From a Dictaphone Tape: 'We Have Such a Suspicion'"]

[Text]

"Honor and Dignity Have Been Questioned..."

The article "Honor and Dignity Have Been Questioned..." published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on 22 December discussed an unexpected situation which developed at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies in conjunction with a presentation by RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Minister of the Press and Mass Information M.N. Poltoranin on Leningrad TV. Many readers have approached the newspaper requesting that it clarify what this presentation was and whether a protest by Deputy V.F. Pylin lodged with the congress presidium was justified.

[Kurkova] Good evening. Passions that flared up during the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia have just stopped reverberating. We have now once again witnessed how heated the course of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies has been. Mikhail Nikiforovich Poltoranin, USSR deputy, USSR people's deputy, and minister of the press and mass media of Russia, is a guest of our program today.

Mikhail Nikiforovich, what is your assessment of the events happening at your congress? You know, in all honesty, I was interested in the beginning of the congress. This very presentation was sort of a presentation with a false bottom in which an attempt was made to express a lack of confidence in Gorbachev. I do not quite believe that this was precisely what the person speaking wanted. Indeed, was there not an ulterior motive involved in this case?

[Poltoranin] Well, with reference to the congress as a whole, we expected more of this congress, of our work because the situation in Russia, in the country.... It is known that we are not just on the brink of something, but we have already crossed the final line that can be crossed. In general, of course, this is the direction the congress should have taken. Why did this situation come about? What should be done? Finally, who is to blame? Because we always say: Let us not look for someone to blame, let us make specific suggestions. This was the congress that, of course, should have proceeded along these lines.

As for the speech by USSR People's Deputy Umalatova, this "Red Hundred" [reference to pre-1917 extreme right-wing "Black Hundreds"] from the CPSU Central Committee, as we call her—of course, various versions are possible in this case—one would have thought that, indeed, the woman waited and waited, she went home to the Caucasus, over there, the voters generally gave her a piece of their mind; she came back and voiced everything that they now think and that she was told. Of course, on the other hand, we have a suspicion, and many people have this suspicion, that this was incited from somewhere, because she spoke right away in order to reduce the tension which could appear at the congress. It had to appear after a speech, a report by Gorbachev, because everyone had to see what kind of report it was and what and where we intended to proceed further. Suddenly, Umalatova spoke at the very beginning and made this proposal. A storm immediately broke out in order to let off steam. I judge this even by the fact of Yanayev's speech. You know, this is what we call him—"a grand piano in the bushes." As soon as the going gets tough somewhere, Gorbachev puts him forward, and Lukyanov rushes to the podium and begins to advocate the official policy they pursue. Apparently, in this case as well he did not figure it out and rushed in there....

[Kurkova] To the defense of Gorbachev?

[Poltoranin] Yes, to the defense of Gorbachev, apparently being unaware of the underpinnings of the events. At this point, Lukyanov motioned with his hand: "Well, let us vote on it." And they put it to a vote.

[Kurkova] Was the grand piano left in the bushes?

[Poltoranin] Indeed, the grand piano was left in the bushes. Precisely why it came up, many people still had not figured out what the point was, and whether it should or should not have been done before it was known what Gorbachev's report was going to be like. Naturally, at this point many people voted in favor of not putting this issue on the agenda. Despite the fact that we, the people who always state their opinion, voted. We were not afraid, we voiced our opinion, where we stand on this issue.

[Kurkova] That is, you believed that this issue should have been on the agenda?

[Poltoranin] We believed that yes, this issue should have been on the agenda. However, it should have come up after we heard Gorbachev's proposal. You know this, you heard the report. When he finished this report—I sit in the first row, right opposite the podium—I immediately breathed a sigh, as they say; the thought occurred to me that he was exactly five years late with his report. However, in this report, he once again... became engaged in eclecticism; in general, the report and all of his proposals boiled down to a call to establish and build a new police state. Let us put control in place, let us clamp down, let us do this, and this, and this. Let us get through this winter on these handouts, these packages, and later we will see. What is there to see? No specific proposals—what comes next? Precisely the very central issue of perestroyka, the issue of property, was not even touched upon. Even what Russia decided at its congress—let us develop peasant farms and farmsteads; private property was at issue. Even Gorbachev said here: "Let us still

submit this issue to a referendum, and let the referendum decide." Over there, they said as early as at the congress, "Let the rural populace alone decide." In general, I believe that this is a step once again aimed at freezing the decision of the Russian congress. That is it. And on the other hand, it is aimed at receiving the data they need, which they find satisfactory. Because how can we hold a referendum now if he intends to hold a referendum in the winter? We have no infrastructure to hold a referendum, and once again the counting—the party apparatus will count the votes for which it is, naturally, disadvantageous if the people speak in favor of private property. We will receive the data which are now advantageous for the party apparatus.

Generally, this is the entire issue now under discussion at the congress....

[Kurkova] What troubles you personally in the present situation? What is your view on the entire situation which is emerging? Because in the report and speeches alike, this opposition to the republics is laid out absolutely unequivocally. That is, once again there is the center, and the republics around the center. What is your assessment as a USSR people's deputy and a minister of Russia? Yours is a difficult situation.

[Poltoranin] Well, my situation is difficult not only as that of a minister but also as that of a person, a resident of Russia and of the entire country because at present the problems of Russia and the country are similar. What can I say? In general, we have begun talking about the report, the principles of perestroyka stated by the president, and his concept, and we have already said that this is the concept of a police state, a distributive concept. How is he to distribute what does not exist? Why not a creative concept—how to produce more and more? This is the first aspect. The second, main, aspect is the concept of reinforcing personal power. That is, it, all of us... everything is due to the fact that we do not have enough personal power, Gorbachev does not—and this is supposedly why all of our problems occur.

I came here literally for one day to attend to some urgent ministry business, and dropped in to visit a colleague. You know, and everybody knows this colleague—Aleksandr Nevzorov. We talked for two and half hours with him. Our people also took an interest in this entire episode here. We were interested to know what kind of an episode this was. As they say, who is behind this episode, this situation? There are different versions. I for one very much dislike the wave in the Leningrad press which went against Nevzorov claiming that, allegedly, he virtually inflicted the wound himself in order to boost his prestige. Nothing of the kind!

As the event indicates, this was an attempt on a person's life pure and simple. However, this attempt very much puts us on our guard; it does in the sense that there are very many questions. However, I repeat that there are versions, and I do not rule out the version that this affair was very well-planned—including based on his conversation. In particular, the fact that he said that previously the Committee for State Security had given him information on one of the leaders of the democrats, naturally information in a negative vein, gravely compromising material. This was just information, not a document. Knowing that he is human, that he likes sensationalism very much, and that he was prepared to go anywhere for this sensationalism, they called him and said that they had prepared, found documents regarding this man. Come, and we will give them to you. He got in the car and went there, and this is precisely where this shot was fired. Only a move he made—I even went to the place this happened and looked at this railway embankment, looked at where a car could be parked there, and how this entire operation was carried out—only the movement of his body, his training made it possible for him, as they say, to come out alive. Therefore, I do not rule out this version, that precisely all of this was recorded from the phone, and documents were given to him, and once they had gotten rid of him, they would have said that the democrats killed him in order to prevent him from going on the air with these denunciatory documents. I do not want to draw historical parallels, but this is somehow reminiscent of the Kirov affair. This is why I also think that we will have to sort it out yet....

Popov Urges Adoption of Reforms at Congress

91UN0505B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[Article by G. Popov, USSR people's deputy and chairman of the Moscow Soviet: "What Should Be Done When No One Is Guilty, or Who Is Guilty When No One Knows What To Do?"]

[Text] During the course of preparations for the fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies, organizational questions are moving to the foreground. What kind of Union treaty will there be? Should the Supreme Soviet be elected anew, or should it limit itself to rotation? How should presidential authority be strengthened? What kind of central organs should there be?

In my opinion none of these questions should be answered without having decided what is most fundamental—what is it that we are preparing to change with the aid of an organizational mechanism, and how? For this we need to answer the main question: What is the program of reforms in regard to the three main spheres—the economy, politics, and the national system?

Indeed, in order to decide whether or not to sign the Union treaty, we need to know why we are doing it. It is one thing if it is for the sake of the center's right to establish new taxes, which will tie our hands still more, and it is another thing if it is so that the center may conduct general monetary reform across the entire country, which will give everyone a stable currency and help all of us in our efforts to get out of the crisis. It is one thing to think about the Supreme Soviet as an organ

which has spent weeks working out the paragraphs of the Law on Pensions and imposing its rulings on the republics. It is another thing to see in the Supreme Soviet the democratic opponent of a quite timely and necessary strengthening of presidential authority.

Therefore, on the threshold of the congress, I would like to spend some time on a subject that has not been duly moved to the foreground in the draft of the congress agenda: The existing programs of perestroyka and the program which the country's democratic forces may propose to the congress.

Over the past two years three programs have been proposed in the name of the center. First, the program of the USSR administration. Second, the Gorbachev-Yeltsin program. Third, the program of the president adopted in October 1990 by the USSR Supreme Soviet entitled "Basic Directions."

The administration's program. As everyone knows, the USSR administration was formed, in essence, before it had set forth a program of action. Freed from pressure on the part of the deputies, the administration found itself in the meantime under pressure from the apparat, and naturally could only propose the apparat's version.

In fact, everything turned out still worse. The administration did not even work out an apparat's version of perestroyka. It seems that for its own part the apparat did not want any changes, even those corresponding to its own interests.

In December 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies approved the administration's version despite opposition from the Interregional Group. Questions of working out the details of the administration's program were transferred to the Supreme Soviet. There something inconceivable began: Some of the administration's laws were adopted and some were rejected. The fight between the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the administration of the country looked like a tragicomedy. They fought over those measures of the administration which the administration had logically proposed on the basis of the general administration plan which those same deputies had approved. The administration believed that once the plan was adopted all of its component parts would also be accepted, including the increase in prices. The administration was stunned by the deputies' vote against something that was an integral part of the general program approved by the congress. But, while torpedoing specific portions of N. Ryzhkov's plan, at the same time the deputies could not vote for the resignation of the administration. After all, they had approved both the administration and its program.

In short, the main sections of the administration's plan for perestroyka were not adopted.

A crisis arose: They were not allowing the administration to function, and they would not ask for its resignation.

The Gorbachev-Yeltsin Plan. This plan took shape in the bowels of the USSR Council of Ministers or, more accurately, in the commission of L. Abalkin. After a series of changes, the plan moved to the Russian Federation and received the support of B. Yeltsin.

Then, instead of the USSR Council of Ministers plan, M. Gorbachev proposed that a general plan of the USSR and Russia be created. Work was begun on a joint plan, which received the symbolic title "The Gorbachev-Yeltsin Program." Then the name "Shatalin-Yavlinskiy Plan" appeared. Nor did the changes cease: Soon not only Yeltsin but Yavlinskiy disappeared from the title. Any roots leading to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] were eliminated from the title of the plan.

I would not spend so much time describing the changes to its name if a more serious process did not lay behind it. What is this process?

The "500 days" plan never was a plan of the democrats. From the very beginning that plan was a compromise between apparatchiks and democrats with a bias on the side of the apparat. By bias, I do not mean the propagandistic way it is formulated (the depiction of measures according to weeks). The problem lies elsewhere. All the most important questions, such as privatization through redemption or free of charge and the political superstructure (a Soviet system or a democratic republic), were either ignored or were glossed over in the "500 days" plan. The question of how denationalization of the land would proceed was also glossed over. The question of radical monetary reform as a decisive condition of the democratic road to a market disappeared entirely. As did the question of party ownership of property.... In short, from its very beginning this plan was a compromise, something that is quite understandable. The "Democratic Russia" faction in the Russian legislature was not a majority, and after all B. Yeltsin was elected with a very small majority.

Under these conditions, only one path was realistic: To put forward a plan of perestroyka that suited not only the democrats but the apparat as well, and in this fashion unite the Russian legislature for work and overcome confrontation.

It is no accident that the president of the country understood the compromise nature of the 500 days plan and decided that the example of Russia could become a model of compromise for the entire country.

But compromise between the Russian democrats and the Russian apparatchiks is one thing, and achieving a compromise between radicals and the apparat at the level of the USSR is another.

The administration of the USSR began to fight the Gorbachev-Yeltsin plan. Not only did the administration refuse to take part in designing it, but it opposed it actively and consistently.

There were two consequences. The democrats demanded the resignation of the administration, and the president began to yield to the administration and back away from the compromise plan.

One asks **why compromise did not take place at the level of the USSR?**

The problem is that the Russian apparat, which had reached a compromise with B. Yeltsin over the 500 days plan, is predominantly local. The central apparat in the RSFSR is not large or influential. Furthermore, the central and local apparat of Russia is an apparat of sectors which are under the jurisdiction of the republic and the local soviets—Group "B" sectors, agriculture, and consumer services. This apparat is more prepared for the market. It is also significant that the Russian apparat is closer to the people and the wave of public discontent hits it harder. It must be taken into consideration that the Russian apparat suffered serious defeats in the elections and had to recognize the instability of its generation, as did the victor, B. Yeltsin. All of this has created conditions for compromise in the RSFSR.

On the other hand, the apparat which has made the generally vacillating administration of N. Ryzhkov unusually strict and unyielding is the apparat of the center. It is the apparat of the Union sectors, the Union departments, and the CPSU Central Committee. In the broad sense, it is the apparat of the military-industrial complex, of centralized diktat, and of the one-party system. For many in this apparat compromise means dismissal from the posts they occupy. After all, what is a bureaucrat who is "managing" Estonia in a particular department supposed to do after the very first months of the implementation of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin plan?

The apparat of the center could only accept one plan for perestroyka—the apparat's plan. This apparat did not even wish to think about compromises.

The combination of the resoluteness of the central apparat and the indecisiveness of the Supreme Soviet preordained the failure of the attempt to adopt the compromise Gorbachev-Yeltsin plan.

The program of the president. Officially the president was supposed to present a document which would unite the draft of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin plan and the proposals of N. Ryzhkov. But the authors of both drafts quite justifiably declared the incompatibility of the drafts, and it was necessary to choose something as a basis.

I proposed that the Gorbachev-Yeltsin plan be nonetheless chosen for designing a new president's plan; but when my proposal did not garner the needed number of votes in the Supreme Soviet, it became clear that the new plan of the president would no longer be a compromise but would become in one form or another a serious concession by the president in favor of the administration.

And that is just what happened. The president's program has dozens of paragraphs concerning measures borrowed from the Gorbachev-Yeltsin program. However, the administration's draft nonetheless became the body of the president's program. The document has ceased even to be a program in its form. I believe that this has been done as the result of a political maneuver. The democrats are asked, "Why are you so worried? After all, the 'Basic Directions' does not say anything specific concerning the issues that are troubling you. Therefore you may be confident that when implementing the program, the president will do just what you yourselves believe he should. And the vagueness has been left in so that there will be less carping on the part of the 'conservatives'..." The nature of a series of provisions in the president's program may also create one more illusion—that the center has supposedly left the field of action to the republics themselves. Yes, theoretically there is much in the document that is not clearly established. It is also possible to interpret the president's program in a democratic spirit—although that would be the same as trying to enter a home using the fire escape instead of the front door. But the whole spirit of the document, it seems to me, leaves no doubt: Before us is a deeply centralist approach. As a result, implementation of the provisions will most likely take place in this same centralist spirit with individual concessions to the republics and democrats. The very first edicts have fully affirmed the bias of the president's plan in favor of the apparat.

The president's program is in favor of pluralism of all forms of property ownership, competition, free prices, a convertible ruble, a labor market, cost of labor, etc. In this sense the president's program officially sets a course for the market for the first time. It is difficult to exaggerate the positive significance of this decision. But concerning the second issue—how to make the transition to a market—the president's program has unfortunately sided with the apparat's version. Nothing is said about free distribution of state property, about the equality of the rights of citizens when it is being shared out, or about the equal right of any citizen to land. And the very brief note to the effect that there will be "a moderate payment" for a plot of land under cultivation as a garden or truck garden leaves no doubt of the apparat-style nature of the general approach.

In this fashion the president's program, from my point of view, is incomplete in the first place inasmuch as it does not contain a program for restructuring the political mechanism. In the second place, it is contradictory from the point of view of its approach to the problem of the rights of the republic. In the third place, an apparat-style transition to the market has been selected in the economic portion. In the fourth place, an inflationary model has been designated as the chief mechanism, but there are no real guarantees that we will escape from an inflationary spiral.

The apparat-style nature of the president's plan is clearly visible in the decree on price increases for luxury items. The calculation was simple: The people despise luxury,

and the country would "swallow" the decree. And along with this "hook" it will also swallow the reinforced rights of the center to set prices. I am not going to talk about such obvious things as the fact that increased prices on luxury items will compel the producer to curtail already insufficient production of consumer items and waste resources on the production of those luxury items that are most profitable for him. He will use resources that are limited as a whole to make primarily what the rich people need—a way that is profitable only for the possessors of money.

But the involvement of the money-holder does not end there. After all, paper money is a dangerous thing to save. And the decree puts gold, rugs, crystal, and other items able to act as "treasures" up for sale. The jump in prices on these objects today and the growth of state income in paper money will hide the main thing: The rich, including the mafia, will own gold and crystal instead of paper money. In a year the money will depreciate. On the market gold will cost 10 times more even than that increased price which has been currently set. And those who buy gold at the increased price today will be still richer tomorrow.

At first I thought out of naivete that the authors of the plan did not see this side of the matter and that they were only worried about immobilizing the paper bank notes that they themselves had printed. Therefore at a meeting of the Council of the Federation where the president's program was being discussed I opposed the sale of gold. Academician A. Aganbegan said that he did not remember the draft of such a transaction at all. I had to show him the page. It was decided to remove that paragraph from the text. Judging by the published president's program they did in fact remove it, but in practice they are hurrying to implement just that same proposal.

Therefore, I am now completely convinced that this was an attempt to ascribe this action, which is so necessary to operators on the shadow economy, to the president personally. And when it did not succeed, they tried to put it into effect anyway. It is clear that those who have accumulated packets of bank notes need it very badly. Incidentally, no one has indicated anywhere how much the state expects to win by this increase in prices and whether the game is worth a candle.

On the whole the current president's program is not able to provide an agreement between the center and the republics or between the apparat and the democrats which could unite the country for a common retreat away from impending catastrophe. Therefore it is so important for the democratic forces to propose their own program for perestroyka to the fourth Congress. What, as I see it, should the democratic version of perestroyka over the coming two or three years be like?

In regard to the economy, here it is important, it seems to me, to stress the points where the approach of the democrats differs from the approach of the apparat.

In the democratic program private ownership of property is not a counterweight to other forms of property but rather something primary in regard to them, even if the share of private property by itself is not large.

First, the right of each citizen to his share of state property is defined, and only later will different types of collective property be formed from these shares—joint-stock property, cooperative property, etc. In the same way, private ownership of land is defined at the beginning, and only afterwards does registration of kolkhozes [collective farms] take place and any other amalgamations of what their members own.

In the apparat's programs collective property exists as something independent and not as the sum of the private investments of the members of a cooperative or, for example, of a leaseholding collective. With such an approach, the participant in a collective enterprise remains closer to a hired laborer than to a proprietor.

In the democratic program each citizen does not simply have the right to his own portion of the state property in the production reserves and in the state land reserve. It is important that his share be defined according to a plan that promotes equality and takes labor into account: Either per "head," or per single worker, or per each year of labor contributed.

In the apparat's programs the shares of state property accruing to a single person are different. Instead of equality, privileges are established for some people and limitations are set for others at the whim of the apparat. The largest share of property goes to the leaders of the apparat themselves.

In the democratic program each worker not only receives an equal share of property but he receives it free, without having to purchase anything.

The apparat's programs stipulate various payments (lease, purchase, etc.) upon the receipt of property for the mass of rank-and-file citizens and a virtual gift for the apparat itself.

In the democratic program, any demand for privatization is a basis for commencing a process of denationalization. In the democratic process of denationalization, after the first such demand from any citizen the wishes of those who currently work at a given piece of property—the collective of a factory, store, etc.—are first ascertained. But if members of a collective do not wish to become proprietors or put off making a decision, that property is quickly auctioned off to all who wish.

In the apparat's programs, on the other hand, everything is handed over to the apparat for review.

The democratic program stipulates quick monetary reform in order to cut the nascent market off from the money of the mafia and the CPSU, and in general from all money that has been printed in profusion by the

apparat of bureaucratic socialism to cover up its errors and has been circulated without any ties to the results of labor.

An upper limit of immediately exchangeable money will be declared, such as the amount of the minimum subsistence level for two months, and later—an upper limit of money registered on a savings passbook (for instance, the amount of a person's general wage over all the years of work plus a sum that is justified by documentation). Of this total, each month the investor may receive payment in the new money amounting to the minimum subsistence level, and the entire remaining portion—two years after the beginning of the reform. All payments begin to be made in the new money. Almost immediately the new money can be converted in part at first and then fully after several months.

The apparat's programs are trying to leave today's currency in circulation at any price in order to preserve even a portion of the power of the apparat which has printed it and disposed of it.

In regard to the national system, if we talk about what should go into a democratic program for resolving the national problem and defederalization, then the first thing is to ask whether we should conduct perestroyka jointly or separately. Should we decide the question of secession from the USSR now or some two or three years later, limiting ourselves for the present to declarations from the republics in regard to upcoming secession and declarations from the center in regard to its agreement with these decisions?

There are many arguments to the effect that it is easier to carry out perestroyka jointly. But mistrust in the center in general and in its ability to conduct democratic perestroyka justifies thoughts about secession from the USSR. An additional factor is the desire to have one's own model of democratic change responsive to the specific needs of the republic and one's own responsibility prior to unification, even though it may be a democratic unification.

Therefore, it seems to me that we must: **First,** recognize the right of the republics to decide for themselves which path to choose. **Second,** make all the republics equal in rights, without dividing them into Union and autonomous republics. **Third,** find a correspondence between the rights of the republics and the center such that the interests of the republics have priority, and let them decide for themselves what rights to delegate to the center. **Fourth,** clearly establish the fact that in two or three years those who have already decided to leave the Union as well as those who come to the same decision after that time period may secede. **Fifth,** establish the priority of the rights of the center in those spheres which the republics have themselves ceded to it. And on the whole, agree that we will come out of the abyss together—in accordance with a program that has been coordinated in the interests of all.

The program of the national structure should be adopted first inasmuch as it will otherwise be impossible to design economic and political programs; they will be blocked by ethnic conflicts.

Political reform. The most important thing in the democratic program is overcoming the absolute power of the soviets and de-sovietization. At the level of the republics that have remained in the Union this means the election by their population of presidents and legislatures. At the local level—democratically direct elections by the population of governors, mayors, and elders, and the election by the population of consultative and supervisory municipal councils [zemstvos].

It is important [illegible] create an independent judicial power.

Reform of the electoral system is also needed for elections over this two-year period. I propose that voting should be done according to party lists. There should be a quota principle (no less than five percent of the votes of the electorate) for the inclusion of candidates from parties on the list for balloting.

In the democratic platform I want to emphasize: the special powers of the executive authority during the transition period, subordination of the secondary elected executive leaders to their superiors, and full depoliticization of the military and the law enforcement organs.

It is very important to note that without reinforcing the executive power along the entire vertical from top to bottom, there is no sense in talking at all about the transition period.

The main thing in the political reform is the readiness of democrats to accept a number of temporary limitations on democracy (and on the rights of the republics and the local organs) for the sake of traveling the path of democratic change and for the sake of implementing the democratic version of perestroyka.

Once various types of property ownership, markets, and new classes of society and their parties have appeared, the conditions will be created for the formation of a normal democratic mechanism.

In this fashion, a democratic program of perestroyka is formed over a transition period lasting two to three years. And on the whole it proceeds from the idea of the preservation of the USSR as a unified object and subject of perestroyka but with due observance of the sovereignty of the republics which have decided to preserve the Union for the transition period.

It seems to me that it is premature to decide the question of the more distant future right now.

If the fourth congress adopts the democratic program of reforms, then the democrats in the center, in Russia, and in the other republics would be willing to compromise: a coalition with the apparat under the leadership of the

president. With all the rulings that result from it: on presidential power, on the Supreme Soviet, and other measures.

The essence of the compromise is simple: The leadership is yours, and the program is ours. However complex this compromise may seem, it is the sole way out of the current situation in which the democrats cannot implement their program and the apparat cannot implement its—there is no support among the masses. The apparat will bring strength to the coalition, and the democrats will bring the trust of the people. This coalition will also restore the trust of the West in our country.

We spoke out in favor of a left-center coalition several months ago—as soon as the will of the majority of the voters became apparent in republic and local elections. The apparat is joining different versions of such a coalition at the local level and it has joined a coalition in Russia and in a number of the other republics. But the apparat at the center objects, clutching at its privileges. Precisely because of the unwillingness of the central apparat to join such a coalition, the crisis is growing into a catastrophe. If the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies cannot create a coalition either, the country can look forward to difficult times.

From the editorial board: The fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies opens tomorrow. We are certain that the discussion will encompass opinions which are different from the those of the author. We will try to present them to the readers as well. It is only a pity that not all the readers will see them. Muscovites, for example, will not be reading the article by the chairman of the Moscow Soviet at the newspaper display cases: Moscow has adopted a ruling to display only VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, KURANTY, AND ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA....

Deputies' Votes on Union, State Name Noted

91UN0594A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "The Deputies Vote: To Be or Not To Be the USSR"]

[Text] **In Favor of a Federation of Equal Republics**

Even as some allegedly "independent" publications are delightedly relishing news which they themselves have manufactured to the effect that "along with the indissoluble Union" "'socialist choice' is finished," the USSR Congress of People's Deputies adopted a very significant decree, perhaps the most important one, at the morning session on 24 December.

Let us return to that startling moment when chairman A.I. Lukyanov said:

"The secretariat has passed along a reminder that Deputy Pribylova, in the name of the female deputies, introduced a proposal to put a question to a roll call vote: Who is in favor of preserving the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics fully guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of people of every nationality?

"I put this question to a roll call vote. Who is in favor? Who is opposed? Who abstains?"

Results of the Voting

Quorum for adoption of a ruling—1120
In favor—1657
Opposed—20
Abstained—61
Voted—1738
Did not vote—72
Ruling adopted.

Results of the Roll Call Vote

Opposed: Sh.A. Amonashvili, A.V. Bakurzdze, V.G. Bernashvili, Yu.A. Bogomolov, Yu.R. Bovars, G.Z. Burbulis, R.T. Gerasyak, A.V. Demin, A.O. Dobrovolskiy, A.M. Yemelyanov, V.N. Zubkov, A.I. Kazannik, V.S. Klibik, I.S. Kudrin, D.V. Pavlychko, G.M. Petruk-Polik, R.N. Fedoriv, S.G. Shapkhayev, A.V. Sharonov, A.V. Eyzan

What Will Our Country Be Called

Discussion of the name of our country began long before the congress and has been taking place in the press, in the labor collectives, and practically in every family. That is because we are all affected by what kind of country this will be and the political choice it will make, and these things have been reflected in its name in the past. But too many people have declared themselves "the gravediggers" of the country and of the choice it made on 17 October and then on 30 December 1922. As a result, discussion of the name of the country has burned with new strength at the meetings of the congress. There have been numerous proposals. Here are a few of them:

A.G. Zhuravlev: "I propose that we give back to our desecrated fatherland, whose citizens were our fathers and grandfathers, its historical name. It was a Russian state, and therefore I believe that our fatherland (and we have already voted in favor of its remaining united) should be named as it was formerly—Russia. And I request that Father Pitirim give us a Christmas blessing in this sacred endeavor."

Yu.V. Blokhin: "The constituent congress of the All-Union Association of People's Deputies at all levels of 'Soyuz' which took place on 2 December 1990 adopted a ruling to raise the question at the congress of preserving the name 'Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.'"

A.A. Sobchak: "I support the proposal of those who believe that a special vote is necessary on the question of the name of the Union. And I should add that I support the name proposed by Academician Sakharov—The Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia."

A large group of deputies proposed that the congress vote in favor of preserving the name Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; the proposal was put to the vote.

To preserve the name: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Results of the Voting

Quorum for adoption of a ruling—1120
In favor—1365
Opposed—189
Abstained—170
Voted—1724
Did not vote—73
Ruling adopted

Results of the Roll Call Vote

Opposed: S.E. Avtorkhanov, A.P. Aydak, T.M. Akramova, N.M. Amosov, Kh.G. Andreyev, Yu. E. Andreyev, I.A. Andreyeva, G.A. Arbatov, S.T. Arystanbayev, G.N. Afanasyev, P.A. Akhunov, Yu.A. Barashkov, L.M.G. Bashirova, M.A. Belikov, N.P. Belous, V.N. Belyayev, N.G. Bobritskiy, O.T. Bogomolov, S.V. Boykov

B.V. Bondarenko, G.G. Borovikov, O.P. Borodin, V.M. Brovkin, G.E. Burbulis, V.V. Bykov, Ya.Ya. Vagris, L.F. Valentinov, S.V. Vasilyev, S.G. Vasilyeva, Yu.P. Vlasov, V.A. Volkov, A.I. Vorobyev, Yu. I. Voronezhtsev, V.I. Voskoboynikov, G.I. Vyatkina, S.A. Gabrusev, M.M. Gayda, G.P. Gidirim, V.A. Gontar, A.T. Gonchar, A.V. Grib, R.T. Gromyak, V.A. Gubin, B.V. Guliy, B.V. Gustov, V.V. Davitulkani, N.A. Demakov, A.B. Demin, M.I. Demchuk, A.O. Dobrovolskiy, Ye.D. Doga, Yu. V. Drunina, V.D. Dubnikov, M.G. Yevtushkov, A.S. Yezhelev, B.N. Yeltsin, A.F. Yemelyanenkov, A.M. Yemelyanov, G.I. Yeremey, V.F. Yermakov, V.A. Yerokhin, A.V. Zhuk, A.G. Zhuravlev, I.I. Zaslavskiy, A.A. Zakharenko, A.A. Zakharov, M.A. Zakharov, I.I. Zbykovskiy, V.P. Zolotukhin, V.N. Zubkov, V.P. Zuykov, V.V. Ivanov (482d territorial district), V. Vsevolodovich Ivanov, N.V. Ivanov, V.S. Kabakov, V.V. Kadannikov, A.A. Kazamarov, A.N. Kazannik, V.M. Kalinichenko, S.B. Kalyagin, S.B. Karaganov, V.Ye. Karepin, L.P. Kartashov, Yu.F. Karyakin, Yu.N. Klepikov, L.A. Klimentova, L.A. Kononenko, S.I. Korneva, V.N. Korneyenko, V.V. Korobkin, V.A. Korotich, N.N. Koryugin, V.I. Kostenko, A.G. Kostenyuk, V.M. Kotlyakov, Yu.S. Kotov L.S. Kudrin, A.P. Kudryavtsev, R.A. Kukayn, G.L. Kurdyumov, Ye.A. Kutepov, M.F. Lavrinovich, B.M. Lapshov, D.S. Likhachev, V.A. Logunov, V.M. Lopatin, K.D. Lubenchenko, D.A. Lunkov, Ye.D. Maltsev, A.M. Mambetov, E.P. Mamedov, R.Kh. Mansurov, A.D. Menshatov, A.V. Minzherenko, I.I. Misuna, K.M. Moldobasanov, N.V. Molotkov, D.V. Moroz, B.G. Mukhamedzhanov, L.I. Mukhtarov, A.A. Mylnikov, A.F. Nazarenko, K.V. Nechayev, G.F. Novikov, A.M. Obolenskiy, V.M. Orlov, P.D. Osipov, A.D. Oskin, A.V. Pavlov, N.N. Panov, A.A. Patrakhin, N.Ya. Petrakov, G.M. Petruk-Popik, S.V. Pilnyakov, T.A. Poluentova, S.A. Popadyuk, G.Kh. Popov, M.M. Prusak, A.G. Pfeyfer, V.I. Romanov, Yu.V. Romanov, A.I. Rusanov, V.G. Russkikh, G.S. Russu, Z.K. Rustamova, Yu.A. Ryzhov, N.S. Sazonov, K.M. Saidov, L.N. Sanduliyak, Yu.B. Setkin, I.N. Sidor, V.S. Smirnov, D.G. Smirnov, I.M. Smorodin, A.A. Sobchak, V.I. Sokolov, R.Kh. Solntsev, Yu.B. Solovyev, Yu.Yu. Sorochik, I.D. Spasskiy, S.B. Stankevich, V.K. Stolbukov, S.M. Tashev, V.M. Timchenko, V.A. Tikhonov, S.N. Tkachenko, N.I. Travkin, A.V. Trofimov, V.I. Trofimov, G.S. Turabov, N.D. Tu-ov, M.I. Umarkhodzhayev, R.K. Usmanov, Kh.A. Faziyev, N.V. Fedorov, S.N. Fedorov, V.L. Fomenko, K.A. Kharchenko, A.V. Tsalko, V.A. Chelyshev, K.S. Cholokyan, G.Kh. Shakhnazarov, Ye.V. Sheyn, G.N. Shipitko, N.P. Shmelev, A.A. Shchelkanov, N.N. Engver, V.N. Yarovshenko, A.Z. Yastrebov

Political & Social

Shevardnadze MOSCOW NEWS Interview Cited

LD030111589l Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1045 GMT 3 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 3 Jan (TASS)—"Eduard Shevardnadze has noted that the decision on his resignation was in no way determined by his relations with Mikhail Gorbachev," says the Soviet weekly MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, the first edition of which came off the presses today. On 20 December, the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry made a statement about his resignation at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

During a conversation held on the eve of the New Year with MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI's editor-in-chief, Eduard Shevardnadze said "the Soviet Union's current foreign policy course has borne its fruit—relations based on a balance of interests and mutual partnership have begun to become established." The USSR foreign minister is also convinced, however, that "if the country's destabilization continues, and the process of democratization comes to a halt, then it will become impossible to pursue the previous foreign policy course." MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI singles out the Soviet foreign minister's words concerning the real possibility of dictatorship emerging in the USSR: "I feel that if it proves impossible to pull the country out of crisis, then dictatorship is inevitable."

Where, then, does the minister see the way out of the crisis? First and foremost, the newspaper says, in uniting the democratic forces and in overcoming inertia. While Shevardnadze believes that the establishment of order and discipline in the country is "vitally necessary," he is "not certain that either presidential rule or any other kind of punitive sanctions, from wheresoever they may be directed, can be the means for resolving the current problems." "No, it is not in any kind of dictatorship that one must seek the way out, but in the development of elementary order within the framework of democracy and legality," the weekly quotes the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

The newspaper says that in the New Year, Eduard Shevardnadze intends to work on establishing an association on foreign policy problems, which would undertake the analysis and prognosis of international issues.

Warns of Dictatorship

AU0201164491 Paris AFP in English 1630 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, Jan 2 (AFP) — Outgoing Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze again warned in an interview published Wednesday that "dictatorship" is looming in the Soviet Union and said current foreign policy would become "impossible" if political reforms were suspended.

"Everyone agrees that the country is in crisis, that chaos and anarchy are approaching. I think ... dictatorship is inevitable," Mr. Shevardnadze told the weekly MOSCOW NEWS.

"If the destabilisation of the country continues and if we suspend the process of democratisation, the pursuit of current Soviet foreign policy will become impossible," he added.

Mr. Shevardnadze resigned in a shock announcement on December 20, saying the Soviet Union was headed for dictatorship.

A Soviet parliamentary official has since said the Supreme Soviet may not accept his resignation until late February.

Crisis Threatens Detente

AU0201172591 Paris AFP in English 1714 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, Jan 2 (AFP)—Outgoing Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said Moscow's policy of detente would become "impossible" if current political upheaval in the Soviet Union continued, in an interview published Wednesday [2 January].

Mr. Shevardnadze also repeated the warning he voiced when he dramatically announced his resignation two weeks ago—that dictatorship was looming. Food shortages, he said, were creating a climate that favoured a violent takeover.

"Everyone agrees that the country is in crisis, that chaos and anarchy are approaching. I think...dictatorship is inevitable", Mr. Shevardnadze told the weekly MOSCOW NEWS.

"If the destabilisation of the country continues and if we suspend the process of democratisation, the pursuit of current Soviet foreign policy will become impossible", he added.

When Mr. Shevardnadze announced his resignation in the Congress of Deputies, the full parliament, on December 20, he said it was in protest against "the approach of dictatorship".

A parliamentary official has said the Supreme Soviet may not accept his resignation until late February.

President Mikhail Gorbachev had bitterly criticised Mr. Shevardnadze's shock announcement, saying he "panicked".

However in the MOSCOW NEWS interview, Mr. Shevardnadze said the move was "not at all the result of an emotional outburst", but "to warn the deputies and the Congress of a real danger".

He said stepping down had been "maybe naive, but honest".

Mr. Shevardnadze, formerly a key ally in Mr. Gorbachev's programme of political and economic reform, said he favoured law and order, but he strongly opposed imposing a state of emergency in some parts of the country, as many conservatives, including Soviet military officials in the Baltic republics, have urged.

"I do not think that the future introduction of a presidential administration—or any other punitive move, wherever it comes from—can resolve the current problems", Mr. Shevardnadze said.

The current crisis, he added, stemmed partly from the fact the authorities had stopped doing their usual work and instead spent their time in endless meetings. "We pass laws that no one implements. And today the person who finds himself in the most difficult situation is the president...he has lots of problems".

Food shortages, Mr. Shevardnadze said, were helping to create fertile around for a violent coup.

"If it is established that goods are not lacking but that they are just not getting to people, if there is constant talk of sabotage and speculation...this means we should go all the way and bring in rationing cards", Mr. Shevardnadze said.

Radio Cites Interview

LD0301110991 Moscow World Service in English 1000 GMT 3 Jan 91

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze has said that if the Soviet Union is not pulled out of its crises a dictatorship is inevitable. The Soviet foreign minister was giving an interview to the paper, MOSCOW NEWS, the first press interview after his sensational statement of his intention to resign.

If the process of destabilization continues while the process of democratization comes to a halt the former foreign policy will be impossible to follow, Shevardnadze went on. The development of events may lead to a

repetition of what happened in Tbilisi or in Baku. What kind of new thinking can we speak about then?

He noted that his resignation move was probably a naive but honest attempt to alert the deputies and tell the congress about the real danger. Shevardnadze sees the way out in uniting all the democratic forces, in overcoming the state of inertia. He said he rejects violence or punitive sanctions wherever they may come from.

Asked about his plans for this year, the Soviet minister said he wants to set up a foreign policy association that would analyze and forecast international problems.

Speculation on Shevardnadze Successor Noted

91UN0584A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by A. Vasilyev: "A Man for Smolensk Square—What Is Being Said in the Corridors of the MFA"]

[Text] It is a dreadful pity that Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze is retiring. But it would be a hopeless task to entreat him to stay. Shevardnadze understands full well that if he remains at his post, he will simply not be taken seriously. And this would indeed put an end to the political future of Eduard Amvrosiyevich. Without a doubt, an individual with such experience and intellect could never be just an extra on the political stage. He will still say what he has to say, but not as minister of foreign affairs. We can only hope that this matter will move along as swiftly as possible, and think about who will replace Shevardnadze in Smolensk Square.

In choosing a candidate for the next minister of foreign affairs, M.S. Gorbachev must take into account external factors—how Washington, Tokyo, and Riyadh will see it—as well as domestic considerations—the reaction of various political forces in our country.

The president's words that he wished to offer Shevardnadze the post of vice president provide every justification to believe that certain changes in foreign policy have taken shape in the Kremlin. The vice president is, roughly speaking, the president's deputy and should Eduard Amvrosiyevich agree to such a position he would remain in the shadows. It is not difficult to notice that the new power structures thought up by M.S. Gorbachev imitate to a significant extent the political diagram of Washington. And when we recall just what position U.S. Vice President D. Quayle occupies in the present American administration, as well as the role of G. Bush in the Reagan administration, we can guess what fate was in store for Shevardnadze. Apparently Eduard Amvrosiyevich understood this himself, insofar as not long before the start of the congress, in responding to journalists' questions as to whether or not he would agree to becoming vice president, he answered with a firm no.

I believe that appointment of Ye.M. Primakov to the ministerial post would be seen primarily connected with the confrontation in the Persian Gulf. How would the White House relate to his candidacy? What would they think in the Arab states that are presently opposing Iraq—Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for example, which together with the Kuwaiti Government have just decided to extend credit to the Soviet Union in the amount of $4 billion?

In my view, M.S. Gorbachev should take into account the existing image of Ye.M. Primakov, even if this does not correspond with reality. But a place will apparently be found on the president's future team for Yevgeniy Maksimovich, and it cannot be ruled out that it too will be connected with foreign policy. After all, a security council is being created. If again we recall the United States, the President's national security adviser sometimes plays a more meaningful role in international affairs than the head of the State Department.

Let us say that M.S. Gorbachev takes all of this into account and intends to send a clear signal for world public opinion: that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union will remain unchanged. In that case the main office in Smolensk Square may be occupied by someone from the corps of professional diplomats. I will venture three names—Yu.M. Vorontsov, A.A. Bessmertnykh, and V.F. Petrovskiy.

Yuriy Mikhaylovich Vorontsov, experts believe, is a world class diplomat. He has worked in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the United Nations, and as a counselor at the embassy in Washington. He served as ambassador to India and France, and provided the foreign policy "cover" for the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. Today he serves as the USSR permanent representative to the United Nations.

Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh is Americanologist number one, having spent his entire diplomatic career dealing with the United States. His candidacy may emerge with the overall course of the Soviet Union towards rapprochement with the United States.

Appointment to the ministerial post of Yu.M. Vorontsov, A.A. Bessmertnykh, or V.F. Petrovskiy would confirm a course towards professionalization of the diplomatic service. For Vorontsov and Bessmertnykh, like other highest-ranking diplomats, were directed from deputy ministerial posts to functional positions abroad—not in exile, but in order to fortify basic areas of Soviet diplomacy. Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy remained in Moscow to facilitate the development of humanitarian cooperation with the West.

Internal political factors might interfere with these appointment, however, in particular the desire of M.S. Gorbachev to calm right-conservative forces to whom we owe the retirement of E.A. Shevardnadze. Then the president will want to concentrate his attention on someone not connected with "the actions of Shevardnadze," someone who does not wear the crown of thorns—"superintendent of perestroyka"—but who is at the same time well versed in international affairs. In this

case, it seems to me, Gorbachev will turn his attention to two other candidates—V.M. Falin and A.S. Dzasokhov.

Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin has a great deal of experience in diplomatic work. In 1950-1951, he served as an adviser with the Soviet Control Commission in Germany. In 1971, he was appointed ambassador to the FRG, where he served until 1978. This is a factor of no small significance, considering our relations with the united Germany. In 1988, he became director of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. In July of this year, Valentin Mikhaylovich was elected secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Aleksandr Sergeyevich Dzasokhov was elected member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the same plenum, entrusted with ideological matters. He, too, is no newcomer to international politics. For several years he worked in the Committee of USSR Youth Organizations, then in the Soviet Committee for Solidarity Among Countries of Asia and Africa. In 1986, he was appointed ambassador to Syria. The fact that Dzasokhov has experience working in the parliament as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs may draw attention to his candidacy.

But a prediction is a prediction—it may or may not come to pass. An individual no one expected may arrive at Smolensk Square. After all, the appointment of Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze was at one time an unexpected event for all...

Executive Powers Threaten Perestroyka

AU0201221191 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 2100 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Interview with Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev, "chairman of Scientific Council of the USSR Foreign Ministry and member of the Academy of Sciences," by Christa Derting, place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The session of the Congress of People's Deputies ended in Moscow last week. At the meeting, President Gorbachev vested his office with enormous new powers by amending numerous points of the Constitution. We asked Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev, chairman of the Scientific Council of the USSR Foreign Ministry and member of the Academy of Sciences, what consequences this congress will have for further development in the Soviet Union. He sees the chances of perestroyka currently in the following way:

[Dashichev] The chances of perestroyka have declined. This is clear. This is a result of Gorbachev's mistakes, of his omissions, and of his half-heartedness during the past five years. Gorbachev pursued an appeasement policy toward the conservatives, thus providing them an opportunity to consolidate power. The economic problems resulting from inactivity and the introduction of the market economy have led to the current crisis.

[Derting] Do you believe that democratization will continue after the session of the Congress of People's Deputies?

[Dashichev] I believe that democratization will be strongly impeded by introducing authoritarian power. The new powers that the president received as a result of this congress are too big, and they restrict the rights of the republics. This is very dangerous. If the republics refuse to accept the new union treaty, acts of violence may occur. If there is bloodshed or a civil war, the union will certainly collapse.

[Derting] In 1956, the Soviet Army invaded Hungary against the backdrop of the Suez crisis. Do you see the danger that, in the event of a war in the Gulf, the Soviet Army might intervene in the disloyal republics this time?

[Dashichev] I believe that Gorbachev is currently considering the use of force. However, I strongly doubt whether this will lead to a solution to the problems. In addition, I also doubt that the Army will serve as an instrument to suppress the people. The Army has also undergone changes. The leadership of the Army, the old guard so to speak, the marshals and senior generals are very conservative. But the younger officers are very democratically minded. I am not sure whether the soldiers would fire shots at the people.

[Derting] Do you think that we can expect a continuation of Soviet foreign policy as pursued under Shevardnadze now that the foreign minister has resigned?

[Dashichev] I believe that there will be changes in our foreign policy after Shevardnadze's resignation. This is clear.

People's Deputy Fears Return to Authoritarianism

PM0201163591 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 51, 30 Dec 90-06 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by People's Deputy Lyudmila Arutyunyan: "Back to Authoritarianism?"]

[Text] Why didn't Armenia send its delegates to the Congress? Not because it has decided to head for full independence like Lithuania or Georgia and won't take part in the affairs of "another state". Not even because the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been unsolved by the USSR government for three years. This is simply one of many reasons. Underlying them is something that simply cannot be ignored: the country clearly veers to the right, leaving unfulfilled the hopes and ideas aroused by reform.

This can be seen in what is being said, in personnel changes and in various measures which have been taken. The demonstration of unity in the slogans "No to Private Property", "No to Breaking Up the USSR", "Time To Enforce Order and Discipline" would not augur any toughening of the regime were they not accompanied by attacks on democratic leaders. Calls for order would not

make people worry if today's numerous problems could be resolved within nascent democratic structures, rather than by the revival of the old structure. Yes, a food crisis can provoke spontaneous riots, but the teams of workers supposed to track down the culprits are an institution of the command system, not of sovereignty of the people, as some would like to think.

Yes, the "war of laws" has landed us in a legal labyrinth from which no exit can be seen. But presidential decrees unsupported by an executive mechanism and which ignore the absence of such a mechanism can only be tools of authoritarian rather than democratic rule. Yes, if the tight knots of ethnic conflicts are not hacked apart they can only be unraveled through agreement. However, the concept of a new USSR now being suggested to us retains the old hierarchy and thus takes away people's hope for equal partnership.

The most worrying thing is that central authority is moving to the right without perhaps knowing this. It seems to be yielding to popular sentiment. As if it is making just one step back to stabilize the situation, promising to make two steps forward at a later date. But this is impossible—once authoritarian structures are brought back to life, they start to dictate logic and method to politicians.

Authoritarianism is an integral system that recognizes only force. We started to dismantle this system and have even implanted democratic institutions in it. But democracy is based on the power of law which can't be bolstered by the force of authoritarian power. The latter uses different methods of decision making, different principles of coordination, different priorities of values. Both systems can only try to supplant each other, they cannot exist side by side.

Two years ago we elected the representative bodies—the parliament and the Congress of People's Deputies. But this does not signify that both are now bodies of democratic power. Their authoritarian nature shows in the voting mechanism, which ensures that those in the minority always lose, and that excessively broad powers are acquired by others without any consent from the Republics. The very fact that the current Congress of People's Deputies can be held in the absence of five so far Union Republics (the country has failed to recognize the sovereignty of four of them) is proof of the Congress's authoritarian power, capable of suppressing all democratic processes. If the principle of authoritarianism prevails in other issues as well, no military coup would be required to revert to the things we have been trying to renounce in the last five years.

The danger of a right-wing coup is terrifying in that it is not perceived by the people as a danger if it is accomplished without violence, under the banner of "ensuring law and order". Advocates of "the strong hand" take offence, saying they don't have in mind Stalinist socialism. But they forget that authoritarianism can only mean hierarchical power and a hierarchical state.

The Congress could stop this process by recognizing the USSR's crisis, naming the main reasons for it and trying to find ways out of the crisis by considering the interests of the people rather than using the mechanical force of the majority. If that were so, it would be sensible to take part in the Congress—we would be on the road towards democracy, not backwards to a "bright future".

Comments Abroad on 'Dangerous' Situation at Home

TA261212490 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 26 Dec 90 p 1

[Report by Yosi Leibowitz]

[Excerpts] Tatyana Krasova, who heads the Israeli desk at the USSR Academy of Sciences [name and title as published], does not rule out the possibility that several Soviet Army officers may attempt to assume power by force. "I would very much like to believe that a military coup will not occur, but we must understand that the situation in the Soviet Army is also very difficult and that radical streams and powers do exist, some of which are liable to pull in that direction," said Krasova. [passage omitted]

According to her, the resumption of diplomatic relations "is not as remote as you think." She stresses that upon her return, she will warmly recommend that the ties be resumed "because this will have an impact on the entire Middle East and enable the formulation of a mutual security model for the sake of both the countries in the region and of the USSR as a superpower with influence on the region."

Krasova does not believe that the Soviet Administration will dispatch troops to the Persian Gulf if war breaks out. "Because of our domestic situation and the involvement in Afghanistan, we have a fear of sending soldiers to a foreign land and, I believe, no one will take the responsibility for such a move."

Krasova says openly that the situation in her country is dangerous. "The prevailing mood in Soviet society is one of fear and panic. This is a dangerous mood. Personally, I am not afraid, but the situation is extremely complicated and dangerous. The people are tired of the constant shortage of basic foodstuff and other staples. I am certain that Gorbachev is the Soviet people's only hope today."

According to her, the USSR's main problem at present is the weakness of the central administration. "Gorbachev has powers. The question is whether he will be able to use them. This is what the future of perestroyka depends on."

Replying to the question of whether it is possible that the aliyah wave will cease, she said: "Nonsense, no one can curb or stem the Jewish emigration. The right to emigrate is part of the new arrangement. Personally, I am very sorry that so many fine and skilled, educated people are leaving my country. I feel hurt, but if a person

chooses to leave, I have no right to prevent him—and I would not even try." [passage omitted]

Ryzhkov Health Said 'Satisfactory'

PM0201212391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jan 91 Second Edition p 1

[Item from "Round and About" column of TASS, INTERFAX reports: "Rumors Unfounded"]

[Text] As an INTERFAX correspondent has been told in government circles, rumors spread in recent hours about a sharp deterioration in the health of USSR head of government Nikolay Ryzhkov are unfounded. His state of health is satisfactory and his psychological state is "pretty cheerful." As is known, Nikolay Ryzhkov suffered a heart attack a few days ago and is in the hospital.

Highlights of Yanayev Interview

LD0301120191 Moscow TASS in English 1147 GMT 3 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—Gennadiy Yanayev agreed to run for the post of Soviet vice-president, because to say "no" would have meant that he rejected the president's policy, "which is not the case", he said in an interview with the GLASNOST newspaper, published here today.

Yanayev was elected to the post by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies last week. He stressed that he "recruited himself to support perestroyka as soon as it began".

Yanayev believes that he was elected to the vice-presidency as a result of the political struggle that "is under way in society and influenced the congressional session".

"The question was: Will a communist be vice-president or not, a communist with definite views?" He said, adding that his first response to Mikail Gorbachev's proposal was negative.

Speaking about his view on the country's social and economic development, the vice-president said that he opposes "shock" methods to revitalise the economy and mass unemployment.

He supports the idea of holding a referendum on private land ownership, crucial to any decision on "which social system will be in the country".

Yanayev believes that "in principle, private property is possible in some industries in the USSR and on a limited scale", for instance in the service industries. But this form of ownership must not "exceed five-ten percent of the total volume of the national economy," he stressed.

Yanayev said that he is married, has two daughters and one grandson. His hobbies are soccer and ice hockey, which he plays two or three times a month. He likes classical literature.

He is paid 1,200 roubles per month as a member of the Soviet Communist Party Politburo. According to Yanayev, nothing was said about his salary as vice-president.

Paper Profiles 'Calm, Confident' Yanayev

PM0301101391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by N. Andreyev under the rubric "Names and Events": "The Country's First Vice President"]

[Text] G. Yanayev is the first vice president in our history and the second person in our state. Hence the heightened interest in this political figure. The interest increased many times over owing to the totally unexpected nature of the candidacy proposed by the president. Various names were named conjecturally, but Gennadiy Yanayev never featured among the aspirants. He was close to the president, but not so close as to have a key place reserved for him in the new system of executive power.

G. Yanayev's biography is typical of those people in our country who have linked their destiny with public work from their youth, moving from post to post in the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League, trade union, and party spheres of activity. According to the comments of those who have worked with him, Yanayev is a strong, reliable functionary who firmly champions the line worked out and unswervingly implements the decisions adopted. True, some deputies regard his long career in the nomenklatura as a shortcoming. He himself, however, reckons he has been very lucky to pass through this school.

G. Yanayev has never concealed his firm adherence to Communist ideals. He once said the following at a news conference: "I have been in the party almost 30 years and have been its soldier all these years. I have always believed that I must carry out the party's assignment." G. Yanayev has always been ready to rise to the defense of the CPSU's honor and dignity. When Deputy N. Sazonov put this question at the opening of the Fourth USSR Supreme Soviet Session—"Why does the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium invite to a sitting CPSU Central Committee Politburo members who are not USSR people's deputies, when there is not enough room for the USSR people's deputies?"—and cited I. Polozkov as an example, G. Yanayev reacted like this: "I do not yet believe that CPSU Central Committee Politburo member is a common noun. I am proud to be a member of this party's Politburo." And then he commented to A. Lukyanov: "...Comrade Chairman, I would ask you to intervene when people insult the party and insult individuals who must on no account be discussed, so to speak, here."

Responding to a foreign correspondent's suggestion that G. Yanayev's appointment marks a return to Brezhnevism, he himself provided this explanation: "I attended my first political universities under Stalin. I started work

under Khrushchev and continued under Brezhnev. So it is incorrect to identify me with the period of stagnation or any other period. I consider myself a man of perestroyka." He points out, however, that big mistakes have been made in the course of it. The first was that illusions were sown that problems which had been accumulating over decades could be resolved in two or three years. The second, in his opinion, was the inaccurate diagnosis: "Gorbachev resembled a surgeon who put the patient on the table and opened him up, thinking to perform an operation for appendicitis, but found cancers already growing inside." Nevertheless, G. Yanayev is optimistic: "We have good groundwork and good foundations. And if we do not ruin it with more speeches, if we work, we will succeed in stabilizing the country in the next few months."

In his new post G. Yanayev could get to fulfill his own proposals, which he advanced while chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. At one sitting of the Supreme Soviet, for example, he proposed adopting a law on employment: "In this law the state must assume the duty of providing a job for all who want to and are able to work." And now, in his new post, he will get to assume that duty himself. And not just that duty—the vice president will share responsibility for the country's fate on a par with the president.

G. Yanayev did not approve of Shevardnadze's action at the Fourth Congress and sharply disagreed with his assessment of the political situation: "I cannot share my friend Shevardnadze's viewpoint that a right-wing, repressive coup is maturing in the country. I am absolutely convinced that we will continue the process only within a political framework. Nothing else is tolerable."

People's Deputy K. Lubenchenko worked with G. Yanayev on the commission on Crimean Tatars. Lubenchenko speaks highly of the vice president's actions in an extreme situation and notes his tolerance and his capacity for compromise. Nevertheless, in compromise and tolerance G. Yanayev draws a line and will not retreat. This is borne out by his following statement: "Under the conditions of a multiparty system, when the CPSU has acquired political opponents who are prepared even for physical violence against Communists, the thesis 'Let's live in concord' appears absurd."

G. Yanayev always has a calm, confident bearing. He was not upset by the results of the first vote on his candidacy and said: "The harder the victory, the better its results. I am sure the deputies will make the right choice."

G. Yanayev gave an unexpected reply when I asked him when Gorbachev had suggested that he should be vice president: "Oh, I wish the question were a little easier... It was two hours before the vote." He had taken the suggestion as a personal overture.

And so the first vice president has been elected. Let us hope that this will be reflected in dynamism in our domestic policy and will add vigor to economic transformation throughout our society.

Yanayev Quotes Compiled on Various Issues

91UN0610A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Dec 90 p 1

["Dossier" prepared by A. Kalinin, I. Sichka, and S. Sokolov: "The President's Right-Hand Man"]

[Text] **After repeat voting, Gennadiy Yanayev was elected USSR vice president.**

Yesterday morning, a vote was held to elect G. Yanayev to the post of vice president. The results of it were as follows: In favor—1,089, against—583.

G. Yanayev lacked 31 votes to be elected vice president.

...the circumstances, some deputies proposed: a) to count invalid ballots as those "in favor"; b) to change the Rules of Procedure of the Congress and vote again by computer; c) "to investigate those who did not vote," and so on.

Nonetheless, it was resolved to confirm the record of the vote-counting commission.

Following this, M. Gorbachev once again nominated G. Yanayev for the position of vice president. The "opening" of the ballot boxes indicated that 1,237 people's deputies supported the president's candidate.

FROM THE KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA DOSSIER

On Deeply Personal Matters

Finally, about deeply personal matters. After a conversation with the president of the country, after—I will be frank—reflecting poignantly on the offer which was made to me, I cannot say that I spent a sleepless night and dreamt a pleasant dream during this sleepless night. I did not dream. However, I indeed spent a very difficult night because I had to make a choice. I made my political choice six years ago, and I do not intend to give it up. This is why I would like to say what Davydov said in "Virgin Soil Upturned": If you elect me, it is your right; I will plow at night with a lamp, but I will plow one and a quarter desiatins [measure of land equal to 2.7 acres].

(From a speech by the candidate vice president on 26 December 1990)

On Shevardnadze Resignation

...neither the president, nor the prime minister, nor the minister of foreign affairs can be held hostage by the congress or the Supreme Soviet.

I am prepared to support only that segment of Burlatskiy's resolution (in particular, it was proposed not to accept the resignation and to state that a dictatorship will not be allowed to occur—editor) which proposes that the

congress make an absolutely unambiguous statement: The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is correct and irreversible.

(From a statement at the Fourth Congress on 20 December 1990)

On Ethics

Comrade chairman, I would ask you to intervene when insulting the party and insulting particular individuals is at issue.

(From a statement at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 10 September 1990)

On the CPSU

...As a Communist who has belonged to the party for almost 30 years, I have always considered it the supreme law for myself to serve the interests of the party and I have gone where the party has sent me....

(From an interview given to the newspaper TRUD in conjunction with his being elected a Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in July 1990)

On Trade Unions

At present, the trade unions hold a position in our society which is new in principle. They have stated that they are independent of all political structures, parties, and the government. Combining, for example, the post of AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] chairman with work in the supreme organ of party leadership is inexpedient.

(From a statement by G. Yanayev at an AUCCTU plenum on 17 July 1990)

On the Market

We are in favor of introducing regulated market relations only on the condition that a system of "social shock absorbers" in the form of legal, economic, and social guarantees are built into our economy.

We are categorically against the position of a number of representatives of economic science who propose to completely give up the guaranteed right to work and deliberately maintain unemployment at a certain level as a means to pressure employees and to increase the intensiveness of their labor and the degree of exploitation.

(From a statement by G. Yanayev at the Eighth AUCCTU Plenum on 18 April 1990 which elected him AUCCTU chairman)

One Month Later

"Some quote-unquote 'reformers' just plain ignore the world experience of transition to a market economy whereby this period sometimes takes decades and includes a complex and effective mechanism for protecting the populace against the market."

THEREFORE:

The USSR vice president exercises individual powers of the USSR president on the instructions of the latter and fills in for the USSR president in the event he is absent or it is impossible for him to discharge his responsibilities.

(From Article 127-4 of the USSR Constitution).

Federation Council To Discuss Federal Budget

LD0301112791 Moscow TASS in English 1114 GMT 3 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Ivan Petrov]

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—The Soviet Federation Council, including top national and republican leaders, is to meet this afternoon, reliable sources told TASS.

It will be the council's first meeting after the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies last month transformed it from an advisory body under the president into an agency the decisions of which are binding and provide the major mechanism for coordinating centre and republic [words indistinct].

It is most likely that today's meeting will discuss federal budget estimates for 1991. This explosive issue nearly disrupted the final stage of the congress, when Finance Minister Valentin Pavlov revealed that the Russian Republic, the largest of all, had decided to slash its contribution to the national budget.

Commenting on the situation then, President Mikhail Gorbachev told the congress that if the Russian approach was adopted, "all republics will have to change their revenue mechanism".

"Each will then live according to the principle: Save yourself by any means you can manage. This will mean the breakdown of not only the economy but of the entire Union," Gorbachev argued.

The congress supported him, reiterating that "the plan and budget must be formed according to the supremacy of federal laws over republican laws. It also recommended that the Federation Council examine the situation in the beginning of January.

MOSCOW NEWS on Establishment of New Party

PM0201164091 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 51, 30 Dec 90-6 Jan 91 p 7

[Article by Sergey Mulin: "The Party of Entrepreneurs"]

[Text] The Free Labour Party was established in December 1990 by Academician Vladimir Tikhonov, people's deputy of the USSR and President of the Russian Entrepreneurs' Union Artem Tarasov, people's

deputy of the Russian Federation. The party's political committee is chaired by Moscow co-op owner Igor Korovikov.

Structure: The party has 1,085 members. A total of 35.5 per cent are self-employed professionals, the rest are co-op members, entrepreneurs and businessmen. The party's leaders expect membership to reach between 15 and 20 thousand in a year's time.

Political Credo: Anti-communism and economic liberalism. The main principle, as proclaimed in the party's rules, is a mixed economy and equality of all forms of property and entrepreneural activity. The party's main objective is to fight monopoly in the Soviet economy, which in certain industries is as high as 98 per cent according to the Rossika Social Research Centre (a joint venture of the Social-Democratic and Free Labour parties).

Allies: The Free Labour Party appeals to common sense. It plans to cooperate with independent trade unions, but not the Federation of Russia's Free Trade Unions, or the Socialist Trade Unions. Characteristically, the deputy chairmanship of the political committee has been entrusted to Leonid Solomin, the leader of the independent Kazakh trade union Berlisu (Unity). In Kazakhstan, 150,000 co-op members have established their independent union as alternative to the Union of Kazakhstan Cooperative Societies which is closely tied to the Republic's leadership. According to Free Labour Party analysts, the strongest attack against the cooperative movement might be expected there in the near future. Unions, like Berlisu, are being established in other Central Asian Republics.

Comrades-in-arms: The Free Labour Party maintains intimate and confidential contacts with the Russian Social-Democrats, in spite of their sharp political differences. Proposals for a merge have also come from Arkadiy Murashov's liberal faction of Russia's Democratic Party and from Viktor Aksyuchits' Russian Christian Democratic Movement, as well as from Mikhail Astafyev's Party of People's Freedom (or Constitutional Democratic Party).

Legislation: The Free Labour Party's attitudes are quite clearly defined in its programme. Private ownership of land without the right to buy or sell it is utterly condemned because it prevents inefficient farmers from going bankrupt. Other existing laws on property, both Russian and all-Union, contain too many reservations. The Free Labour Party regards economic freedom as the basis of all civil liberties. Private property is sacred and must be protected by the state. Hence the party's support for the new draft Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Threat of Nuclear Arms in Collapsing USSR Viewed

PM0201164291 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 51, 30 Dec 90-6 Jan 91 p 12

[Article by Yuriy Pinchukov: "15 Aspirants for a Nuclear Legacy?"]

[Text] The world is looking upon developments in one of its two superpowers with mixed feelings. Uncertainty about the future state system in a country covering one-sixth of the Earth's surface engenders various forecasts, including those which envisage the worst imaginable outcome: loss of control over Soviet nuclear weapons, even to the point of seizure of nuclear arms and control systems by warring groups, irresponsible leaders or others.

Hopefully this will never happen. However, it is evident that possession of nuclear weapons may well become the subject of internal political debate before long. The fact of the existence of nuclear weapons in the country restricts the spectrum of possible state systems suitable for the future Soviet Union. This circumstance calls for a strong "centre" authorized to use nuclear arms under conditions of a military emergency. Central control over nuclear weapons—at constant standby during peacetime—inevitably restricts certain functions of the local and regional authorities. Authorities controlling nuclear weapons must also control the entire armed forces, as well as foreign policy, i.e., all aspects of national security.

Totalitarian states strive to acquire superweapons, the possession of which inevitably encourages imperial ambitions, even in democracies. Perhaps the nuclear arsenal imparts additional stability to the command-and-administer system by preserving the legitimacy of control by the central authorities and the defence department over the ICBMs and other nuclear-arms carriers deployed throughout the country. This in addition to the control of the nuclear infra-structure network, including systems of control, communications, missile-attack warning and space monitoring, armed forces related to the nuclear forces and also branches of the defence industry, research organizations and testing facilities "catering" for the nuclear arsenal.

The USSR central government has no territory of its own, therefore the issue about the deployment of nuclear weapons may become critical when the new Union Treaty is negotiated. It will be impossible to simply delegate all national defence to the Union authorities without specifying the most important aspects, i.e., those relating to the issue of nuclear weapons. The USSR Supreme Soviet Defence and State Security Committee believes that the new Union Treaty must give the Centre the nuclear-arms prerogative, while nuclear-arms infrastructures must be deployed on the territory of one or several sovereign states within the Union. But this approach can hardly be productive, since political-economic relations between the Centre and the Republics are unstable.

I think that "dual nuclear control" agreements between the Centre and individual Republics having nuclear means deployed on their territory might be a more plausible alternative. In this case the Centre's sanction for the use of nuclear weapons could not be effective without specific consent from the head of state of the

Republic concerned. Similar agreements exist between the USA and its NATO European allies.

Such partial "decentralization" of the nuclear prerogative would impart additional stability to the existing mechanism of control over nuclear weapons in a situation fraught with the loss of central control over nuclear arms. But it would entail sharing weapons out among the Republics. No one Union Republic except the Russian Federation, perhaps is capable of ensuring the safe functioning of even a small portion of the nuclear arsenal amassed in the USSR unaided. In order to maintain a powerful and sufficiently invulnerable nuclear deterrent, a country must possess vast territory and unhampered access to the sea for nuclear subs, as well as an atomic industry. Otherwise the safety provided by nuclear arms would fail to fulfil their function as a deterrent and would be regarded by neighbouring countries as a provocative factor undermining international security.

Delegation of a part of the nuclear prerogative to the sovereign Union Republics would enable the latter to more actively contribute to the development of the Union's nuclear strategy, as well as to the process of international nuclear disarmament and the slowing down of the international nuclear race. This would lead to the introduction of the elements of democratic control over nuclear arms in this country.

Centrist Bloc Criticizes Fourth Congress

LD0201200891 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] A plenary session of the centrist bloc of political parties and movements was held in Moscow today. A statement of the centrist bloc on the results of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies was adopted. It says: The progress of the Congress and its results do not change the assessment of the country's political and economic course formulated in the bloc's manifesto of 15 November. This course remains indefinite and unconstructive, and is essentially deadlocked. Intensified presidential power and the congress' failure to adopt a specific program to get the country out of the crisis is none other than a movement along the path of restoring the administrative command system.

Changes in Composition

LD0201210391 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 2 Jan 90

[Text] A plenary session of the centrist bloc of political parties and movements was held in Moscow today. Voronin, chairman of the bloc, informed those present on certain changes in the bloc's composition. In his words the bloc now has eight principal members, including the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union and the Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces, and 11 observers, including the deputy group Soyuz, the Soviet Peace Defense Committee, the democratic movement in the CPSU, and a number of others.

Some of the observers, Voronin told an INTERFAX correspondent, will in time become principal members of the bloc. During the plenary session a statement by the centrist bloc of political parties and movements was adopted on the results of the work of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Voronin informed correspondents present that Olenik and Nishanov, members of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of Nationalities, often participate in the bloc's work at its invitation.

Registration of Political Parties Begins

LD0201161591 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] The registration of political parties and public associations has started. Thus, after seven decades, the country is again returning to an immutable democratic norm—a free functioning of various political parties and movements in society. A special service that has been set up at the Ministry of Justice is carrying out the registration of parties, movements and organizations seeking an all-union, inter-republican, or international status.

Registration Ends in 'Failure'

LD0201174191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1640 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 2 January. (TASS)—The first practical step in the emergence of a multiparty system in the USSR has ended in failure. The registration of political and public associations seeking to operate at inter-republican, all-union or international levels, which began on 2d January, has proved abortive.

The USSR Justice Ministry department specially created for this purpose, and heading by a 44-year-old member of the CPSU, V. Zhbankov, has already received six written and 16 verbal applications from representatives of various organizations. However, the head of this department told the TASS correspondent that the Justice Ministry cannot begin considering them since all the applications were incorrectly submitted.

The head of the department also disclosed that a special briefing on this subject will be held shortly for representatives of public associations.

Kryuchkov Television Address Criticized

PM0201163491 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 51, 30 Dec 90-6 Jan 91 p 4

[Article by Len Karpinskiy: "Write to Us, Brothers, Write..."]

[Text]

Public denunciation to Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB, on Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the USSR

I listened to your penetrating televised talk with the people last week with a feeling of tremendous joy. A

surge of patriotic excitement was aroused in me—and not in me alone—by your call to "all honest citizens" urging them to refer to the KGB whenever they learn anything "about encroachments on the socialist state and socialist system". At long last. Otherwise honest citizens would have felt miserable: sitting idle and threatened with the total loss of all skills. In the meantime the democrats have been raging—life has been made impossible by these "destructive forces". But it seems life can take its normal course again now, thank God!

Only one thing is not quite clear. You told us that you spoke on instructions from the President, but, I believe, this citizen "encroaches" more than anyone else, which is why he has long deserved, to use your metaphor, an "adequate reaction" from respectable bodies. I would like to inform you, if you don't already know, that in the period since April 1985 alone he has, according to my estimates, declared on at least a hundred occasions that he considers the perestroika unleashed by him to be a veritable revolution, not just decorative repair to the old social edifice. But what did Lenin teach us? He taught us that a revolution was a "breakdown in the most fundamental respects" so that "as little as possible" should be left of the old.

There is no need to go far to find compromising material. Only quite recently, addressing the leaders of the country's state-owned enterprises, the President wholeheartedly admitted the limitations of the strategy initially proposed by him which boiled down to partially modernizing the planned economy. Very soon he started speaking about privatization and transition to the market. And the ball started rolling...It rolled as far as the recognition of private ownership—with reservations, it is true. But, after all, the type of ownership is exactly what determines the social system. Ask our best political economists—they can prove it. Once we accept the sale of state property and change the type of ownership, it means that we modify the social system.

And look what this person has done to our formerly indomitable class ideology. The priority of universal human values imposed by him has essentially relieved our citizens of ideological responsibility. And thereby he has disarmed the wonderful army of security officers able, with the help of penetrating biographical particulars, to determine in a couple of minutes "who is who", whom he is descended from and what he can be admitted to. Don't you see, esteemed Chairman of the Committee, that it is pluralism, especially political pluralism, that has primarily played havoc with our social and state system? After all, it used to be essentially monolithic and unitarian.

As a result, we are giving free rein to our vital Republics. As everyone remembers, these were as supple as a glove prior to Gorbachev. Very aptly you called this "the Soviet people's state unity". One colony would indulge us with cotton, another with tea—that's the way we lived.

Quite correctly you point out in your address the sinister role of "foreign special services" and "different foreign organizations" engaged in secret warfare against the soviet state. Who opened state frontiers to our foes, who permitted herds of agents to penetrate our country in the guise of businessmen and tourists and snap up our secrets by setting up joint ventures and other spying projects? By building every possible kind of "bridge" and making our society open, even open to uncontrolled exchanges with Western countries (people's diplomacy—sic!). Gorbachev and his team have essentially turned the "secret warfare" waged against us by individual special services into open warfare, with the participation of most of the West.

How many of our citizens have betrayed the Motherland and rushed abroad and how many, staying at home, have betrayed it mentally, beginning to doubt the incomparable advantages of the social and state system bestowed on us? Isn't this a means of undermining it? How can we defend the system now that nobody is afraid of mixing with foreigners? Plus those dissidents whom our glorious security people once strived to kick out of the country, but who now either return or visit us with their lectures and their literary lampoons.

Gorbachev has methodically destroyed and continues to destroy the clear-cut picture of the world consisting of two opposed systems. How should we live now? What must we do with the economy, three-quarters of which has been organized as a military-industrial complex? How can we safeguard our citizens' military-patriotic mentality against corruption? Gorbachev's feigned protests against "attacks on the army" are totally ineffective when plans have been made, in the guise of so-called conversion, to destroy the military-economic fortress of communism. It's good that Ryzhkov's patriotic government has been putting up stiff resistance to the realization of this unholy (surely masonic) conspiracy. And Gorbachev keeps on going off abroad. What does he whisper about over there with the leaders of imperialist states, behind closed doors? I don't know, do you?

Now about the fundamental principles of the state system. When replacing the police-barracks from the government with a law abiding one and to place representative authority above rule by fiat, Gorbachev encroached precisely on these basic principles. True, today he seems to have decided to correct himself by creating remarkable new executive powers. However, can we be sure that the president will change his mind and use these powers to neutralize the malicious democrats and strengthen our tried and tested ministries, instead of using them for the benefit of the market and the sale of state property? This Gorbachev is capable of anything. And our system may collapse as a whole.

Dear head of state security, I can't say everything in one denunciation. I and many others still have a lot to tell you which could be of interest. But in your televized address I specially singled out the part which guaranteed "quick and objective consideration of citizens' calls to

the KGB on these matters". If you keep your promise, I can imagine what an avalance of appeals will flood in.

Television Official on 1991 Program Changes

OW0301050791 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1900 GMT 26 Dec 90

[Interview with Marina Nazarova, a staffer in the Program Planning Department of Central Television, by station announcers Vladimir Beletskiy and Natalya Andreyeva, in the studio—live; from the "120 Minutes" program]

[Text] [Beletskiy] Good morning, once again. Unfortunately, it is not often that we have guests. However, today our guest...

[Andreyeva, interrupting] Particularly television workers on our program.

[Beletskiy] Yes, that is doubly rare. With us is Marina Nazarova, from Central Television's Program Planning Department.

[Andreyeva] We have many questions to ask Marina. I believe that what she will have to say will interest you. To begin, Marina, how is a Central Television program prepared?

[Nazarova] Viewers probably have no idea how complicated a process it is to prepare a program, say, for a week. Figuratively speaking, it is like a mosaic: each item must have its place so that it all comes together.

[Andreyeva] Even I, who have been working for many years, am still amazed at how you manage to calculate things, put things on, and provide variety.

[Nazarova] Each program, every transmission must take place, and only then can a complete week of television take shape. This applies both to the First and the Second programs, to Central programs, as well as to the Orbita and Dubl programs.

[Beletskiy] What are the peculiarities in the preparation, precisely, of the Dubl and Orbita programs?

[Nazarova] Well, the editor puts this mosaic together, so that on a particular day we can open the paper and see what there is to watch in the near future, next week.

Differences between programs, of course, exist, because, theoretically, the Orbita and Dubl must repeat the basic Central Television program, allowing for the time difference in the targeted region. In practice, it is difficult to achieve this at times for many reasons. Basically, and probably most important, is the availability of live telecasts necessitating amendments to the daily or weekly plan as a whole because very often it is simply impossible to show this or that telecast on the same day, forcing us to transfer it to the next day. Conversely, when it is possible to do this, we have to upset the daily schedule, so as to give Orbita program television viewers the opportunity to see a live telecast.

[Beletskiy] Excuse me, I will interrupt you. Our viewers often write and complain, they reproach us in fact, that they have to view some kind of second grade programs.

[Nazarova] Of course this is not so. This is not so because often Orbita program television viewers find themselves in an advantageous position...

[Andreyeva, interrupting] Yes, because compared to [words indistinct].

[Nazarova] First, as concerns sports telecasts, they see it earlier and often have the opportunity to see it live. That is how it is. It is not at all like some people write, claiming that we show tapes and saying we do it badly. Now, if there is something in the program, some kind of discrepancy, it absolutely does not mean that Orbita program television viewers are treated any differently. It is simply the result of some necessity. In particular, this often happens at the editor's discretion, if we must preserve a program, a feature film, and not lose it if it is interesting. For example, I always try to keep the cartoons and programs for children, because I see how they make my daughter happy.

[Andreyeva] Daughter? I have many adult friends who cannot tear themselves away from cartoons.

[Nazarova] Simply, these are probably times that give children their only opportunity to see something, to make them happy.

[Beletskiy] Do the local television studios influence the planning of Central Television programs?

[Nazarova] Well, generally yes. This influence has become more significant recently and can be observed not only in television programming, but in other mass media such as the press. Local studios have started to appear on central television with their own big programs. For instance, this is happening on the Dubl-1 and Dubl-2 programs. A new, large, weekly public information program called Dalniy Vostok appears on Mondays, and, as it appears directly in parallel on the Dubl-1 and -2 programs, it, of course, involves amendments to the day's programming as a whole, and, subsequently, to the whole television week. I also know that certain technical intermissions are envisaged so that the local studios can broadcast their telecasts.

[Andreyeva] Marina, you have told us about what has appeared; but what else will appear, what else is being prepared for our viewers in 1991?

[Nazarova] It is a little premature to talk about it in detail, because the work on the structure of...

[Andreyeva, interrupting] What do you mean [words indistinct].

[Nazarova] It is in full swing. It can be said, however, that broadcasting time will increase considerably. As far as social and political programs are concerned, there will be a tendency to reduce the scope of social and political telecasts, but artistic...

[Andreyeva, interrupting] We now begin at 0630 [0330 GMT] and finish at around 0100 [2200 GMT].

[Nazarova] Nearer 0300 [0000 GMT] most likely.

[Andreyeva] It will now be around 0300 [0000 GMT].

[Beletskiy] Is that on all programs?

[Nazarova] It concerns, it can now be said, the first program and the Orbita programs. The volume of artistic broadcasting will increase. Films will be shown every day; large blocks of artistic information programs will be shown during the day for people who are at home. Furthermore, many features are appearing that deal with contemporary issues. There are new programs devoted to business, commerce, and advertising, such as Television Kontakt and Delovoy Kuryer [Business Courier]. As far as I know, changes also will affect your program.

[Beletskiy] Yes, it will be somewhat longer.

[Nazarova] It will increase, and so we will see...

[Andreyeva, interrupting] And the staff [sostav] will change a little.

[Nazarova] We will see, in a week...

[Andreyeva, interrupting] Of course, our viewers will suggest amendments, so please keep watching and respond. We will await your comments. Thank you very much Marina, I think it was very interesting.

[Beletskiy] Thank you. We hope that the viewers are just as satisfied with what they have heard, and that they have received a more complete picture of how the programs are compiled, particularly for those regions which are now viewing us.

[Andreyeva] They also now know where to address their complaints, to the Planning Department, and maybe to Marina Nazarova, for too often they are addressed to the program, to the announcers.

[Nazarova] I would like to take this opportunity to greet everyone on the approaching New Year, to wish everyone good health, peace, goodwill and patience; patience in your life and toward us, toward all those who somehow try to fill and organize your leisure time. Write to us, write kind letters with your wishes and reflection, so that our common task becomes better and more interesting. I wish you all success and all the best.

[Andreyeva, Beletskiy] Thank you.

Phone Tapping Policy, Practices Detailed

91UF0264A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Dec 90 Union Edition p 6

[Article by A. Illesh and V. Rudnev: "My Phone Is Ringing... But Is the Confidentiality of a Conversation Ensured in Our Country?"]

[Text] Perhaps, the idea of eavesdropping was born well before the telephone was invented. To be sure, at the dawn of the age of surveillance it was easy to avoid "a long earshot": vigilance and an out-of-the-way location guaranteed the confidentiality of a conversation. It appears that the telephone put citizens and the states' special services on an unequal footing. On the one hand, technology made the naive lower their guard by creating the illusion of confidential communication while, on the other hand, it made it possible for the "realists" to literally record half-tones in the revelations of those taking part in a conversation.

Communications were improved, and so was the technology of wiretapping. At the same time, laws were also perfected protecting the people against secret invasions of citizens' privacy by the state.

This was the case in the world. What about our country? They did wiretapping here. Does anyone have any doubt? After all, our technology was not inferior to that of others at one time, and the special services were "world-class." As far as undesirables are concerned, there was never a dearth of them. Judging by the results of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the terror of the VChK [All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage]-OGPU [United Main Political Administration]-NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]- MGB [Ministry of State Security]-KGB, the state was never known for its integrity in its choice of means.

There were only public laws "over there", in our country, there were secret instructions. They had legal guarantees of the confidentiality of phone conversations for all law-abiding citizens. We had administrative instructions protecting only the chosen few (regardless of their mutual relations with the law). In civilized countries, legal arrangements for protection against such infringements were worked out. In our country, a person "complaining" about the lack of telephone rights would have been laughed out of court...

Only in 1977, a century after the telephone was invented, did the new USSR Constitution finally proclaim our right to the confidentiality of telephone conversations. It was proclaimed a right, but our father-legislators forgot to guarantee this right (did they really forget?). An organ of state authority authorizing wiretapping was not specified. Likewise, there was no procedure for appeal in the event the Constitution was violated.

An acquaintance who worked in the Moscow Division of Criminal Investigators then became the first violator of the 1977 Constitution (at least the first known to the authors of this report).

"One day before the Constitution was adopted, we zeroed in on a gangster we had been chasing for a month. We wanted to grab him right away. However, he was behaving very carelessly, and we decided to keep following him, and to arrest the whole gang at their hideout if we got lucky. We successfully put a tail on him. It is funny to recall this, but I even managed to drink a mug of beer with this gangster and discuss the weather... We followed him for two days in Moscow. We uncovered three apartments and got the fix on a dozen of his buddies. The third day was drawing to a close. We thought that this was it, the time to take him. As we were making arrangements to apprehend him, he led us to a long-distance telephone center. We heard him booking a call to some southern city there.

"What were we to do? It was useless to ask our superiors for a wiretapping authorization: This business used to drag out forever! We went to our bosses with a report, and they sent a coded message to the KGB. Over there, they served their customers first, and only later served ours. Anyway, a militia detective had to plan a phone tapping a month ahead of time.

"Meanwhile, the gangster was waiting for his call; they had promised to put him through within an hour. We went to the switchboard operators. We persuaded them, and listened to this conversation. Incidentally, out of the entire three days of surveillance it was precisely these five minutes on the phone that were decisive in unmasking the culprits.

"After we apprehended him, I was called on the carpet. I was reprimanded for illegal monitoring rather than thanked. The switchboard operators 'spilled the beans' on me to KGB officers. The latter went to their superiors. This is how our superiors got wind of it. They said Andropov himself called Shchelokov and complained about me: He said that the constitution has only just been adopted, but that captain of yours has maliciously violated it. After all, this is what the convention was at the time: The KGB does wiretapping legally, but the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] does not..."

Let us interrupt the revelations of the detective. What does this episode suggest? First of all, it frequently becomes necessary for detectives to follow, eavesdrop, and spy. At present, it is hard to question such techniques of criminal investigation. Whether we like it or not, they have been eavesdropping and will keep doing it for a long time to come. However, our constitutional right to the confidentiality of telephone conversations is a sham given such practices. Everything depends on the resourcefulness of the detective and his affiliation with a particular "law-enforcement" organ.

So, on 12 June of this year the president signed the USSR Law "On Amendments and Additions to the Foundations of the Administration of Criminal Justice of the USSR and the Union Republics" allowing monitoring of phone communications when f...ing criminal cases. Who can be monitored? **"The suspects, the accused, or other individuals privy to a crime**(the emphasis is ours—the authors)? This is authorized either by a procurator or a court. This investigative technique cannot be used for more than six months. Finally, procedures for wiretapping and sound recording are set forth in the criminal procedure legislation of the Union republics.

At first sight, all issues have now been resolved, at least in theory. There is a special law authorizing wiretapping only with criminal cases. This is to say that upstanding citizens are safe from an illegal invasion of privacy. Investigators have finally been given an opportunity to use technology in solving crimes on their own, without turning to the KGB.

...Half a year has passed since the law was adopted. Have the calculations of the legislators been borne out? Is wiretapping helping in the fight against crime? Finally, what are our inalienable rights?

Here are the officials' answers. The Ulyanovsk Oblast Procuracy has issued two wiretapping authorizations to the militia. On one occasion this enabled the militia to unmask an organized crime group... The procurator of Sverdlovsk Oblast has only authorized such an action once... Nobody has yet approached the Procuracy of Khabarovsk Kray for authorization to monitor phone conversations... The deputy procurator of Saratov Oblast answered the question of a correspondent as follows: He has not issued authorizations and will refuse to for the simple reason that the Union law has still not been ratified by Russia... The employees of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Department for Combating the Theft of Social Property do not apply for authorizations for the same reason (allegedly). One more thing: They admit that they do not have either the technical or organizational potential for this...

There is no technical potential for wiretapping phone conversations according to a message from one of the leaders of the Sverdlovsk KGB as well. The chief of the Khabarovsk Kray KGB Administration observed: The law is not operational because "a mechanism for tapping has not been fine-tuned."

Stop! Are they wiretapping criminals after all, or are they not? If we were to follow the logic of the answers given by the officials, at present virtually nobody is wiretapped, neither us nor the criminals. What was the law introduced for then? We are overcome by doubts yet again... We put questions again and again to the employees of the militia, the KGB, the procuracy, and telephone exchanges. Once again, we hear the evasive "neither yes nor no..." Since this is the case, we will venture a journalistic version based on documents and, as they say in such cases, "our own sources of information."

The first argument of the officials is: There is no wiretapping because there is no republic law. We dare say that this is an answer for the naive! Lawyers know: There is no republic law; the Union law applies. In addition, immediately after the USSR Supreme Soviet decision on phone tapping, "Recommendations for the Use of Video and Audio-Recording Equipment, Movie and Photo Equipment, and Phone Communications Equipment, and the Use of the Results Obtained in Solving and Investigating Crimes" were sent to the heads of the law-enforcement organs of Union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, cities, and okrugs, in a word to everybody. Everything was outlined on 30 pages: Who? How? When? What for? This is a most interesting document...

The second argument: The investigators and the militia have neither the technical nor organizational potential for monitoring. Perhaps we will believe this assertion. Our data suggest: Special tapping equipment has always been concentrated in the KGB. This is precisely where all the aces of telephone control are on the payroll. They would do well to share their "wealth" with those who are on the front line of fighting crime—militia detectives and investigators. After all, as we understand it, the president signed amendments to the law precisely with this in view. Alas... On the contrary, more and more crime-control functions are being shifted to the KGB. Should we rejoice? Let them go after criminals rather than dissidents? Or should we be upset? Who is going to unmask spies then? Incidentally, there is much more talk about fighting the mafia than there is results. Perhaps, the following assertion by USSR KGB Deputy Chairman V. Grushko—"The recording of **all** (the emphasis is ours—the authors) telephone conversations at automatic telephone exchanges would be completely illegal and senseless"—is the only point with which we can agree without a doubt. Indeed, most likely the KGB will not cope with wiretapping 280 million people at once. But what about 100,000? Or is extending specific phone care to 50,000 citizens within one's resources? Who can tell...

A strange picture emerges: The law authorizes wiretapping only in conjunction with filed criminal cases. However, the investigators do not have the equipment it takes. Yet, the special services have such equipment, but there is no law on the special services which would (on top of everything else) regulate phone tapping. Therefore, the special services operated, and operate to this day, outside the law, which, translated from the legal jargon into Russian, means—illegally.

This means that our constitutional right to the confidentiality of phone conversations is nothing but a beautiful democratic slogan—a mere slogan.

...By way of summation: Several days ago, an employee of the Moscow KGB shared his revelations on this issue in the Vzglyad program. The essence of his admission was: Yes, the chekists do practice phone tapping, but within the framework of a law. However, the KGB employee failed to name the law. He could not have named it since it does not exist.

The clouds are oh so dark, especially when the protection of the rights of citizens by the law-enforcement organs is at issue.

Commission Investigates Psychiatric Abuse

91US0192A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Dec 90 Union Edition p 6

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Kornev: "Indefinite Stay in Lunatic Asylum"]

[Text] Vologorod Oblast—**The special mental hospital of Dvoryanskoye village in Volgograd Oblast is keeping almost 200 out of 600 persons behind barbed wire without justification—this is the conclusion that was reached by a commission of doctors that is investigating the institution.**

The testimony of an eyewitness. "For a month," says L. Sokolova, chief psychiatrist of the oblast, "I was unable to get over what I saw in Dvoryanskoye. This is some kind of a nightmare! It is not surprising if a person under such conditions loses the habits of articulate speech and can only mumble and breaks down completely..."

What unnerved the doctor? The inhuman situation that reigned in the special mental hospital where the court sends for compulsory treatment. The "Republic Interoblast Strict Psychiatric Observation Hospital" is its official status.

Being chief psychiatrist of the hospital, even though carried out on a community volunteer basis, is a responsible duty. Sokolova's main position is that of chief doctor of the oblast psychoneurological hospital. She has been engaged in practical psychiatry for more than 30 years. The profession gave Sokolova an opportunity to see all kinds of things, and if the procedures in Dvoryanskoye evoked such an outburst of indignation, you can just imagine what was going on there...

And the checkup began with the history of the "illness" of V. Novikov. Psychiatry is an extremely delicate matter. Therefore, I will quote the official certificate that V. Shchukin, supervisor of the Volgograd Oblast health department, gave me: "In his mental state, V.I. Novikov should not be in the interoblast strict psychiatric observation hospital, but should be transferred for further treatment to the Voronezh City routine psychiatric observation hospital."

Why to the Voronezh hospital? Because Novikov was originally brought to Dvoryanskoye from there. But if transfers are made from hospital to hospital, then how great is the difference? Tremendous! The words are similar, but the essence is incommensurable. Dvoryanskoye, we will call things by their names, is a prison. With all of its attributes. In fact, until recently, it was under the full supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and only now has it come under the care of the

RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Health. It was transferred with its entire former staff and, of course, with the procedures that became ingrained over many years.

I. Bondarenko, first deputy supervisor of the oblast health department, commented, "There are more guards at Dvoryanskoye than doctors."

Well, naturally, the area is surrounded by a high fence with barbed wire. The cells have strong bolts and peepholes. All of this "administration" was served by an Internal Troops subunit, and it continues to serve there now. Of course, now the people with shoulder boards receive their pay from the pocket of the Ministry of Health. For what? Like it or not, and whether you want to or not, you ask the question: Can the Internal Troops really support a hospital system in which a person, as L. Sokolova said, instead of using articulate speech switches to mumbling? But the people in the wards, I will emphasize, are patients! And in contrast to the usual prisoners, they are in fact deprived of civil rights. But no attention is given to their complaints (with due regard for diagnosis).

Moreover, although a person is sent here by a decision of the court, this is not considered a conviction. And no term of stay in a hospital-prison is set. It would seem to be proper: Everything depends on recovery. But in practice, there is "no time limit," and the patients are completely dependent on the personnel.

This is exactly what happened with V. Novikov. The lad had not reached 17 years of age when he was criminally charged with hooliganism and writing "slogans of an anti-Soviet nature" on monuments. Court medical experts determined that he was mentally ill. That is how Novikov turned up the first time in Dvoryanskoye in 1983. In 1987, on representations by the medical commission, the Kamyshin people's court issued a decision: to send him to a general routine hospital. But in 1989, Novikov escaped from that hospital. And, once again—Dvoryanskoye.

It is not known how long he would have had to stay there if the Volgograd Oblispolkom [Oblast Soviet Executive Committee] had not decided to verify the propriety of sending this person to the "strict regime" hospital. I have already talked about the results of the checkup.

Credit must be given to the Volgograd doctors. They not only checked up on Novikov's "sentence," but they also dug deeper. Here, in addition to the Volgograd commission, a commission from Moscow institutes was also at work. I will cite data from their findings: Two hundred out of 600 persons are in Dvoryanskoye behind barbed wires without justification!

The Volgograd Oblast health department requested that the RSFSR Ministry of Health to establish a competent commission for recertification of the entire contingent of patients of the special mental hospital. But the country has more than one such "mental institution." Of course, the question should not be oversimplified—similar hospitals also keep those who have committed extremely dangerous crimes. But there are also those who are "serving time," for example, for hooliganism.

This is a problem for specialists to resolve. But it must be resolved quickly and without participation in a statement of the diagnosis by "specialists" from the Internal Troops.

Grievances of Tent City Dwellers Unfounded

91UN0578A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
24 Dec 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by N. Krivomazov: "'I want A High-Level Position Because I Know How To Cause Cataclysms': Subjective Notes"]

[Text]**There is a new type of entertainment in the capital on Sundays. The people do not go to concert halls or even the zoo, but to the Rossiya Hotel, nearby there is a tent city set up by the disadvantaged. They have built themselves the semblance of housing here—using tarps, plywood boxes and pieces of galvanized tin—and they live in it. With the advent of winter they have added some insulation, hoarded some food; the city has detailed a special police post there. All in all, the new perestroyka "ghetto" is rich in paradox, pain, and silliness.**

To avoid being accused of prejudice, from now on I will refer to the results of the commission created by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium reviewing grievances of the people who live near the Rossiya Hotel.

The settlement emerged in the spring, the commission was created in the fall. It includes about 15 all-Union, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], and Moscow City Soviet people's deputies. The list included 157 tenants of the tent city. Only 62 lived permanently in the tents, the rest came here only in the daytime—to display a placard, to collect contributions—rumor has it up to several hundred rubles a day. Ten of these people, despite the commission's high level, refused to discuss their problems, saying that such a commission should be created under the immediate stewardship of M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, and that this commission should have the power to annul or modify court decisions, to reinstate people in their jobs, and other powers that are under the competence of completely different organizations.

What is the main grievance? The majority do not agree with court decisions on civil (labor and residence) and criminal matters. These grievances constituted two thirds of all grievances presented to the commission. Almost one quarter (31 people) disputed being diagnosed as mentally ill; 27 were appealing actions by law enforcement officials; and 15—decisions on their pension claims. There are groups that have political demands; there are quite a few who have suddenly decided to appeal five and 10-year-old decisions.

The commission came to the conclusion that the majority of grievances emanating from the tent city are UNFOUNDED. For instance, citizen R. (from Ryazan) appealed to the commission to provide him with a document certifying that "all his life there was nothing impermissible in his thoughts and actions."

Citizen U. from Krasnodar Kray, who has lived in the tent city from the very beginning, believes she can affect the weather. She claims that as soon as she is hospitalized, all kinds of cataclysms start taking place in nature. She came to Moscow because she would like to be USSR president.

At the same time, the commission did request that appropriate organs conduct additional investigation on 26 cases. Three grievances (two on unlawful dismissal from jobs and one on a criminal case with a charge of document forgery) have been found valid. At the commission's recommendation, the RSFSR Procurator's Office terminated criminal proceedings against Comrade Shemyakin; the commission's decisions have been forwarded to the former places of employment of Comrades Vakurova and Bolshakova, recommending their reinstatement.

Based on the evaluation of materials and personal interviews with the claimants, the commission concluded that the reasons bringing people to such a form of protest as setting up the tent city, are found primarily in inadequate handling of grievances in the localities, unsatisfactory resolution of people's problems with social and living conditions, illiteracy in legal matters and legal nihilism on the part of the claimants, a disrespectful attitude towards the law and the violation of citizens' rights on the part of officials.

It was said long before us that all happy people are alike in their happiness, while all unhappy ones are unhappy in different ways. Obviously, the commission drew conclusions from these misfortunes. For example, clarity is needed on the whole issue of such forms of protest as tent cities or sit-ins in state organization offices. The commission recommended that a complex of legal and organizational measures be worked out regarding the availability of psychiatric help for citizens; particularly, the adoption of a law on making such help available, and the creation of inter-departmental psychiatric commissions where citizens could come for expert evaluation on whether they are mentally ill. The country does not have social rehabilitation centers or a system of shelters where single people without residence and means of support could find temporary refuge.

There is only one conclusion that remained "outside the frame." The conclusion that nobody would dare, in any country of the world, to build a shack a few meters away from the president's residence. No law is needed for that. A couple of law enforcement officers would be enough to clear the main square in any capital. In short, here is a quote from the last part of commission's conclusions. "Considering that the majority of the demands of the persons living in tents near the Rossiya Hotel are not based on legal grounds, the commission recommends that the Moscow City Soviet return tenants of the tent city to their places of permanent residence."

'Democratic' Programs, Actions Scored

91UN0567A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by A. Bogatov, second secretary of the Ulyanovsk Rayon CPSU Committee: "Why 'Democrats' Has Been Put in Quotation Marks"]

[Text] A branch of the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR] has been created in Ulyanovsk. Its members have said that the word "democrat" should be used without quotations marks but that members of the party should refer to one another as gentlemen. By chance I managed to gain admittance, and I was envied by those who remained outside the "democratic" hall. Later the speakers, not without some grounds, accused themselves of having taken the road of the Bolsheviks and firmly shut the door after themselves. And they pointed significantly at the slogan that hung in a visible spot and disclosed one of the directives of the party's program. It read: "Personal freedom first and foremost!" Let us consider this awkward moment merely a misunderstanding.

Lately there have been more and more arguments over whom to call a democrat. When there were no democratic parties in the country, that notion objectively reflected the leftist forces. Now even those Communists who advocate serious changes consider themselves democrats.

Let us then abandon the classical definition of the concept "democrat"; but today, when democratic parties spring up in the country like mushrooms, it is hardly appropriate for the Communists to call themselves democrats, even without quotation marks.

"Democrats," including the Communists, are against an administrative system. Moreover, it seems at times that they have gone still further. But that "further" is not necessarily to the benefit of order. Their democracy borders on anarchy and chaos. Here are the words of N. Travkin, leader of the DPR: "Many democrats have declared in the past and even today declare that discipline is not needed" (the newspaper DEMOKRATICHESKAYA ROSSIYA, No. 2). That is putting it mildly inasmuch as "democrats" not only declare that slogan but put it into practice.

However that is not the main difference between Communists and "democrats." "Democrats," some openly and some in veiled fashion, call for capitalism. I wish to point out one small fact that went unnoticed by many of those sitting in the audience at the conference. The words "Constituent Oblast Conference of the DPR" were portrayed on the banner at the table of the presidium. At the ends of the cloth were the tricolor flags of

tsarist Russia. What did this symbol mean? Could the "democrats" themselves decipher it? To my mind it means that the Democratic Party repudiates the history of the Soviet people.

The "democrats" differ only on secondary questions and come together on the main thing. The DPR, like other democratic parties, was not created to oppose the "Democratic Union." The main goal of all "democrats" is to oppose the CPSU. The proof of this is their attempt to create a bloc. If they do not manage to unite themselves today, there will be a new attempt tomorrow. And there is nothing unnatural in that. Let them unite themselves. But what forms and methods of struggle do they use? Rallies, strikes, walkouts, and civil disobedience.

Undoubtedly there are many honorable people among the members of the democratic parties, people who sincerely wish for a rebirth of the country. But we are not talking about individuals; we are talking about parties and their programs and methods of struggle. For the time being none of the democratic parties are prepared to function within the framework of democracy.

Cooperation Between CPSU, Soviets Urged

91UN0575A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 51, 22 Dec 90 p 8

[Interview with O.S. Shenin, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by M. Briman, in Kransoyarsk, date not given: "To Feel the Realities of Life"]

[Text] [Briman] Oleg Semenovich, the events of recent weeks have raised the issue of the role of communists in the soviets of various levels in a particularly acute manner. The need to advocate the principled positions of the CPSU Central Committee is becoming increasingly apparent. What do you think about this?

[Shenin] The issue of "communists in the soviets of people's deputies and their mutual relations with the party committees" emerged when many communist candidates, to put it mildly, sharply criticized the party in their election platforms. Initially, this put the party apparatus on its guard and caused a hostile attitude toward them by the party apparatus classifying these people as "color-them-gone individuals." In the apparatus, they did not understand, and on many occasions did not want to understand, that such criticism was very frequently made from the standpoint of genuine socialist ideals rather than the position of anticommunism in general. In essence, some time later, at the 28th Congress of the party, such criticism was voiced quite sharply in the speeches of quite a number of delegates who had been faithful to the party and remained so.

Mutual mistrust and ambitions remained, however, and had their unfavorable effect on both sides. I must admit that even we in the Central Committee hesitated for a period of time, for example, on whether we should invite for a talk communist deputies of the USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviets. Could this be taken as an encroachment upon their independence, as an attempt to exert pressure? However, when a meeting was held, we heard the following: "Comrades, why did you procrastinate so long, what were you thinking about?" It turned out that the deputies had long felt the need for contacts with the party committees. Being human, they need advice, consultations, and a well-tuned-up apparatus to help them in their work rather than "valuable pointers." We have now created an appropriate structure in the Central Committee. This is a commission for legislative initiatives and legal work for rendering effective assistance to our deputies. It will use the best scientists, specialists on the national economy, experts in their fields. The whole point is for us to become necessary to our deputies. This is when regular work will begin. This is when party groups in the soviets will make sense and acquire authority. We are now recommending that similar structures be created everywhere.

[Briman] The decisions of the congress not only aim at a dialogue with "our people"; they demand the same dialogue with all public movements and parties not rejecting the idea of democratic socialism. To your mind, are the local party committees ready for such contacts? After all, the art of politics under a multiparty system is yet to be learned. How are they learning? In principle, is a dialogue possible given that virtually all parties are trying to score points by casting slurs upon the CPSU?

[Shenin] Let me begin by responding to the last question. Since the congress, members of the new Politburo and Secretariat have managed to visit many regions of our country. Virtually everywhere there are social forces thinking soberly enough and are seriously concerned about the needs of the people maintaining contacts with the CPSU for the good of the people. I say this on the basis of my own business trips to Moldavia, Armenia, and Lithuania.

As far as readiness for a dialogue in the field is concerned, it is difficult to give an unambiguous answer. In principle, a dialogue is a creative endeavor requiring initiative and the independent assessment of one's own region. However, to my mind, the demand to come up with instructions on all issues sounded too persistently at, for example, the last seminar of ideological functionaries held at the Central Committee. Meanwhile, the main "instruction" was given long ago by the 28th Congress of the party. As far as this meeting is concerned, I got the impression that some of the participants still live in the atmosphere of a pre-congress, intraparty discussion. They are entirely absorbed by intraparty affairs. They are just afraid to venture beyond the framework of these affairs at a time when showing that the party does not live for its own sake but for the sake of the people is necessary. One can only notice that the Politburo and the Secretariat still draw these rebukes. "Why does the Central Committee not defend the party? Why does it not give instructions to stop the persecution

of party functionaries?" This expectation of some magic words and actions by the Politburo is positive proof of the fact that some ideological functionaries still live in the past and neither understand nor perceive today's realities.

[Briman] However, Oleg Semenovich, those comrades who "fail to understand" and continuously demand instructions from on high are precisely the new people to whom great hopes of leadership were attached.

[Shemin] We have to acknowledge that new alternative elections are not necessarily capable of advancing truly new people in and of themselves. This is explained by the fact that, first of all, such elections still have not become a guarantee against all kinds of "apparatus intrigues." Second, and this is particularly lamentable, the electors themselves quite frequently had a hazy notion of the intellectual and creative standards for party leaders which our time sets.

[Briman] Where is a way out?

[Shemin] I think that complete independence does not preclude co-participation by the party committee in resolving cadre issues. However, this should be done in a way absolutely different from the old one. I am convinced that all party organizations will accept the findings of the cadre commission normally if they are based on a serious study of opinions in the field and include several candidacies rather than just one. Besides, I think that at present these candidacies should not proceed from the networking principle and what he has to say, but rather be done on a scientific basis. We must draw scientists into the process of elections even at an early stage—psychologists, sociologists, and professionals who deal with human character, intellect, and temperament, people who have mastered the modern methods of studying cadres, including Western methods. The party has such professionals. After all, we have 16 higher party schools, plus the Academy of Social Sciences. At present, we are completing a program of restructuring their activities together with the Ideological Department. In particular, we mean the creation of special structures for the study and selection of the leading cadres. I believe that given this approach, the party masses will understand that we are guided by one thing—to provide plenty of latitude for the intellectual and creative potential of the party.

[Briman] This interests many readers of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA. Do party organizations have a role to play in art and culture, and if yes, what role?

[Shemin] I do not think that this role is different in principle from the one a party organization should play at any enterprise. After all, the defense of the rights and interests of the working people wherever they happen to work is the thrust of our activities at present.

What should the issue be with regard to an art establishment? The point is for every member of the collective not to feel abandoned and to have an opportunity for creative development regardless of the open and hidden pecking orders presently prevailing everywhere in our country. In essence, it is not just respect for talent although, to be sure, is required, but respect for the personality in general, equal rights for a people's artist and a supporting actor, their equality before the law. Naturally, everyone should be rewarded according to his talent as far as titles, remuneration, and so on are concerned. However, in everything else a person honestly doing his job should be equal to any star. Who is in a position to form such a moral microclimate? I believe that only an acknowledged authority and a professional of the highest caliber, and at the same time a person for whom the communist ideas of the equality of people—equality rather than leveling—are an essential segment of his view of the world and his personal traits. I believe that this answers the question of whether party organizations are needed in creative establishments or not.

Rehabilitation of 1962 Art Exhibition Noted

LD0201234991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2137 GMT 2 Jan 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Many long years passed under the magical quotation that art belongs to the people. Life, however, dramatically overturned this banner slogan. So now one has the new reality. It is called "From the Manezh [Gallery] to the Manezh."

[Correspondent T. Mitkova] For long years we have traveled this path, doubting and believing. We have been moving along it in an effort to get to know man and art. We have travelled along it because someone should travel along it. These words were said 28 years after a routine victory of the apparat over art. Eyewitnesses recall words used by Khrushchev, unseemly to use in society. At the time in November 1962, there was an attempt to morally annihilate not just the 600 artists of the Belyutin Studio but to deny the right of existence to a whole art trend, which Khrushchev and those around him did not and could not accept. The civil execution on the walls of the Manezh led to the studio's oblivion for 28 years. The painters of these pictures are referred to as "those missing." They have had not a single exhibition or a single mention in the press in 28 years.

There were no prior publicity or pamphlets for this long-awaited official rehabilitation. The Belyutin Studio has now emerged from almost 30 years of underground work. But does this mean that the pictures of over 100 artists will become the property of those for whom they were painted?

[Announcer Dmitriy Kuzlev] We showed an excerpt from this report on our afternoon bulletin. At that time we promised a sensational report this evening. However, the exhibition has not been visited by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. He himself has not yet gone to the Manezh. He has probably decided to remain incognito for the time being. But if it were not for Gorbachev,

this present exhibition at the Manezh would not be taking place. The artists themselves at least are saying that he personally, and also Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev and Raisa Maksimovna Gorbacheva, helped with the opening of the exhibition. The sensation, however, does not lie in that.

Throughout all the 28 years of its existence the Belyutin Studio has not sold a picture abroad, hoping above all for recognition at home. Indeed, the exhibition has been held, and it is now in its third week, but we are the first to have filmed at the Manezh. Nor have newspapers and periodicals been showing favor to the exhibition.

Today an American firm offered $100 million for 2,000 of these pictures and 10,000 drawings. Will it happen that the Culture Fund, after some passage of time, indeed be presenting canvases by Belyutin Studio artists from abroad?"

Comparison of Pugo Television Speech

WA2812201790

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 7 December 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 2 a TASS report on the speech delivered by B.K. Pugo, USSR internal affairs minister, on Central Television 6 December. Comparison of the PRAVDA item, entitled "Speech by the USSR Internal Affairs Minister," with the translation of the Moscow Television Russian version published in the 7 December Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, PAGE 46, reveals the following variations.

column two, fifth complete paragraph, sentence one, PRAVDA reads: ...[Text] B.K. Pugo, USSR internal affairs minister, delivered a speech on Central Television 6 December. He said:

At the instruction... (inserting PRAVDA opening passage, picking up paragraph seven, sentence one:

page 47, column one, paragraph one, sentence one PRAVDA reads: ... decisive measures to restore order in the fight against... (subbing "to restore order in" for "for promoting"):

column one, paragraph one, sentence two PRAVDA reads: ... against organized crime, banditry, corruption, speculation, hooliganism... (subbing "banditry" for "brigandage"):

column one, second complete paragraph, sentence two, PRAVDA reads: on the quickest adoption, by the... (deleting "possible")

Economic

Official Explains Gorbachev Economic Decrees

PM0201161391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 91 Union Edition p 3

[Interview with USSR Deputy Finance Minister V. Rayevskiy by V. Romanyuk under the rubric: "Commentary on Presidential Decrees"; place and date not given: "Unpopular, But Forced Measures"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The USSR presidential decrees on creating extrabudgetary funds to stabilize the economy and on introducing a sales tax are commented on by USSR Deputy Finance Minister V. Rayevskiy.

[Rayevskiy] The common feature of the decrees is that they both have the aim of supporting socioeconomic programs adopted by Union and republic legislatures and bringing about the recovery of our finances. The measures envisaged by the decrees are simply essential if you also consider the fact that both the Union and republic budgets for 1991 are running an enormous deficit. At the initial stages in drawing them up a figure of more than 200 billion rubles [R] was cited. Several factors came into play here: The implementation of a package of social programs to boost pensions, grants, and assistance to large families—R47 billion in all—and a reduced rate of tax on profit (45 instead of the previous 60 percent), which reduces budget receipts by R28 billion.

[Romanyuk] Quite recently, when examining the draft budget, legislators criticized the government for excessive generosity toward the defense complex, for dubious expenditure on maintaining loss-making enterprises, for squandering resources on helping developing countries, and so forth.

[Rayevskiy] But yet many sectors do need support. The Union budget has no resources left for capital investment in new construction. We have invested too little recently in the fuel and power complex and are beginning to pay for this with a fall in oil production. Around R10 billion must be provided to subsidize individual republics—to level out the development of the social sphere. Even the conversion of the defense sectors, from which we hope to derive a large return, demands initial investment of many billions of rubles. As far as aid to other states is concerned, this year is it was cut by 50 percent, and in 1991 it will be reduced again—by 60 percent.

[Romanyuk] And the R86 billion which other countries owe us?

[Rayevskiy] To obtain at least part of this sum will take purposeful efforts and time. There are proposals—very interesting proposals—to sell some of the debts to third countries.

[Romanyuk] What in that case are the real sources for forming the stabilization funds?

[Rayevskiy] Deductions representing the difference between the old maximum norm for social insurance contributions and the norm adopted for 1991 form the largest and most stable source for the stabilization fund. This will be of the order of R40 billion in total. Moreover, it has now decided to channel 20 percent of allowances for depreciation into the fund. One-fifth of the resources obtained from transforming state property (privatization), which is being carried out through the resources of the population, among others, will also go into the stabilization fund. There are other sources—the increase in contract prices for output above the ceilings set for profitability, and also 50 percent of enterprises' funds directed toward buying up part of the property they employ. Some economic managers compare this operation to the taking of excess funds out of circulation that occurred in the period of the 1965 reform. There is no direct analogy here, however: Labor collectives are now becoming partial owners of fixed capital, and this is confirmed by title deeds.

[Romanyuk] Many people had a negative attitude to the possible introduction of a sales tax, regarding it as a new tax.

[Rayevskiy] It is a new, indirect tax. All deals now connected with the sale of industrial goods, consumer goods, work, and paid services will be subject to a five percent sales tax.

[Romanyuk] But we already have a turnover tax?

[Rayevskiy] In general terms the turnover tax might better be regarded as an excise tax on the state monopoly of the sale of a product. A sales tax is something else. Western Europe has adopted a flexible form—value added tax (a "net value" type); the R60-70 billion which will be raised thereby will go to cover the budget deficit.

[Romanyuk] The decrees adopted by the USSR president are "unpopular" measures. What reaction do you expect to them?

[Rayevskiy] Agreement was basically achieved with the republics during work on the questions. Most of the programs which it is planned to finance are aimed at supporting the least protected strata of the population during the transition to a market economy. Incidentally, socially significant goods and services—products for children, medicine, educational equipment, children's books and city passenger transport services—are exempt from sales tax. Measures for the social protection of the population have been envisaged in view of the introduction of this tax. All this is fine. But the agreement of all the republics enshrined in the temporary economic agreement for 1991 is required if the presidential decrees are to be successfully carried out.

Government Authorizes Currency Exchanges

LD020118269l Moscow TASS in English 1814 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 2 TASS—A Soviet Government resolution "On Measures to Form an All-Union Currency Market," envisaging the setting up of an all-Union currency exchange in Moscow and a network of republican and regional currency exchanges, took effect on January 1, IZVESTIYA reports today.

The exchange will help democratise the distribution of currency resources and strengthen the country's banking and financial systems, experts believe.

A network of currency exchanges will redistribute currency among buying ventures and will determine the ruble's real value, and subsequently lead to ruble convertibility, they say.

Only agencies that have been licensed by the state to operate with currency (authorised commercial banks, qualified broker organisations) will be allowed to trade in currency.

The exchange is a joint-stock company with controlling interest belonging to the USSR State Bank. Stock holders are the Vneshekonombank and the 15 republican banks of the USSR State Bank.

In the beginning, the Soviet currency exchange will work as a big currency auction, Aleksandr Potemkin, chief of the currency auction department of the Soviet Vneshekonombank, believes.

The major difference is that it will have mediation brokers—mostly commercial banks—who have been denied from taking part in currency auctions.

Finance Minister Denies Wage Freeze Plans

LD2912101790 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] The Soviet Finance Minister Valentin Pavlov has refuted rumors about a planned wage freeze. He explained that to take such a step would mean to make it impossible to move toward a market economy. In fact there are plans to lift restrictions on wage growth. Of course these plans must be backed up by higher production efficiency. At the same time, mandatory pay tariffs are envisaged to guarantee the subsistence level. This planned reform is part of the overall program to normalize the economy, overcome production recession, stabilize the market, and curb inflation.

NEW TIMES Criticizes Economic Mismanagement

PM0201151091 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 52, 25-31 Dec 90 pp 7-10

[Article by Simon Soloveychik: "What Is Going On?"]

[Text] What is going on? In the summer of 1990, another February Revolution, or something like it, broke out unknown to all. An end was put to the autocratic dynasty which ruled the country for decades—the Politburo dynasty, enormously rich, and omnipotent, which had made its enormous power almost hereditary: only a Politburo member could become General Secretary. Even General Secretary himself could fall prey to it. We prefer not to recall the fact that when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary five years ago, his entourage comprised men like Grishin, Romanov, Kunayev, Shcherbitskiy, Ligachev and—who else? And, yes Gromyko.

At a time when all of us "squeezed the slave out of us drop by drop," Mikhail Gorbachev was fighting this hydra almost single-handed. Now we have forgotten all about the alarmist rumours ("They are deposing Gorbachev, have you not heard?") which circulated during each Central Committee plenum and about the practice we made at one time of peeping through the window to make sure no tanks were stationed outside. Now, at long last, the all-powerful Politburo, which could swat off any reformer like a pesky fly, is no more. The dynasty has been cut short. Be that as it may, Gorbachev has performed this feat, got the better of what looked invincible and destroyed the most formidable force in our country. Everybody recognized Gorbachev's services to the world, but let us face it, making a deal with Reagan and Bush was, perhaps, less of a problem than defeating Romanov and Grishin.

This revolution, which dragged out for five years, cost the nation a lot. Where would it have landed us had it been accomplished overnight, as was the case in February 1917? The Politburo was incomparably richer and stronger than any tsar and would never have abdicated of its own free will.

Well, what is going on now? Exactly what was going on in 1917. Although "going over to the free-market economy" was not the order of the day then, the February Revolution added to the damage done to the economy by the long war. In August, 1917, wages grew threefold as compared with August, 1914, while prices soared about 500 percent. A private letter sent from Petrograd to Switzerland in the summer of 1917 was published recently. It said: "The country is broke (prices have gone crazy, the ruble is worth 25-30 kopeks, at most). The city is awfully neglected, and people are expecting the worst—a civil war, famine...." The February Revolution caused much enthusiasm, promptly followed by a rude awakening: the fall of the monarchy, freedom of speech and pluralism of the press did not make life any better. By autumn, political apathy set in, and the public began to clamour for a dictator. The magazine Novoye Vremya wrote then that the government was no longer an authority, that it had lost its moral prestige and lacked the mechanism for using force: that was written in October—in October, 1917, that is—right on the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Quite recently, as a matter of fact.... After the overthrow of autocracy, any rule seems weak.

What is going on? What we are having now is a typical case of dual power. The vanguard party is fighting rear-guard battles which are shaking the country. The democrats elected to the soviets against the party's will have no power leverage, with all the means of pressure and suppression remaining in the hands of the Communist Party, the latter is also in control of all the food supply channels and can always block them. Wherever the party is stronger, the situation is more orderly, and food supply is better; where the party is weaker, the people are worse off because, as I have already an occasion to point out, everything in our system used to work—and still works in places—on the principle "do or lay down your party card." As threats are losing their force, power is weakening, which makes the phrase like "only the party can cope" sound more convincing. The party, and the party alone. That is the drama.

Everything is too obvious to need any comment. You cannot run a huge economy like our without coercion. Coercion can be exercised by economic or "extra-economic" means. In a situation where the weakening of "extra-economic" pressure ("...or lay down your party card!") has not been offset by a proportionate strengthening in economic pressure, supply goes down all along the line. While the party is tenaciously hanging on and the democrats are mustering their strength, the clearance develops into a crack, then into a ravine, and finally becomes an abyss. Are we to retreat then? That would be like starting major renovations and then—with the old rotten-through girders removed—changing one's mind all of a sudden, and saying: "Stop it. I do not want this house repaired, after all. It looked much nicer before, and I was happy with it!"

What is going on in the economy? We are being assured that all our troubles come from profiteers, thieves, "under the counter" dealers and from the inefficient railway traffic control which has left thousands of food carloads stranded. The implication is that the answer to inadequate food supply lies in closer supervision and stronger law enforcement agencies.

Here are some statistics explaining what is going on in the country—I am quoting them from the book "Towards a Free Market" compiled in 1990 by a working group formed on the basis of the joint Gorbachev/Yeltsin decision.

Theft is indeed rampant, there is no denying that. From year to year, investigators disclose misappropriations to the tune of 200-255 million rubles. When these figures are made public on television, the viewers make indignant noises, especially if this information is accompanied by pictures of instant coffee cans stashed away by profiteers.

Here is a figure to make them more indignant still: the damage done by theft to our national economy is estimated at 5.2 billion rubles. Only a twentieth of this sum

is retrieved. It is indeed time to sound the alarm and demand more powers for the law-enforcement bodies: five billion rubles is no joke.

Here are more statistics from the same source.

Non-productive expenses and losses amounted to 40 billion rubles in 1988, according to the USSR State Committee for statistics.

The annual output of poor-quality (defective?) products is worth 110 billion rubles.

Industrial and farm product output statistics have been overstated by an equivalent of 15-30 billion rubles.

It also turned out that downright double-dealing accounts for 36-40 percent of the social product's worth, according to Gosplan. In 1989, for instance, 60 billion rubles were allocated to pensions, public education and culture, but this money was non-existent. A fictitious economy.

Now where have those 600+110+40+15, billion rubles got to? Why are they shouting from the rooftops, from morning till night, about five billion rubles being stolen, about the militia having found 250 million—but keep silent about 765 billion lost annually? The country makes three billion rubles' worth of products a day. Let us now divide 765 by 3, and we shall see that we have nothing to show for 225 working days per year. These statistics (obviously understated, by the way) explain why we all earn so little. "We cannot go on living like that," one hears people say. But can we go on working like that? We are told that the Army costs a lot to maintain. But all the money we lose could maintain a dozen armies of that size! What a waste of our great nation's effort!

What is going on? What does all this mean? This means that neither socialism, nor capitalism has triumphed in our country; this means that our country is run neither by communists, nor by democrats, rats, but by "Bolshoy Beskhoz."—wholesale mismanagement.

This concept is the pivot of our political economy and our economic policy, and the root cause of our economic dislocation which goes back much further than the onset of the perestroyka period.

Mikhail Gorbachev has performed another unrecognized feat. By persistent effort, he has taught people to articulate, at least, the word "market economy." This has taken him five years. Today the changeover to the market economy is the talk of the town. Could this have been accomplished overnight, as in some Eastern European countries? Hardly so—millions have been shot and tortured to death in this country on charges of seeking to restore capitalism. As a result, hatred for capitalism is deeply rooted in our society, in its subconscious.

The changeover to a market economy presupposes private ownership of not only land, but also of the means of production as well—without this, the free market is just a marketplace, the kind you go to for pansies. The words "private property" sound offensive to many, they have been made "immune" against this temptation. Are we in for another five years of adaptation? Shall we not turn up our toes in the process?

Private property ownership and what goes with it—hired labour and exploitation of man by man—goes against our grain. The free market economy for us? Oh, no, that is the limit! Counterrevolution! A creeping coup!

Some hasten to reassure the alarmists: come off it, take it easy! There is no cause to worry! We shall have the market all right, but without private property and without exploitation, a socialist market.

Others object: exploitation, you say? Do we not have exploitation now? Does the state not exploit the wage-earners much more heavily than the capitalists do?

These arguments are easily brushed aside. State exploitation, the alarmists say, is one thing, it is no exploitation at all, ours is a state of the entire people, but the exploitation of man by man is something else again, it makes all the difference between the two social systems, and we must draw a line at that. This argumentation is followed by more shouts of "Beware of capitalism! Beware of counterrevolution!"

We have drunk our bitter cup to the dregs, we are half starving—but we remain convinced that there is no evil worse than "exploitation", oceans of blood have been shed over this foreign word which not all of us are quite sure how to pronounce and spell, because this very word provided the justification for dictatorships, revolutions, boundless violence, for the "dispossession of the kulaks," for the GULAG. Every effort has been, and is being made, in the name of eliminating exploitation, in the name of the alleged emancipation of labour.

For all I can tell, the word "exploitation" is the bloodiest word in the international vocabulary.

What is actually going on? What we are having here is a case of deception, or self-deception. The idea of emancipating labour, proclaimed over a hundred years ago, proved so attractive that many outstanding personalities succumbed to its appeal—who did not go in for Marxism at the turn of century? It was quite some time before it transpired that so-called emancipated labour was incompatible with personal freedom, that what was supposed to bring about the emancipation of labour actually imposed double enslavement upon the working people. In his thriller called Das Capital, Marx unravelled just one mystery of exploitation—out of two, at least. Marx's teaching is omnipotent because it is true, we are told. I would rather think that Marx's teaching is impotent because it is only half true.

The notion of "exploitation" connotates two actions: (1) someone takes my earnings away from me and (2) appropriates them.

Which of these two evil acts hits the working man harder? The former one, of course, because it amounts to robbery. Who cares where the money, taken away from me, has gone to? I will never get it back anyway. That is where the problem lies! Exploitation means not only misappropriation but extortion as well, no matter where the extorted money has gone to. What only matters is that the money has been taken away.

According to Marx, labour is divided into useful labour plus surplus product.

Surplus product, as we know, is appropriated by the capitalist. Besides that, the worker spends an enormous proportion of his working time making a product which is taken away from him but not appropriated by anyone; this is nobody's product thrown to the winds.

As a matter of fact, the formula of exploitation looks as follows:

useful labour + surplus labour + labour lost through mismanagement.

Marx could not possibly notice the third variable because under capitalism it is negligibly small and tends towards zero. The exploiting capitalist is very much in evidence, with his top hat and all; but there is also an impersonal exploiter, who is invisible like a pestilential bacillus. Incidentally, the plague is a vicious killer, and in our country this third variable, which undermines the logic of Marxism, is tending towards infinity, taking more away from the worker than three capitalist exploiters could.

Generally speaking, the "Beskhoz" (mis-management) is a universal phenomenon—like entropy, it appears of its own accord if nothing stands in its way. A certain amount of "Beskhoz" is to be observed everywhere. Japanese automakers marvel at the disorderliness of American motor works.

Beskhoz' Big Beskhoz' Big Terror has been described in many works, and the number of its victims have been counted, even though only tentatively; however, no one describes and estimates the enormous masses of live effort wasted over the past seventy years.

Beskhoz is a form of exploitation, consequently, every workingman is subjected to double exploitation: by his employer and by Beskhoz. The latter form of exploitation is worse by far than the exploitation of man by man or by the state in other countries—recall the figure 765 billion. All this money has been actually expropriated!

Imagine a street with a socialist factory on one side and a capitalist factory on the other. Let us assume that at the socialist factory exploitation constitutes 10 percent (too little, but let it be), and at the capitalist factory—50 (an improbable figure, but let it be). Horrible! Those damned capitalists are cashing in on my work! But then at the socialist factory I make a 10 rubles' worth of products a day and earn nine rubles, while at the capitalist factory I make a 100 rubles' worth of products and earn 50 rubles a day.

Which of the two factories looks better to someone who says that he is for the workingman, and that the good of the people comes first to him?

As a matter of fact, a Soviet worker actually gets four, if not two, rubles - not nine—per a 10 rubles' worth of the product he makes. The state of the entire people and Beskhoz join hands in skinning the workingman alive. There is "exploitation-free labour" for you. Some people even have the nerve to defend this system of double and triple robbery, calling it socialist and, therefore, progressive.

Well, we are told, we are poor but moral, while they are rich but immoral, all they believe in is cash.

Immoral? How dare we talk about morality?

Look what is happening: crematoriums are smoking!

Whichever way you look in our country, you will see smoking factory chimneys on top of the crematoriums which are burning—day and night—human effort, muscles, brains, human flesh itself. Their smoke does not only pollute the air, it kills morality because what sort of morality can one talk about in a situation where human labour is being continuously wasted before our very eyes? Where hard-working people are turned into lazybones, and where honest men are made thieves of? The morality of the peoples is in inverse proportion to the extent of Beskhoz.

Some may object that I have got it all wrong, that all this is no news to anyone, that the party has been combating mismanagement since the early years after the revolution. They may even thrust a few quotations on me. 'We shall make an extra effort, they will say, correct the mistakes made by our predecessors, and then each worker of our socialist factories will make not 100, but 500 and even 1,000 rubles' worth of products a day because national property reigns supreme in our country, and all we have to do is disclose the advantages of our advanced and progressive social formation, socialism, because the future, as all know, is with it.

It is no use arguing with them, you will never make out your case, although the struggle they have been waging against Beskhoz over three quarters of the century is obviously of no avail—Beskhoz is steadily getting worse. After seventy years of experiments they still keep reiterating that the answer lies in promoting cost accounting, establishing order and strengthening discipline, in giving the workers material incentives, in closing the ministries (or strengthening them), in replacing the Council of Ministers by some other body, in transferring power from someone to someone else, in setting up National Economic Councils (or in disbanding them), in dividing each Regional Party Committee into two (and then merging it again), in issuing shares, encouraging people

to take land plots on lease, dividing factories into separate factory shops and then bringing those shops together again.... Other measures are suggested which have not been tried yet but which are certain to bring results.... Remember the two characters of The Golden Calf who stole cast-iron weights and sawed each in two to find out whether they were made of gold? One of the characters saw at once it was no use, but the other kept sawing, hoping against hope that the gold would glitter at last. This is about us.

So what is going on? What is the secret? Indeed, why, despite the absence of capitalist exploitation and private property, exploitation by Beskhoz, far from weakening, is growing at a runaway rate?

The secret is simple and known to all. Economists say that in our country the means of production are alienated from the workers, too; but the main thing is that the private ownership of the means of production is an important but not the only prerequisite for economic efficiency. The latter also takes the gift for investing capital in such a way as to make it grow. In Marx's words, a capitalist has to be fanatically bent on increasing cost. In his fanatical drive to keep the cost rising, Marx wrote, he unrestrainedly compels mankind to produce for the sake of production and, consequently, to develop public productive forces and to create the material conditions of production which alone can provide a real basis for a higher form of society, the underlying principle of which is the full and free development of every individual. By that form of society Marx meant communism, of course. By compelling mankind to produce, the capitalist-such is dialectics-gets mankind closer to the "higher form of society" and what is more important, puts out crematorium fires.

Hatred of capitalism has been inculcated in all of us. I, myself, have also regarded everything bourgeois and petty bourgeois as something "alien," but now we have to admit that although the capitalist is motivated not by humanism but by profit, he is more humane—for all his cynicism and greed, described in thousands of books—than those who are pompously talking about communist ideals, thus advocating Beskhoz. Their rhetoric is communist, and their hands are stained with the soot of the crematoriums where human effort is burned.

When people talk about the market, they usually think about goods. But the importance of the market lies not only in that it brings abundance, but also in that it alone can bring the kind of private businessman capable of defeating Beskhoz. A product of tough competition, this businessman will live in fear of ruination. This danger compels him to go all out in fighting Beskhoz. You cannot appoint or even elect him to be a businessman anymore than you can appoint or elect anyone to be a writer.

Why does Beskhoz reign supreme in our country? Because out of a hundred factory managers, only ten, at the most, can overcome it. All of them are selected by party committees, which prefer them to be party members, obedient and go-getting. These species have been dismissed, expelled from the party, jailed, shot even—but everything has been, and will always be, in vain. Captains of our industry are talented in their own way, they manage to survive in the system of total Beskhoz where a Western entrepreneur would have gone broke in a week. Ours, too, will prove no good as soon as we go free market—they are part and parcel of Beskhoz and are prepared to die for, and with, it. They will never put up with the free market as their recent meetings and conferences have clearly indicated. In all probability, our future industrial tycoons are now locked up behind bars. Political dissidents are already at large, and economic ones are still in jail. We are kowtowing to Western ones, and baiting our own. Such prisoners make good presidents—like Havel for instance—and company managers.

What is going on? An accursed contradiction has barred our way to normal life: national welfare can be created by the rich, and the rich are hated here. For good reason, too: most of our country's rich are frauds and thieves. Now we need the legitimate rich, i.e. those who have put their capital together by legal means.

Why not civilized cooperators? After all, they are more "socialist" and may help us do without the "moneybags." Look at all the cooperatives prospering in other countries!

They are prospering all right, but only in competition with private companies. Any cooperative depends for its prosperity on the talent of its "moving spirit." Shall we ever realize that it takes talent to amass wealth? It is impossible to write a lyrical poem in double harness any more than it is possible for a hundred or a thousand people to run a business. Hamlet loved Ophelia more than forty thousand brothers could, to which Marina Tsvetayeva's pensive comment was that forty thousand were not worth one lover.

These lines can be well applied to collective company management. An enterprise does not need forty thousand owners with "a sense of being in control"; an enterprise needs just one "lover," in a fanatical pursuit of profit.

So what is going on? Is it "down with socialism"? If the word socialism connotates production without exploitation, then the slogan "down with socialism" makes no sense because how can one refute that which is nonexistent? I wish somebody could tell me the address of at least one socialist enterprise which does not exploit its workers. In this sense there has never been any socialism on earth, either barracks, feudal, human or inhuman. All this is fiction. If an enterprise is unprofitable, then it is no enterprise at all and exists at somebody else's expense. There is no profit without exploitation.

But socialism is about maximum social justice worthy and worthily paid labour. Socialism is about ideas, aspirations, about social justice; capitalism is about

goods, things, the accumulation of capital necessary for the production of the necessities of life.

Far from being alternatives or complements to a whole, these two notions do not even overlap. They belong to different dimensions.

I am no economist and have no idea of what is to be done. Neither am I a judge, and I do not know who is to blame. In the meantime, the crematorium chimneys keep smoking, and our effort is being burned. This is what is going on.

KGB Reports Inflated Prices on Some Exports

LD2012205791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Jan 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A TASS correspondent learned at the USSR KGB's Public Relations Center that incidents of Soviet-made goods being sent abroad for hard currency have been discovered; moreover, they were purchased from foreigners for higher prices than had been received when they were previously sold abroad. For instance, enterprises in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast bought Zhiguli automobiles in Germany for 5,500 foreign currency rubles each; they were sold abroad for 1,500 foreign currency rubles each. A total of 10,000 Dnepropetrovsk-made sweaters were acquired in Hungary. Carpentry items manufactured at Dnepropetrovsk house-building combine No. 2 were purchased in Poland. Their value was 100,000 foreign currency rubles. Material on the incidents which have been uncovered has been sent to the procuracy bodies.

New 'Supertrawler' To Help Export Production

PM0301110391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 31 Dec 90

[Report by I. Fedorov, from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Fedorov] This is already the fifth modern fishing vessel built by Ukrainian shipbuilders on the orders of Leningrad Production Association fishermen.

The new supertrawler "Vechernyy Leningrad" is the sector's first ship to be equipped with a high-performance fish-processing complex. From now on, apart from the usual fresh, frozen, and canned fish, the ship's processing unit will also produce fish delicacies. This is a real step toward organizing production for export on all new ships built in Nikolayev.

The seamen are leaving for their New Year maiden voyage in a good mood.

Scientific

Salyut-7 To Disintegrate in Earth's Atmosphere

LD2912215290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] The flight of the Salyut-7 Kosmos 1686 orbital complex is drawing to a close. The flight control center and the monitoring stations on the ground are supervising the progress of the flight and carrying out trajectory measurements of the parameters of the orbit.

On 29 December, the maximum altitude of the station was 305 km, while its minimum altitude was 275 km. According to the forecast of the specialists, the Salyut-7 Kosmos 1686 will enter the dense layers of the Earth's atmosphere and disintegrate in February 1991. As it descends, the orbital complex, weighing about 40 tons, will disintegrate into small individual parts, most of which will burn up in the dense layers of the atmosphere. There are no radioactive or any other harmful substances aboard the station. Information about the precise date and the time of the station entering the atmosphere and about the likely site of impact will be published 24 hours before the event. All states on whose territory individual parts may hit the Earth will be warned in good time.

Space Station Manning, Funding Problems Viewed

PM0201100391 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Dec 90

[Report by P. Orlov, V. Dubov, and V. Dolina, from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The work in orbit by Gennadiy Manakov and Gennadiy Strekalov and also the Soviet-Japanese spaceflight were described today at a news conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center.

[Orlov] The Japanese TBS [Tokyo Broadcasting Service] company has plans for Toyohiro Akiyama to write a book about his flight. Well, that is the plan. It looks as though Gennadiy Manakov and Gennadiy Strekalov have already finished their book.

They have spent two weeks with pen and paper. Whenever there was a minute free they were surrounded by specialists asking: How did everything work, what should be changed, what can be improved?

The cosmonauts insist that two people on the station is too few. Manakov and Strekalov, for instance, were improving smelting techniques in space, but they were naturally unable to be in all the units and modules at once.

In weightlessness even bolts can work loose. God knows why, but it is necessary to keep an eye on them. Generally, this is why they slept normally only once in three days.

It emerged at the news conference that weightlessness did not suit Toyohiro Akiyama at all. Especially during the first three days, when he could not swallow any food. Rather the opposite. His bosses, having seen all the materials that he provided, are pleased with their special correspondent's work. They are also pleased with the help received from all four Soviet cosmonauts.

At today's news conference Akiyama himself took advantage of the favorable atmosphere to ask for a vacation. The TBS job is finished.

The commercial side of the project remains confidential; however, it was announced at today's news conference how the profits will be divided.

[Unidentified speaker] Fifty percent of the money will go to the state, to be paid into the budget, and 50 percent will be used by the manned flights department for its own purposes. Equipment has been purchased for sums amounting to more than $1 million—this much I am allowed to state. It is equipment for the production of disposable syringes.

[Orlov] Another three commercial flights lie ahead. But, as was stated at the news conference today, the space sector has sufficient funds only for the next three months.

The prospect of a forced vacation does not bode well for anyone. Apart from Toyohiro Akiyama perhaps. For him the flight is over. But for us?

Cosmonauts Prepare to Repair Kvant-2 Module

LD2912113290 Moscow TASS in English 1220 GMT 29 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—Soviet cosmonauts Viktor Afanasyev and Musa Manarov are preparing for an unusual Christmas, celebrated on January 7.

On this day, they are expected to work in outer space to repair a hatch of the Kvant-2 module, which caused problems for the previous expedition of Gennadiy Manakov and Gennadiy Strekalov.

"The cosmonauts are testing their space suits and oxygen containers, equipment and tools they will need during their exit to outer space," flight head Vladimir Solovyev told TASS. "They are undergoing physical training, including training on bicycle ergometers for arms muscles. They are also involved in astro- and geophysical experiments."

Cosmonauts Conduct Experiments, Test Equipment

LD0201112891 Moscow TASS in English 1051 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 2 TASS—Soviet cosmonauts Viktor Afanasyev and Musa Manarov today removed their space suits from storage and are testing the functioning of all systems on board the Mir space station.

In accordance with the flight schedule, they have begun preparations for work in outer space to repair a hatch door mount of the Kvant-2 module.

Later in the day, they are expected to measure the spatial and energy characteristics of space radiation with the help of the Buket telescope and Granat spectrometer.

Within the framework of the programme for astrophysical research, using the international Roentgen orbital observatory, the cosmonauts studied a Roentgen source in the Vela constellation.

An experiment on the Gallar installation continues to grow a monocrystal of semiconductor zinc oxide. The experiment was started on Monday.

The flight continues in accordance with the schedule. The cosmonauts are feeling well.

Murom Plant Develops Talking Home Computer

PM0101153991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0930 GMT 24 Dec 90

[Report by S. Vetoshkin; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Item begins with demonstration of talking computer]

[Vetoshkin] A computer wishing happiness and good health to all Soviet people. Production of these talking computers is currently being mastered at the Murom radio and measuring instruments plant. I find that the most attractive features of this computer are its price—750 rubles (R), the fact that it can be used in conjunction with a normal domestic television set and a cassette tape-recorder. The computer also has a most attractive name—"Christa."

Andrey Yuriyevich, you have taught "Christa" to speak. What else can it do?

[A.Yu. Samodelkin, main designer of the computer] Its applications are very wide-ranging. It can be used in industry, in schools, and in the home for purposes of reference, card-indexes, and as a music synthesizer. It is also suitable for leisure activities based on electronic games.

[Vetoshkin] That is to say its applications are wide-ranging.

[Samodelkin] Very wide-ranging.

[Vetoshkin] While "Christa" was been learning to speak, its younger brother was born at the enterprise—the personal computer "Quasar." It will cost a bit more—R1,100. But it is a more powerful machine, on which any IBM program can be used. It also produces color graphics.

Moderate prices in general are the distinguishing feature of the output produced by the Murom instrument builders. No doubt, everyone will gladly buy a stereo

radio record player for R175, or a first-rate mini stereo system for R650. And this set here is the last word in Soviet radio equipment—a stereo radio record player which also includes a two-deck cassette recorder with a memory. It can record on both cassettes simultaneously.

Nikolay Mikhaylovich, can you say something that will cheer up the television viewers who would like to have this kind of equipment in their homes. After all, at the moment not just stereo systems are not available in the stores. It is impossible to buy an ordinary radio set.

[N.M. Agapin, plant chief engineer, identified by caption] We could increase the output volumes of this equipment. But for this we need basic parts.

[Vetoshkin] And these are lacking?

[Agapin] Unfortunately, this is correct. The main plants which are hampering our work are Irkutsk, Dushanbe, and Poltava. Under the 1990 plan alone they have failed to supply us with some 20 percent of essential parts.

It is strange, as it were. We all want the equipment, especially if it is high-grade equipment, yet basic parts are lacking. It is an impossible situation. Everyone seems to be interested in this.

[Vetoshkin] At least that's what they are saying.

[Agapin] Yes, that's what they are saying, but in practice it is just the reverse.

Military

Yazov Views Past Year, Future Tasks

LD0206125591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1040 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, USSR minister of defense, by TASS correspondent Mikhail Zakharchuk; place and date not given]

[Text] Moscow, 2 Jan (TASS)—[Zakharchuk] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, in your view what results have the Armed Forces achieved in the last year?

[Yazov] This was not an easy year, but I would not single it out among others. This is because preceding years also abounded in difficult problems which were addressed against a complex social background. Nevertheless, in 1990 the programs and plans for operational, combat, and political training were fulfilled. The combat might and combat readiness of the Army and Navy are being maintained at a level which ensures the prevention of war and the guaranteed repulsion of aggression. Large-scale measures have been implemented within the scope of the military reform inaugurated by the new defense doctrine.

I have in mind primarily a reduction in troops and armaments. In accordance with the INF treaty, short-range missiles have been eliminated and the elimination of medium-range missiles has continued. Overall 96.4 percent of missiles have been destroyed in the USSR, and 78.8 percent in the United States. We have completed a unilateral cut of 500,000 men in our Armed Forces. The withdrawal of formations and units from East Europe and Mongolia is being carried out.

Much work has been done to transform the composition, structure, and activity of the Armed Forces. Significant changes have taken place in the social sphere. The most important of these has been the approval by the USSR Council of Ministers of the program for social security for servicemen and members of their families, and also for people discharged from active military service. This has been drawn up by the Ministry of Defense. This is a statewide program. It encompasses all the main issues of social security. The plan is to be implemented mainly from 1991 to 1993.

Among the legislative acts adopted in 1990 aimed at providing social protection for servicemen and their families, I can name with satisfaction the USSR law on servicemen's pensions, which came into force on 1 January 1991, and on pensions for participants in the Great Patriotic War, which has been in force since 1 October 1990.

Servicemen of all categories will receive a significant pay raise in 1991 in accordance with a decision by the USSR Council of Ministers adopted in November of last year. Increased food ration quotas will be introduced from 1991 to 1993 for soldiers on conscription. The amount of meat and eggs is being increased and milk and fruit juice consumption is now to be introduced.

The decrees of the USSR president "On Some Measures for Implementation of Proposals by the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers," and "On Preventing Illegal Restrictions in Residential Registration of Servicemen and Members of Their Families" should play a great role in the course of social and legal protection.

The problem of providing servicemen and members of their families with housing remains a sore problem in the Armed Forces. We have about 177,000 unaccommodated families at present. Last year servicemen, unaided, built about 60,000 apartments. However, this is not enough. We hope that local soviets will render us assistance, though they are not yet in a hurry to return what they owe us, which runs to 24,500 apartments. We envisage increasing the rate and volume of housing construction: 24 million square meters of housing are to be built, 19 million by our own efforts. Apart from this, 2 million square meters of housing are to be built using the money allocated by the German Government. As a result, we are to get about 500,000 apartments in the next five-year period.

The adoption of USSR laws on universal military service, on the status of servicemen, and other legislative

acts in the sphere of defense will serve to raise guarantees for the social and legal protection of servicemen.

[Zakharchuk] The Armed Forces engages in resolving tasks in the interests of the national economy. What has been done in this area and what is being done?

[Yazov] On the instructions of the USSR Government, the Ministry of Defense sent 94 mechanical transport battalions, 46,600 vehicles, and 60,000 men in 1990 to gather the harvest. They transported more than 30.5 million tonnes of agricultural loads. Twenty-one road-building brigades and eight repair and restoration battalions are continuing to carry out tasks in the Non-Chernozem zone. In the literal sense, these roads are bringing a rebirth to the region. By the end of 1995, about 20,000 km of paved roads will be laid. More than 1,600 km of roads have already been built.

The Armed Forces are forced also to develop a system of self-provision. We have 83 military state farms, 80 special dairy farms, and about 9,000 subsidiary farms of military units, enterprises, and establishments working for us. In 1990 they produced more than 300,000 tonnes of grain, 202,000 tonnes of potatoes, 119,000 tonnes of meat, 66,500 tonnes of milk, and 234 million eggs.

[Zakharchuk] The majority of Soviet people have feelings of gratitude and respect for the Army. However, an anti-Army campaign is also apparent in certain parts of the mass media. What, in your view, is the cause of this phenomenon?

[Yazov] The main cause, I think, is that our Army represents one of the firmest supports of statehood and stability and order in society. This means that by its very existence it hinders the implementation of the plans of nationalist, separatist, and indeed all destructive forces, no matter what their slogans and banners are, to break up the USSR as a federal state and to shake even such cornerstones of national self-awareness as patriotism, internationalism, and loyalty to the socialist choice.

[Zakharchuk] Can you at least briefly speak about the main tasks of the Armed Forces in the new year?

[Yazov] Their main task in 1991 will still be to maintain the combat readiness of troops and naval forces at a level guaranteeing the repulsion of any possible aggression and the reliable protection of the sovereignty and state integrity of the USSR from encroachments from outside.

It is envisaged that the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and the withdrawal of formations and units from Mongolia will be completed and the large-scale redeployment of troops from Germany to the territory of the Soviet Union will begin.

Operational and mobilization plans will have to be reworked. The formation of strategic defense groupings will have to be continued on the territory of frontier military districts and places where fleets are based.

One of the major tasks is the practical reshaping of political bodies. They will have to purposefully study questions of servicemen's social security, the strengthening of military discipline, further improvement of educational work, and the deepening of democratic processes in the Army and Navy.

In addition, in 1991 we will complete the implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Reduction will begin on the main types of armaments and military equipment of the land forces and Air Force—tanks, combat armored vehicles, artillery systems of 100 mm caliber and more, warplanes, and strike helicopters—in accordance with the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. We will be required to carry out much work with the preparations for the destruction of strategic offensive weapons in the event of the signing of the treaty for a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons.

It is understandable that these are only the key, main tasks in the highly complex set of measures making up the material fabric of the military reform.

[Zakharchuk] The last question is: How do you see the USSR in 1991?

[Yazov] While I realistically evaluate the whole complexity of the present crucial stage of perestroyka, I look to the future with optimism. I, like the overwhelming majority of Soviet people, would like to see the Soviet Union as an integral and renewed state, embodying national accord and peace. Our sacred duty to present and future generations is to preserve the status of the USSR as a great power and to realize the potential of socialism for radically improving the life of the people and for multiplying the wealth and glory of our multinational fatherland.

I am sure that we are up to this task. The key to tackling it lies in strengthening and renewing the Soviet state on the basis of a new Union treaty, establishing state and public order in the country as soon as possible, ensuring the unity of words and actual, practical deeds, and ensuring successful work by each person in the area entrusted to him. I cannot fail to speak about one particular feature of the year that has just begun. It is the year of the 50th anniversary of the attack on our country by fascist Germany, of the first battles and bitter losses in the Great Patriotic War, and of the first victories over the aggressor. That heroic time has become a symbol of the steadfastness, courage, and heroism of Soviet people and of the all-surpassing fraternal friendship of the peoples of our country. It is our common, priceless heritage, a life-giving source of the might of the Soviet state.

The men of the Army and Navy guard this heritage sacredly. They are loyal to the traditions of older generations, and are carrying out their military duty with dignity and honor in the name of the security of our fatherland.

Northern Fleet Ballistic Missile Catches Fire

PM0301112591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by Captain Third Rank P. Ishchenko: "What Happened to the Missile?"]

[Text] Northern Fleet—The mass media have already reported that in the course of technical operations a ballistic missile caught fire in a Northern Fleet garrison. The incident was immediately surrounded by a mass of rumors and fabrications—there was even a story that it was only by luck that there was not a nuclear explosion. How did matters stand in reality? Justice Colonel M. Durnov, deputy military prosecutor of the Northern Fleet, tells us about it:

"In accordance with the work plan in one military unit preparation was under way on 11 December to salvage a missile beyond its storage life. It had to be moved to the place where the rocket fuel components are dumped—by that time the missile warhead had already been dismantled. After the missile had been loaded onto a tractor work leader Captain Third Rank O. Vorobyev did not wait for the missing driver but took the wheel himself. During a movement on the icy road the officer lost control and the tractor overturned. The rocket fuel components which were spilled produced a chemical reaction and a fire broke out.

"A fire crew was alerted and the unit personnel also took part in extinguishing the fire. Less than 30 minutes were needed to put out the fire. There was no threat of an explosion, especially not a nuclear explosion. But while the fire was being extinguished a number of sailors, warrant officers, and officers were poisoned with varying degrees of severity by the rocket fuel fumes—46 men were hospitalized. Of these 34 were discharged within a few days—many of them were kept in hospital for preventive reasons and as of today three men, including Captain Third Rank Vorobyev, are being treated still. There is no threat to their health and they will soon be discharged."

Army's Problems With Food Supplies Described

PM2812165590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Dec 90 Union Edition p 6

[Report by N. Burbyga: "The Army Has New Uniforms. But No Meat"]

[Text] The country is taking its first steps toward market relations. What impact is this having on the USSR Armed Forces? A press conference held in an independent [otdelnyy] motor vehicle battalion in the Moscow region was devoted to this and other questions.

Journalists were addressed by Lieutenant General V. Litvinov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services, who reported that collaboration between the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services and sectors of the national economic complex had markedly fallen off recently, particularly in questions concerning the provision of troops with food—meat, butter, fruit, and vegetables. The Army has therefore been forced to provide for itself. This year Defense Ministry agricultural enterprises have produced 119,000 tonnes of meat (live weight), around 230 million eggs, 300,000 tonnes of grain, and 200,000 tonnes of potatoes and other vegetables.

The reduction in the size of the Army and the Navy has made it possible to dispose of some existing equipment. This is being sold in the national economy. But what do the military units derive from this? It was said at the press conference that 20 percent of the sum obtained from the sales becomes part of the income of Defense Ministry enterprises and organizations, 50 percent becomes state income, 10 percent goes into the local budget, and 20 percent goes to the territorial organs of the USSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply]. But is such a distribution of income fair? In Litvinov's opinion, it is time that the procedure for distributing these sums be reviewed.

As journalists were informed, in view of the particularly difficult situation regarding the provision of foodstuffs for military servicemen and their families in a number of regions of the country, the Defense Ministry had taken the decision to provide officers, NCO's, and ensigns of the Baltic and Transcaucasus Military Districts and all the personnel of all units of branches of the Armed Forces with food rations in kind as of 1 November and to provide likewise for members of their family as of 1 January 1991. Jumping ahead: Next year it is planned to appreciably increase the basic pay of all servicemen, including enlisted and NCO personnel, for whom considerably enhanced catering standards will be introduced from 1 January.

"Avarice" Seen Prompting Desertions in Germany

PM0201142591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 91 Union Edition p 6

[interview with Colonel of Justice A. Korotkov, deputy chief of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office Investigation Directorate, by correspondent N. Burbyga; place and date not given; first paragraph is introduction: "Soviet Troops in Germany. A War Between Hard Currency and Duty"]

[Excerpts] More than 100 servicemen from the Western Group of Forces are now on the run. And recently, as is now known, Regimental Commander M. Kolesnikov, unable to resist temptation, fled to the FRG, taking with

him three shells for the new tank, an anti-aircraft missile, and a guided missile. The military prosecutor's office organs have instituted criminal proceedings under three articles of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Criminal Code—for treason, desertion, and theft of munitions. Our correspondent talked to Colonel of Justice A. Korotkov, deputy chief of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office Investigation Directorate, about the circumstances of the case. [passage omitted]

[Burbyga] As is well known, this is not the first case of desertion by Soviet servicemen. How many of them are now being sought?

[Korotkov] In all 145 servicemen have dodged military service and deserted. We have information that 49 of them have asked for political asylum. However, there are no grounds at all for considering them politically motivated deserters. They have all committed military crimes. For example, in September Privates Khalyasmyago, Kyuyn, Yyesaar, and Kevendya stole a vehicle and drove to the city of Luebben. Warrant Officer Matiyenko murdered a colleague for personal gain and fled with the marks he had stolen. He has now been handed over to us and an investigation is being conducted.

[Burbyga] How should the German authorities act in these cases? Are there any commitments on this score?

[Korotkov] There is an agreement between our country and the FRG which lays down all the terms governing the temporary stay of Soviet troops in Germany. Article 18 of the treaty says that the investigation of the circumstances of a crime committed by a Soviet serviceman is conducted by our side. And it must be said that the German authorities look favorably on applications from our side for deserters to be handed over.

[Burbyga] What conclusions has the Defense Ministry drawn in respect of the deserter Kolesnikov?

[Korotkov] Army General B. Snetkov, commander in chief of the Western Group of forces; Colonel General A. Kolmochenko, chief of the Group Political Directorate; Major General A. Zhurov, the commanding officer; and Major General V. Shipilov, chief of the Group Personnel Directorate, have been relieved of their posts, and many other commanders have also been punished. But the chief enemy, in my view, is the acquisitiveness and avarice of certain people. I could not begin to offer advice on how to combat this. It is clearly a disease which has infected all of our society today to some extent.

[Burbyga] Last question, Anatoliy Pavlovich: How widespread has the "disease" of selling munitions and weapons become in the Western group of forces? Many publications have been devoted to this topic abroad. Do we have any statistics on it?

[Korotkov] Our uniforms are in big demand in the West. Aware of this, some smart operators in the Army are trying to make rich pickings out of it. As far as small arms are concerned, they are being stolen, but the rumors about their disappearance and sale are greatly exaggerated. Eighteen firearms have been stolen during the year for profit. As of 1 October 14 had been found, and two pistols were also recovered recently. So two firearms, excluding the projectiles stolen by Kolesnikov and his accomplices, are now under investigation.

Reporters Visit Ships, Servicemen of Northern Fleet

LD2712070690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0350 GMT 27 Dec 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Excerpts] Here is something on an Army subject. Recently, in Severomorsk, a meeting took place between representatives of the mass media and the servicemen of the Northern Fleet. On that day one could go on a warship or a submarine unhindered. Nevertheless, the correspondents had more questions to ask afterwards than beforehand.

[Begin L. Obukhova recording] On 14 December in Severomorsk a meeting took place between representatives of the mass media and servicemen of the Northern Fleet. On that day one could go on a warship or a submarine unhindered. It would be naive to suppose that the military had fully raised the curtain of secrecy. This yet again confirmed rumors about a fire that occurred on December 11 this year at one of the facilities [obyekt] in Severomorsk. If the fire had not been extinguished in time, the consequences would have been unpredictable. It is possible that the Kola Peninsula could have ceased to exist on the geographical map.

In the local Navy newspaper we saw a few lines about the fire that occurred on December 11. There are no victims and no one suffered, it says. One can only learn from rumors about the health of those who prevented the fire. It is best to see something once, as they say, than to hear about it a hundred times; therefore we went for the military hospital, for the special department where there are 43 people who were in the fire. [passage omitted] [end recording]

To complete our report from Severomorsk, at the meeting between journalists and the commanders of the Northern Fleet, for the first time figures that were until recently considered classified were cited openly. Over the last year alone 70 servicemen have died in the Northern Fleet.

Retired Military Academic I.L. Knunyants Dies

PM3112144190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Dec 90 First Edition p 4

[Obituary of Major General Knunyants]

[Excerpts] Major General, retired, Ivan Lyudvigovich Knunyants, an outstanding Soviet chemical scientist and

a full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, died on 21 December 1990 following a serious and prolonged illness. [passage omitted]

I.L. Knunyants was born the son of an engineer on 4 June 1906 in the city of Shusha. After graduating from the N.E. Bauman Higher Technical School in 1928 he worked as a teacher at the department of organic chemistry at the same educational establishment.

From the moment that the Military Chemical Defense Academy was formed, all I.L. Knunyants' scientific activity was connected with this military educational establishment, where he progressed from a teacher to chief of one of the leading departments. [passage omitted]

[Signed] D.T. Yazov, M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, N.I. Shlyaga, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, E.I. Shaposhnikov, V.N. Chernavin, V.M. Shuralev, V.M. Arkhipov, V.P. Mironov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov, V.F. Yermakov, Yu.A. Yashin, A.V. Beterkhtin, N.A. Moiseyev, M.P. Kolesnikov, S.V. Petrov, V.K. Pikalov, V.A. Korablev, V.I. Kovalev, Yu.N. Koryakin, A.D. Kuntsevich, M.M. Dubinin, A.V. Fokin, V.S. Kavunov, P.A. Tarasenko, N.S. Stepanov, N.P. Gordeyev, D.I. Lomakin, A.H. Sinitsyn

Baltic Republics

Internal Affairs Troops Occupy Riga Building

Details on Occupation

LD0201163291 Tallin Domestic Service in Estonian 1500 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] As already announced, a Black Berets unit has taken the Riga Press Building under its control. All access to the Press Building is being guarded by military vehicles, and the permit procedure has been tightened. Dainis Ivans, deputy chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council, and Ilmas Bisers, deputy chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, could not gain entry into the building, despite the fact that both are USSR people's deputies. Furthermore, they were threatened with a submachinegun.

The Baltija information service announced this afternoon that (Kazimierz Dunduru), director of the press building and chief of Latvian newspaper and magazine publishing, is under de facto arrest even though no warrant for his arrest has been presented to him. Correspondents of both Baltija and the Latvian Telegraph Agency found (Arkadij Vrublevskij) in his office, as the present—quote—boss—unquote—of the Press Building. He has been appointed on this post by the communist party of Latvia Central Committee. Apart from the two directors, there were three individuals in the office dressed in plainclothes and a military man armed with a submachinegun.

A parallel leadership of the Riga Press Building has already existed for several months. A paradoxical situation reigns: The Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee does not recognize the authority of (Dunduru), while the collective of the Press Building does not recognize the authority of (Vrublevskij). Until recently management was in essence in the hands of (Dunduru).

I have been kept away from my post ever since this morning, said (Kazimiers Dunduru). He continued: Once I entered the building, I was met by armed young men who asked to see my documents and took me to the publishing office—even though my plans at the time were different. To the demand to officially hand over the conduct of affairs, I categorically answered in the negative. Now I am no longer a master in my office; wherever I go, even to the toilet, I am being watched by a Black Beret.

(Arkadij Vrublevskij) said: We recognize USSR laws according to which one must not take away from the CPSU Central Committee any general party property. We find that the publishing house must not be reorganized into a joint-stock company. Contacts with the government have brought no solution, and for this reason we are defending—according to a communist party of Latvia Central Committee resolution—our own property. He said, At the same time we are of the opinion that publications must be printed, and I hope that all newspapers will be published as before.

An attempt to come to an agreement with the Press Building collective has failed for the one who was made director with the aid of armed force. A meeting turned into a rally which condemned the activity of the communist party of Latvia Central Committee. The people left the hall once (Arkadij Vrublevskij) mounted the rostrum. A few hours later the building of the communist party of Latvia Central Committee was being picketed. A red flag is flying on the Press Building, hoisted there by the Black Berets. It is unclear if tomorrow's papers will come out in Riga or not.

On the course of events in Riga, we have been informed by (Sergey Prokhotenko), correspondent of the Latvian Telegraph Agency, via the Baltija information service.

Shooting, Violence Reported

LD0201170691 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1545 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Interview with Janis (Osovs), acting head of Latvian Radio, with unidentified correspondent on 2 January; place not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] In the Latvian capital of Riga, the pro-Moscow troops, the Black berets, are still besieging the press building. During the day there has been some violence, according to Janis (Osovs), acting head of Latvian Radio.

[(Osovs)] Yes, a little trouble and a small fight and so on.

[Correspondent] There is talk about shooting.

[(Osovs)] Yes, there are certain reports indicating that shooting has been heard. I have learned that there were shots fired at the car in which travelled a television team, which (?seems) to have filmed the material for the news broadcast in Moscow. [passage omitted]

Tanks Surround Press Building

LD0201172091 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1600 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Excerpts] The Soviet Internal Affairs Ministry's special troops, the so-called Black Berets, have occupied the building housing the editorial offices and printing plant of the most important Latvian papers in Riga, the capital of the independent-minded Republic. Tanks are surrounding the building and soldiers are checking those entering the building. Thousands of people are gathered outside the Central Committee of the pro-Moscow Communist Party demonstrating against the occupation of the press building. The party and the Latvian Government have earlier argued about the ownership of the building. [passage omitted]

According to the latest reports, the Latvian Supreme Council has urged the employees to leave the press building for their own safety's sake. The Supreme

Council has also sent a telegram to Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow stating that it would inform the Soviet president on what his subordinates are doing. It is said that the special troops occupying the building came to Riga from the region of the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius.

Officials React to Seizure

LD0201172391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1542 GMT 2 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Valery Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga, 2 Jan—A special purpose militia detachment this morning took under its guard the property of the CPSU—the publishing houses of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, in which most republican newspapers and editions of central publications are printed—and has forced corrections to be introduced into the agenda of the republic's legislature.

As was stated today at the Latvian Supreme Soviet session by Daynis Ivans, the legislature's first deputy leader, "the Latvian Communist Party wants to take political revenge".

As has already been reported, in spring of last year the republic's leadership decided to nationalize the publishing house of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, making it Latvia's property. The representative of the proprietor—the administration of affairs of the CPSU Central Committee—did not agree with such a decision. A new director of the Party publishing house was appointed, and on the first working day of the new year measures were taken to guard the property and ensure the publishing house's work. As the TASS correspondent was told by Alfred Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, "These actions are fully in accordance with the USSR president's decree. The publishing house is the Party's property and we will defend it".

During a discussion in the legislature on this situation, certain speakers suggested the republic's Communist Party of Latvia be declared unlawful.

Daynis Ivans talked on the telephone with USSR internal affairs minister Boris Pugo who, in the words of Ivans, advised "resolving this question by political methods". But, as Ivans thinks, "political questions are not resolved under the muzzles of automatics". It has to be said that they are not resolved in a strong-willed manner either—at the wishes of one of the sides.

As deputy Sergey Ivans, leader of the "Ravnopravnye" faction, said at the plenary session, "one should treat property very carefully. He who has property taken away will defend it". In the view of Viktor Alksnis, republican and USSR deputy, the legislature, with its impulsive actions, is pushing things "to what it did not want—the introduction of presidential rule in Latvia".

At the call of the Popular Front, a meeting took place by the building of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee under the slogans, "down with the occupation", "shame on the oppressor party", and at which an appeal by the Supreme Soviet was read. In this document the legislature condemned "the seizure of the house of the press" and demanded that armed formations be removed from the building. The republic's government has been instructed to organize the printing of republican publications on an alternative production base.

Editorial collectives and printing workers have perceived the situation in the house of the press equivocally. It is quite probable that tomorrow republican newspaper will not reach readers.

Occupation Not Ordered by Moscow

LD0201180191 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1700 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Excerpts] Special troops of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs today occupied a press building owned by the Latvian Communist Party in Riga. [passage omitted]

The Latvian authorities have made a strong protest about the activities of the special troops. Daynis Ivans, deputy chairman of the [Latvian] Supreme Council and member of the Latvian Popular Front leadership, called in a radio speech on Latvians to stop work and to take part in a demonstration in central Riga. An estimated 20,000 inhabitants of the capital took part in the peaceful demonstration. Ivans tried to visit the occupied press building, but troops prevented him from entering the building. The Latvian Government has already been in telephone contact twice with the Soviet Internal Affairs Minister Boris Pugo in order to obtain more information about the occupation. According to Pugo, the special troops have not received the order to occupy the building from Moscow.

Leaders To Meet Gorbachev 3 Jan

LD0301083191 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 3 Jan 91

[Text] Riga—No incidents took place last night in the Latvian capital. The Black Berets are still in charge of the press house. An ultimatum was issued to (Dundulis), director of the press house, to hand in the seal, the keys and the joint-stock company check book to the leaders of the pro-Moscow Latvian Communist Party by 1400 [1200 GMT] today.

Of course, newspapers did not appear in Latvia today. The leadership of the republic is looking for possibilities to publish them elsewhere.

Latvian Supreme Council Chairman A. Gorbunovs and Prime Minister I. Godmanis are to meet with Soviet President M. Gorbachev in Moscow today.

Internal Affairs Troops Control Vilnius Buildings

LD0201132991

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1000 GMT on 2 January carries two reports read by Jurate Valanciute. She says that the archives of the History Institute are now under the protection of servicemen of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) troops. She also says that Lithuanian Radio informed listeners this morning that the premises of the former Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party were controlled by units of the Soviet MVD troops.

Valanciute then says that Latvian Radio reported this morning that Black Berets broke into the premises of the press palace this morning. She says that those Latvian journalists to whom she spoke on the telephone this morning could not tell her who these Black Berets represent.

The militia officers who were on duty in the building were thrown out by the paratroopers, she reports. The chairman of the press palace was ordered to leave the premises; telephones in his study were disconnected. Journalists are not being allowed to leave the premises. This information was obtained because one of the journalists present in the building at the time somehow managed to make a telephone call to the editor's office, in which he said that workers at the print shop had refused to work. At first they were given an ultimatum to start work in an hour. When the print workers refused this ultimatum, the time was extended to three hours. The workers were told that if they failed to obey then all of them would be fired.

Valanciute said that Dainus Ivans, deputy chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council, and (Romualds Razuks), chairman of the Latvian People's Front, made a statement on Latvian Radio a short time ago in which they said that this action was organized by the pro-Moscow Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

D. Ivans pointed out that he talked to B. Pugo, USSR minister of internal affairs, who informed him that he had issued no instructions for such actions to be carried out in Riga.

Valanciute said that at 1300 GMT a protest rally opposite the building of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee will be held. The protest action is organized by the People's Front. She concluded by saying that having looked at the two reports from Vilnius and Riga the question naturally arises whether these actions were coordinated according to a plan set up by some forces.

Further on Action

LD0201231591 Vilnius International Service in English 2230 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] Representatives of the special units of the Soviet Union's Interior Ministry, which is stationed in Vilnius, have ousted Lithuanian police guards from two buildings in Vilnius which are claimed by two communist parties—the pro-Moscow one and the one which has already been renamed the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party.

Up to now the buildings were guarded both by the Lithuanian police and by the Soviet Union's (?militarized) militia. On 1 January the Soviet militia chiefs demanded to annul the posts at the building of the former Institute of the Communist Party History and the following day they drove out the police guards, but without using force, from the so-called Central Committee building.

The interior minister, Marijonas Misiukonis, told a correspondent of the ELTA news agency that on the eve of the new year he had received a message from Major General Algimantas Naudziunas, a secretary of the Soviet Union's Communist Party organization in Lithuania, to the effect that the party, fulfilling the Soviet president's order, undertook to protect the party's property; thus it did not need the services of the local police. Not bothering to settle the issue, the words were soon followed by deeds, said the interior minister. He also added that talks were being held over these events and that the Lithuanian police was ready to further perform the duties assigned to it.

The Lithuanian interior minister said he saw no grounds to think that the incident reflected the tougher line possibly adopted by the new leadership of the Soviet Union's Interior Ministry.

Landsbergis Withdraws Independence Moratorium

Seeks To Facilitate Talks

PM0301060591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Lithuania: A Step Toward Talks or in the Opposite Direction?"]

[Text] Vilnius, 2 Jan—We have withdrawn our proposal to introduce a moratorium on the act "On restoring an independent Lithuanian state" of 11 March 1990, Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, announced this in an address today on Republican radio. The speech by the head of the Lithuanian legislature was recorded on the eve of his departure for Norway.

As is well known, the Republic's Supreme Soviet decided that as soon as talks began, the Lithuanian side would observe a 100-day moratorium to cover the period of the talks. This opened up certain prospects for unravelling a mass of problems and complications which had been steadily accumulating in relations between the two sides. But the moratorium never came into force during the six months which followed. A mutually acceptable approach was never found.

The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet decision "on interstate talks between the Republic of Lithuania and the USSR", which was adopted shortly before the new year, was described as an "important political decision". According to Landsbergis, it rendered "the path to talks more open and free".

The head of the Lithuanian legislature stressed that the agreement to sit down at the negotiating table without signing a protocol beforehand did not mean that a decision had been made to hold talks in any capacity other than that of an "independent state".

"We have taken yet another step to facilitate talks", Landsbergis said. But is that actually the case? Can one reach one's goal by going in the opposite direction?"

TASS Views Statement

LD0201193291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Jan 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] TASS reports: Lithuanian republican radio today broadcast a speech by Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which was recorded on the eve of his departure for Norway. He announced that a decision has been made to cancel the proposal to introduce a moratorium on the 11 March act on the restoration of the independent Lithuanian state.

The head of the Lithuanian legislature nevertheless stressed that the Lithuanian side has taken yet another step to facilitate talks.

Is that really the case? TASS remarks. Can one achieve an aim by moving in the opposite direction?

One should recall that the Lithuanian side had committed itself to a 100-day moratorium to cover the period of the talks, but in the subsequent six months this moratorium never came into force, and it was not possible to find a mutually acceptable solution.

Lithuanian Deputy Premier's Son 'Murdered'

LD0201225491 Vilnius International Service in English 2230 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] A spokesman for the republic's procurator's office has released information that the 20 year-old son of the Lithuanian Vice Premier Romualdas Ozolas, a student of Vilnius University, was murdered during the new year night. His body is reported as being found in [word indistinct] district outside Vilnius. The case is under investigation.

Suspected Killer Arrested

LD0301094591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 3 Jan 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The son of Lithuania's deputy premier, Romualdas Ozolas, has been killed in Vilnius. On the night of New Year he was beaten up in one of the city's gardens and died from his many wounds. The suspected killer has been arrested.

Poll Shows Lithuanians Support Independence

LD0201140691 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Summary] An opinion poll carried out in Lithuania late December focused on finding out how many people support Lithuanian independence. Of those polled, 69 percent favor an independent Lithuania. Among them, 81 percent of Lithuanian nationality. Of those polled, 13 percent support the idea of a confederation and signing an new Union treaty; among those, six percent are of Lithuanian nationality. Only three percent of the polled voted for the former Soviet Union, of whom two percent are Lithuanian.

Prime Minister Prunskiene remains the most popular politician of the year. Of those who support Prunskiene, 56 percent are of Lithuanian nationality and 22 percent are of other nationalities.

Second place is occupied by Deputy Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas. Vytautas Landsbergis took third place in the popularity rating.

Asked if Lithuanians would like to emigrate to any of the Western countries, five percent said they would like to emigrate permanently, 21 percent would like to go abroad for a period of time and work in the West, 42 percent said they categorically would not want to leave Lithuania, and 32 percent did not have an opinion.

Lithuanian Territorial Defense Official Cited

PM0301103991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 91 First Edition p 5

[Report by Captain Second Rank V. Gromak: "Shifting the Blame"]

[Text] Vilnius—In the republican press A. Baytkaytis, former medical service colonel and now deputy general director of the Lithuanian territorial defense department, has called absurd discussion on how "the department is allegedly creating armed detachments."

"We have enough facts," I am told by colonel V. Shurupov, a political worker in one of the units stationed in Lithuania, "of the territorial defense department forces provoking armed clashes. People who have been subjected to violence by the department's volunteers are appealing to us."

Today the department has over 300 motor vehicles confiscated from the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy and VHF radios. By spring it is planned to arm 15,000 young men with rifles. This is

stated openly, including inside the Lithuanian legislature. The activeness of the "territorial defenders" displayed at so-called customs service posts is a source of constant tension and conflicts.

Meanwhile, V. Landsbergis, the head of the republic, takes advantage of the slightest opportunity to argue the opposite, that is, he presents the Soviet Army servicemen as the focus of evil. Thus, speaking on television, he stated that "the military are figuratively speaking the vandals who are capable of shooting one of their own soldiers, as has already happened in history, thus provoking actions against us."

New Rationing Norms Announced in Vilnius

LD0201235791 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] New food rationing norms have been announced in Vilnius. Monthly food coupons will now entitle each resident to 400 grams of butter, 10 eggs, one kg of sugar, and one kg of groats. Adults will be able to purchase six packs of cigarettes and one half-liter bottle of vodka, or a bottle of champagne or wine. Once a quarter each resident will be able to purchase two kg of flour, half a liter of sunflower oil, half a kg of macaroni, and one kg of salt. As before, scums for detergent and soap are provided for. There will also be coupons for some industrial goods, such as stockings, knitwear or fabric, and towels.

Latvian Organizations Oppose Price Increases

LD2812135890 Moscow TASS in English 1349 GMT 28 Dec 90

[By TASS Correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] The Ravnopravnye (Equality) parliamentary faction and seven public and political organisations—including the United Workers Collectives' Council, the Communist Party Central Committee, the Baltic Military Servicemen's Union and the All-Latvian Public Salvation Committee—have demanded a suspension of the proposed government price hikes on food.

In a joint statement today the groups said that tripling prices for bread, meat and milk from January 3 will hurt people's living standards.

The document says the government says the government proposal to compensate workers at cost-accounting enterprises and organisations with the ventures' wage funds is a gross infringement on work collectives' rights to use their money.

Republican industries will have to pay more than 300 million roubles a year in compensation. Many enterprises do not have the means to do this because of cruel taxes set by the Latvian Parliament, it said.

Compensations will increase production costs and will boost prices on industrial goods. This is the result of the government policy towards economic isolation and its refusal to pursue a uniform budget, tax and price policy with the Soviet Union, the statement reads.

The government, lowering people's living standards, simultaneously enhances the republic's administrative budget, allocating 65 million roubles in 1991—four time more than this year. This is an anti-popular policy, intensifying tensions in Latvia, the document says.

"We are forced to address the USSR president and the USSR Supreme Soviet to demand protection of the rights and vital interests of citizens of the USSR and to prevent the implementation of the government resolution, raising prices on food products," it says.

Latvian Defends Role of USSR Procuracy

91UN0598A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Dec 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by A. Reinicks, first deputy procurator general of the Latvian SSR: "Two Procuracies—Two Laws?"]

[Text] **Should the USSR Procuracy remain integrated and centralized as before, or should the procuracies of the republics be free and independent sovereign structures? This question is being discussed at the present time at various levels. The legislatures of some Union republics, however, not waiting for the end of these discussions, have unilaterally declared their right to appoint republic procurators general, to approve their collegiums, and to make the procurators general accountable exclusively to the Supreme Soviets of these republics.**

The attitude of the leadership of the Procuracy of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] to such actions is unequivocally negative. We are for the preservation of a centralized procuracy system, for strengthening it, and for granting the procuracy organs additional rights for strict and undeviating adherence to laws, keeping in mind the priority of Union legislation over republic legislation.

I make the immediate reservation that this is not dogma that is not subject to further review. Not discarding the rational core in opinions about the need to divide the procuracy into federal and regional systems and to determine their competence and main directions of activity and principles of cooperation, I think that the implementation of practical measures to put these schemes into effect immediately is premature and, therefore, disastrous for a guarantee of legality and law and order in the country.

Of course, our life has changed in many ways in the 70 years of existence of the Soviet Procuracy. The rights of the Union republics are being broadened, including in the legislation sphere. The transition to market relations, the perfection of the treaty system, and other actual realities of perestroyka also demand an improvement in their system of legal guarantees. The procuracy, as an organ that executes the functions of higher oversight

over adherence to the requirements of the law, also needs improvement, release from rigidity and petty guardianship, and greater flexibility.

Indeed, all of this is needed. But, under conditions of the existing muddle in the country's economy, the nonadherence to treaty discipline, the legal nihilism, and the manyfold increase in nationalist and separatist tendencies compels putting these schemes off into the future. Now, more than ever, the centralization of executive authority in the center and in the localities is necessary. Simultaneously, procuracy oversight should be intensified, and any weakening in the organs of the procuracy by way of their subdivision is intolerable.

Here is specific confirmation of this.

The republic legislature began an active process of law-creating activity after the adoption on 4 May 1990 of the declaration "On Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic," which in itself is an illegal act that contradicts Union law, which already existed before that date, and which clearly defines the procedure for a Union republic to secede from the USSR structure. The package of laws that was passed in great haste had only one aim—to consolidate and provide a basis for separation from the Union more quickly. At the same time, the actual problems of the vital functions of the republic were put away in the long-range drawer. Among the laws and decrees adopted by the republic Supreme Soviet were those that clearly discriminated against many citizens and groups of the population.

How else is it possible to characterize the decree of the republic Supreme Soviet of 3 October of this year "Concerning Holidays and Memorial Days," the abolition of the celebration of 8 March, Victory Day, the Anniversary of the Great October Revolution, and their designation as workdays? In addition, stiff sanctions were provided for failing to come to work on these days, and threats were heard about instituting criminal proceedings against managers of enterprises and organizations who organized the celebration in their collectives of the 73d anniversary of Great October.

Or, for example, the numerous decrees of local organs of authority about pulling down and dismantling monuments to V.I. Lenin and to Soviet soldier-liberators. Finally, on 14 November of this year, the republic Supreme Soviet adopted a decree whose contents do not in any way come within the scope of common sense. It directs the curtailment of social and material support for any subunits of the USSR Armed Forces and "CPSU territorial organizations" (meaning the Latvian Communist Party) located in Latvia.

The Latvian SSR Procuracy, among other sound forces of the republic, came out against these laws and decrees, thereby inviting furious attacks from the Latvian People's Front and the legislaturecary majority that it controls. In quick order, a law was worked out "On Procuracy Oversight in the Latvian Republic," which provides for the sole subordination of the procuracy to the republic Supreme Soviet and its exclusive right to appoint the Latvian procurator general, his deputies, and even to confirm the members of the collegium.

It should be said that in the course of several months the Latvian SSR Procuracy did not shun joint work in the commissions of the republic Supreme Soviet; it considered the new scheme in its collective, and it worked up its own proposals. The easiest thing to do is strike a pose. We believed that we should not refuse constructive cooperation, because the scheme itself, with the exception of the aforementioned and several still unacceptable theses (for example, entrusting to the republic procuracy the oversight of fulfillment of laws in military units), virtually repeats word for word the new draft of the Law "On the USSR Procuracy." We do not object in principle to the elaboration of the concept of procuracy oversight itself in the republic, because it can be useful in the future, but no earlier than from the time that the Union treaty is signed.

The republic Supreme Soviet resolved things its own way. On 26 September 1990, the Law "On Procuracy Oversight in the Latvian Republic" was adopted, despite the refusal of the legislature's opposition to participate in the voting. On that same day, the procurator general of the Latvian Republic and his deputies were confirmed. From the first days of its existence, the new "independent" procuracy took the position of active defense of the transformations that were taking place in the republic that were directed at complete secession from the USSR. This was only the first part of the plan. The second consisted of destroying the Latvian SSR Procuracy and paralyzing its work completely.

With this aim, colossal pressure was put on the workers with the purpose of enticing them into a parallel procuracy, using both material incentives and individual cultivation. These measures were partly justified—a majority of the collective went to work in the newly created procuracy. Every person has his own problems—you have to get an apartment, to graduate from the university... All of this was exploited. But most of all the mood of the collective was influenced by uncertainty about tomorrow and the lack of prospects.

After the establishment of the republic procuracy, an order came from the Minister of Internal Affairs, which oriented militia employees on cooperating exclusively with the newly created procuracy, and which prohibited them from transferring criminal cases to us, to turn to us for a punitive sanction, or to fulfill any of our instructions. The Supreme Court and the people's courts refuse to accept and review criminal cases and investigations by investigators of the Latvian SSR Procuracy, they do not permit the participation of our workers in court proceedings, and they do not accept and examine protests that are raised.

Finally, the Supreme Soviet approved a declaration (!) by which the Latvian SSR Procuracy is outlawed in general. The leaders of local organs of authority, enterprises, and

organizations are told not to enter into any kind of contacts with the Latvian SSR Procuracy, and to return our documents without execution.

Other sanctions were also applied. The Riga Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] demanded that the Latvian SSR Procuracy move from the premises it occupies without offering any other premises.

Of course, not everyone in this situation proved to be fighters. Intellectual ferment was also promoted by the adoption of similar declarations in some other Union republics and by the center's passive position. But not everyone understands that there is a substantial difference between the declared decrees on independent procuracies in Russia, Belorussia, and other republics, and the situation in Latvia. While even the appointment of a procurator by local authority changes little in essence, here, under conditions of a practically total antisocialist and anti-Soviet coup, the procuracy of the republic is established as an organization that is antagonistic to the USSR Procuracy, and as a weapon for the speediest possible dismantling of Soviet authority in the republic.

The Latvian SSR Procuracy has nonetheless held up. After losing a large part of the collective, we were able to restore our structures substantially. In addition to the central apparatus, eight city and rayon procuracies are operating, although half of them are not at full staff. Steps are being taken to ensure fulfillment of the ukases of the USSR president and to defend the rights of citizens. General oversight verification is being performed, and work is being carried out on the rehabilitation of those who were illegally suppressed. As previously, many visitors whose rights and legal interests were seriously infringed upon by local authorities are turning to us.

There are still tremendous difficulties. For example, we and the republic procuracy (parallel) are working at cross purposes. We initiate criminal proceedings in a case of illegal dismantling of a monument; they—in a case of opposing dismantling; we—in a case of illegal eviction of the party gorkom [city party committee] from premises they own, and they—against OMON [special purpose militia detachment] workers who prevent this illegality. The monument wreckers and organizers of evictions do not come to us, insofar as they do not consider us a legal organization, and those who are victims and OMON workers do not go to them, because they recognize us only.

This is what hasty and nonconstructive actions in accelerating the breakup of the procuracy system can lead to under conditions of increased interethnic and group disputes. It will not be inappropriate to say that this also affects the struggle against crime in a significant degree.

Savisaar Says Estonia To Reject Union Treaty

LD0201151491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1415 GMT 2 Jan 90

[TASS correspondent Arkadiy Provazhnyy]

[Text] Helsinki, 2 Jan—We have adopted a decision on the sovereignty of Estonia. It is final, and we unequivocally refuse to sign a Union treaty. At the same time we stand for equal talks with the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a treaty that satisfies us. Edgar Savisaar, prime minister of Estonia, announces this today at a meeting with representatives of Finnish business circles.

Savisaar noted that last year was more successful for the republic than we expected, and this is a good precondition for the investment of foreign capital here. The main goal is the creation of a market economy in the republic, and we take European market relations as a model; the main direction in stabilizing the present situation is the privatization of the state sector of the economy.

Views Soviet Troop Presence

LD0201151891 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1400 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Begin reporter recording] The Estonian prime minister received the news about the events in Riga a couple of hours ago at his news conference in Helsinki. Savisaar does not regard them as the beginning of more extensive operations, but did refer to the recent bomb explosions. He paralleled these explosions with other events in Finnish history, especially with the Mainila shots on the eve of the Winter War in 1939. [Russians alleged that seven shots had been fired from the Finnish village of Mainila, killing four Soviet troops, while a Finnish report said that the shots were fired from the Soviet side]

Savisaar was unable to confirm an estimate by an Estonian minister yesterday that more troops had been brought to Estonia. Savisaar said, however, that there are enough troops in Estonia now for any military operation. Estonia is, in his view, one of the most peaceful places in the Soviet Union, but it is always possible to find excuses for bringing in troops. Prime Minister Savisaar referred to the extensive exceptional powers just obtained by President Gorbachev. He thinks Gorbachev now has a need to show that he will be able to use them. If Estonia is placed directly under the rule of the Soviet president through exceptional powers, the response, according to Prime Minister Savisaar, will be civil disobedience in accordance with the decision of the Estonian Supreme Soviet.

Savisaar does not consider a military coup likely in the Soviet Union. The prestige of the Armed Forces is much too low for that and the forces are, in addition, torn by internal conflicts, Savisaar said. He considers a dictatorship headed by Gorbachev possible, but even in that case it would be necessary, after a couple of weeks, to ask how to proceed from there. [end recording]

Privatization of Estonian Enterprises Reported

PM0201124791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Leonid Levitskiy report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "A Private Taxi Fleet and More..."]

[Text] Tallinn—The Estonian Government is transferring six large enterprises into private ownership.

They are the Baltika Sewn Goods Association, the Vyyt Factory, the Tallinn taxi fleet, the Valga Vehicle Depot, and the Mareta and Sami Enterprises. The state is retaining the 11 most important plants and associations. They include the Estonian Railroad, which the Ministry of Railways is transferring to republican ownership.

But next year [as published] the majority of economic subunits will be transformed into state joint stock companies. The status of enterprises under union jurisdiction is also changing. For example, plants belonging to the Integral Association are also becoming state joint stock companies. Members of labor collectives will be able to buy one-half of the shares.

Army Sets Up Television Network in Estonia

PM0201163091 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 51, 30 Dec 90-6 Jan 91 p 2

[Unattributed "news" feature: "Estonia. Garrison TV"]

[Text] The powerful Nadezhda radio station, which belongs to the Intermovement of Estonia, started broadcasting on August 28 from a military base. Soon a 2-3 hour TV programme will also be produced here, following a decision of the communications chief of the USSR Defence Ministry. For the rest of the day this channel will belong to the 1st Programme of Central TV.

The studio will be built in the outskirts of Tallinn, and relay stations will be installed in eight military garrisons and the network will cover the entire territory of the Republic. Equipment has already been delivered, military designers have arrived and construction work will be supported by the Army.

"Today 96.3 per cent of Estonia's population watch the 1st Programme of Central TV," says Toomas Somera, the republican Minister of Communications. "The new programme will support the interests of the military chiefs of intermovement, as during the establishment of the Nadezhda radio station. Nobody even thought of appealing to the Estonian authorities for permission to set up their own TV network. Even the designers did not notify the local authorities about the work to take place. This is direct interference by the Army in civil affairs, already far worse than what the USSR Defence Minister Marshal Dmitriy Yazov described on Central TV on November 27.

Radio Station Run by Estonia Intermovement

91UN0611 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Yu. Shchekatikhin under the rubric "Report From Estonia": "With Faith in 'Nadezhda'"]

[Text] Tallinn—I met with Yuriy Yakovlevich Rudyak, the co-chairman of Estonia Intermovement, in the vestibule of one of Tallinn's hotels. We were talking about recording an interview for the radio station "Nadezhda." We became acquainted. Looking around and convinced that we did not attract any attention, Rudyak recommended: "Let us go out..."

We went out onto the street and turned into a deserted corner.

"Listen carefully," Rudyak said seriously and precisely, "tomorrow at such and such an hour and so many minutes go up to such and such a house. A man will be waiting for you in such and such a coat and such and such a hat. There will be such and such a newspaper in his left hand. I will describe you to him. You will say... He will answer... You will go after him for a distance of 10 meters."

"Some kind of delirium," I thought. "For I am in the capital of what is still Soviet Estonia..." And at that time my glance fell on the steeple of the Long Herman Tower. There the blue-black-white flag of the Estonian Republic—not Soviet and not socialist—was fluttering.

"And, so, do you work in the underground?"

"Half the time. I will explain later. You will follow him, you will enter the building, do not explain anything to anyone, you will turn and follow him..."

"And, if they ask?"

"Answer that you are a cooperative worker from Leningrad."

"But what does this turn out to be, a partisan radio station?.."

"Well, not entirely, but something like that...

I will admit that if I were of a Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] age, all of this, perhaps, would be romantic. In the present situation on the territory of the USSR, in a city where half the population speaks Russian (?), however, this is hard to grasp. I nonetheless understood that if I did not meet the stated conditions, the meeting with those who work at the "Nadezhda" radio station will not take place.

Everything went smoothly. Except for the two strapping young people sitting at the entrance to the vestibule who looked me over carefully from head to foot, but an assured walk and my friendly nod, probably, misled them. Up, down, up, down a lateral poorly lit stairway—and then I am in the studio. I looked around. A small

shabby little room of no more than 20 square meters. The table held crude run-of-the-mill equipment: a microphone, two tape recorders, a record player, and an amplifier. Several chairs. Little tables, and on a table in a corner—bottles with mineral water and a "Pepsi," and half a loaf of black bread. My escort introduced himself: "Yuriy Andreyevich Stefanovskiy—one of the editors of 'Nadezhda.' Excuse me, I did not have dinner." (It was almost 1900 hours local Estonian time, one hour's difference from Moscow time.) Somehow I immediately took him to be a reserve officer—because of his bearing, his precise gray haircut, and by the way he ate with restraint. I was not mistaken. Stefanovskiy turned out to be a captain second rank in the reserve.

Rudyak was also here.

"I can introduce one more," he said. "V.Ya. Kiemets, Intermovement cochairman. He is being discharged for the third time. He has been 'found out.' The others—by name, they are still working."

"Quiet, we are starting," Rudyak warns. They began recording the regular hour and a half broadcast. The station's musical theme can be heard: "'Nadezhda'—my compass is Earth. Radio station 'Nadezhda' is speaking," a young woman announces with emotion.

Someone's footsteps can be heard on the stairs. Everyone freezes. The footsteps quiet down—we continue the recording...

I looked at these tired assembled people—and I admired them. Later I learned that there was not one radio journalist or radio equipment specialist among the dozen workers at the station. True, all of the men are engineers and know something about equipment. The women are volunteers with good diction.

In pauses between recordings, we talk in a low voice "for life." Those who were "found out" were discharged simply and elegantly in a reduction in force. God save us—for not knowing the language! But the language program, according to the law, is calculated for several years. For U.Ya. Rudyak, who was "identified" while still in Intermovement, everything was crudely simple: He lost his job on 1 July, a single position was cut, specifically his, chief mechanic in an automatic devices enterprise. For the time being, there is still no chief mechanic there. Later the position will be restored under some other designation, for example, senior mechanization work superintendent. And the law will be observed.

Kiemets has already been "cut" in two jobs, one out of 300 employees. He is now expecting the same thing in a third position. Stefanovskiy was also discharged in a "reduction in force." The women are still working. For the time being... Now I finally understood why it was necessary to steal into the studio with such caution.

Thus, a dozen enthusiasts on the air oppose the powerful propaganda apparatus of Estonian radio with a staff of one and a half thousand persons and with modern equipment and technology. It was the military that helped establish Radio Intermovement. At first the operators—on short wave. Later, after an appeal from Ye. Kogan and Yu. Rudyak to the USSR Ministry of Defense, broadcasting was started on medium wave—the ground forces joined in. The broadcasts are recorded in the city, and they come out on the air from military units. A 20-kilowatt transmitter "Bolshaya Nadezhda" transmits from the territory of a tank regiment motor pool. The radio station is guarded by four armored personnel carriers, a tank with a basic load of ammunition, and several sentries in bulletproof vests. "Malaya Nadezhda" is guarded by sailors.

"Are you operating illegally?"

"Well, no, what for? The USSR Ministry of Communications assigned us frequencies, we are registered with USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, and we have coordinated the time schedule for coming on the air. We are officially recognized in the USSR. But then the organs of authority of our republic think: We are not, we cannot be, and we must not be!"

The radio station "Nadezhda" came on the air for the first time on short wave radio on 28 August 1990. Its transmissions began to be received in Siberia and Kazakhstan, in Moldova, and even in Albania (one radio ham sent us a card with a request to make a note of his call letters). But the principal target of "Nadezhda" is the Baltic republics, the "weak spot of the Union from which the cancerous tumor began to spread," as it was put by Yu. Rudyak. And on 16 September, "Nadezhda" came on the air on medium waves.

It is here that the "pluralistic democracy" of the Republic unfolded in all of its "legal" splendor. A mass persecution campaign started in the mass media.

But the popularity of "Nadezhda" is growing. People write to it, including Estonians as well, they give information, and they send money. But all of them ask not to mention their names, and not to indicate addresses—under the conditions of the "new democracy," this is not without danger.

The initial capital for the organization of "Nadezhda" was what was left from contributions made by Leningrad workers to the fund to help Estonians during the general political strike last year. Yu. Rudyak asked to convey thanks to all of those who responded to station "Nadezhda," who are sending it letters, and who are helping it materially. He asked that SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA readers be furnished basic information about the station: "Nadezhda" broadcasts daily on medium waves in a frequency range of 401.6 meters, 747 kilocycles three times a day in Moscow time: from 0730 to 0900, from 1330 to 1500, and from 1930 to 2100 hours; on short waves in a frequency range of 25 meters (11096, 12020, and 12056 megacycles) twice a day: from 0730 to 0900 and from 1930 to 2100 hours. The current account is 700822, code 781459, in the Bank for Housing and

Municipal Services and Social Development of the city of Kohtla-Jarve, Intermovement Kohtla-Jarve for radio station "Nadezhda."

Our meeting came to an end. I bid farewell and wished success in the difficult struggle. "Will you stand your ground?" "We will stand our ground, and, what is more, we are getting ready to start our own television."

RSFSR

RSFSR Unions Successful Without Strikes

914F0095A Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Dec 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Managed Without a Strike"]

[Text] **Well-argued demands and skillful tactics on the part of the Russian Republic trade union of textile and light industry workers has led to a certain success. The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Government adopted a decree on urgent measures aimed at stabilizing the functioning of the industry's enterprises.**

"The situation in the industry lately heated up to the limit," T.I. Sosnina, chairman of the republic trade union committee, told our correspondent. "Because of disruption in the deliveries of raw materials, unclear prospects for getting them, and the breakdown of economic links, production stoppages developed that resulted in layoffs. The situation became explosive."

The industry trade union took the strike committees at the enterprises under its wing, it formed a coordinating council under the republic committee, and worked out a package of well-argued demands for the Russian and Union Governments. The industry headquarters stayed in daily contact with the regions, informing the workers collectives about the situation.

All of this helped to achieve first results. The resoluteness of the workers and their unity helped to achieve initial results. What results?

Previously, the payroll part of product cost was no more than five to seven percent; now the industry average will be about 12 percent. This applies, of course, to enterprises that will achieve a production output growth.

The RSFSR Government will not tax the money earmarked for consumption funds if production volumes decreased for reasons beyond the enterprise collective's control. This means that salaries will continue to be paid at current levels even if the production stops. The Russian Government has also undertaken other steps directed at stabilizing how the industry functions. It also appears that the problem of writing off a billion and a half in debts for the textile, light, and porcelain and stoneware industries will finally move toward resolution. The RSFSR Council of Ministers presented a proposal to that effect to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

All of this gave the coordinating council of the industry strike committees a reason to call off the warning strike planned for December 17. The struggle is not over. The Union Government has assured us that hard currency will be allocated for the industry to purchase raw materials abroad in the first quarter. It is necessary to find such means for the entire year. The Union authorities will also have to solve the problem of inter-republic deliveries of raw materials and the issue of price-setting. We have set a deadline—December 27...

I.Ye. Klochkov, chairman of the Independent Trade Union Federation, comments on the situation:

"The Russian committees of the industry trade unions are still being formed, but they must immediately plunge into the most acute problems. The example of the trade union of textile and light industry workers is instructive in many respects.

"Why did the textile workers succeed? In my view, their success was the result of the following: their skillful analysis of the local situation; the formation of an anti-crisis headquarters; the ability to come up with precise, specific demands; and the daily interaction with the workers' collectives of all of Russia; an all-Russian teleconference, a direct conversation with the trade union aktiv which had never before prompted people to undertake such decisive collective actions.

"These were the literate and civilized steps undertaken by the republic trade union committee. This is the only way we should go if we want to have the workers' demands met.

"It should not alarm anybody that the trade unions have managed not only to get a drastic increase in salaries, but also were granted the ability to keep salaries being paid even under stoppage conditions. This measure permits us, in this difficult time, to save the industry's main resource—its cadres.

"We have learned that social explosion can only be averted by negotiations, by searching for reserves together with the authorities. As we have learned, such reserves do exist..."

RSFSR Constitutional Changes Law Published

91UN0587A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Law of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) "On Changes and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the RSFSR" signed by Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin on 16 December in Moscow]

[Text] In keeping with the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the RSFSR and the need to provide for further development of the political and economic processes taking place in the republic, the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies decrees:

I. To make the following amendments and additions to the RSFSR Constitution (Basic Law):

1. To present the preamble to the RSFSR Constitution (Basic Law) in the following wording:

"The Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies,

"—recognizing its historical responsibility for the fate of Russia,

"—respecting the rights of all peoples included in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

"—expressing the will of the peoples of the RSFSR,

"confirms the state sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic through its entire territory and declares its resolve to create a democratic rule-of-law state on the basis of a renewed USSR."

2. To present Articles 1 and 2 in the following wording:

"Article 1. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic is a sovereign state creat-1 by the peoples historically united in it.

"Article 2. All power in the RSFSR belongs to the multinational people of the RSFSR.

"The people exercise state power through the soviets of people's deputies, who comprise the historical basis of the RSFSR, and directly."

3. To present Part 2 of Article 4 in the following wording:

"State and social organizations and officials are obliged to observe the RSFSR Constitution, the USSR Constitution, the laws of the RSFSR and USSR, and the constitutions and laws of the republics included in the RSFSR published within the limits of their authority."

4. To present Articles 10 and 11 in the following wording:

"Article 10. The right to property in the RSFSR is recognized and protected by the state.

"The state creates the conditions necessary for the development of various forms of property and provides equal protection for all forms of property.

"Based on social interests, the law establishes the limits of freedom of economic activity.

"Article 11. The land and its resources, water, and the plant and animal kingdoms are the property of the peoples living on the corresponding territories.

"Possession, use, and disposal of natural resources may not be carried out to the detriment of the interests of these peoples.

"The forms of ownership of the land and its resources, water, and the plant and animal kingdoms are established by the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies by a qualified majority of votes or a nationwide vote (referendum). Possession, use, and disposal of the aforementioned natural resources are regulated by laws of the RSFSR and the republics included in the RSFSR and acts of local soviets of people's deputies published within the limits of their authority."

5. To add to the constitution Article 11 (1) with the following content:

"Article 11 (1). The state property of the RSFSR is the property of the multinational people of the RSFSR.

"Property owned by the RSFSR includes state enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the RSFSR, resources of the continental shelf and the RSFSR maritime economic zone, cultural and historical values of statewide significance, funds in the state budget of the RSFSR, state banks of the RSFSR, the RSFSR share of the Union gold reserve, and diamond and currency supplies, and republic pension, insurance, reserve, and other funds.

"State ownership of the RSFSR and subjects of the federation may include means of production in industry, transportation, communications, and information science enterprises, enterprises of the fuel and energy complex, other enterprises, and other property necessary for carrying out the tasks of the RSFSR.

"The possession, use, and disposal of state property are carried out in keeping with legislation of the RSFSR and subjects of the federation.

"The RSFSR and subjects of the federation participate in the management of property turned over to the USSR for carrying out Union tasks."

6. To present Articles 12, 13, 14, and 17 in the following wording:

"Article 12. The property of sovkhozes [state farms], kolkhozes [collective farms], cooperatives organizations, peasant farms, and their associations includes the products they produce, their means of production, and other property necessary for carrying out their production or other activity that is not prohibited by law.

"Plots of land for the production of agricultural products are granted by the state for use, lifetime possession with inheritance rights, and ownership. Withdrawal of land is not permitted with the exception of cases established by RSFSR legislation.

"The sale or other dispossession of plots of land other than through inheritance may be only to the state in the form of the soviet of people's deputies on whose territory the plot of land is located. A plot of land may not be bought or sold for 10 years after the acquisition of the right to own it. After that the question of buying and selling plots of land may be decided according to the procedure established by the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies by a qualified majority of the votes (referendum).

"The state contributes to the development of all forms of agricultural production. Proceeding from public interests, the state may establish maximum sizes of plots of land.

"Land users must use the land efficiently, take good care of it, and increase its fertility.

"Article 13. The property of citizens is created and multiplied through their labor incomes from participating in public production and from conducting their own businesses, or through other incomes received according to the procedure and under conditions that do not contradict the law.

"The property of citizens and the right to pass it on are protected by the state.

"Property may not be used for purposes that run counter to the interests of the society or the rights of other citizens.

"Article 14. The citizen has the exclusive right to dispose of his capabilities for productive and creative labor. A citizen exercises this right independently or on the basis of a labor agreement.

"Individuals employed in production that is based on any form of property are guaranteed by law to have fair conditions for hiring, firing, wages, and protection of labor."

"Article 17. The RSFSR creates conditions and encourages economic initiative directed toward dynamic development of production, growth of labor productivity, and improved well-being of the society and of each worker.

"The state regulates economic activity, provides for the development of the market mechanism, does not allow monopolies, and protects the interests of the workers; it protects the environment; it conducts a uniform tax and financial policy; and it resolves disputes among participants in economic life and prevents abuses in economic activity."

7. Part 2 of Article 30 after the words the "USSR" is to be augmented with the words "and the RSFSR."

8. To present Article 31 in the following wording:

"Article 31. The grounds and procedure for acquiring and abandoning citizenship on the territory of the RSFSR are determined by the Law on Citizenship on the RSFSR.

"Nobody may be deprived of citizenship or his right to change his citizenship.

"In keeping with the single Union citizenship established in the USSR, each RSFSR citizen is a citizen of the USSR.

"Citizens of other Union republics enjoy the same rights as RSFSR citizens on the territory of the RSFSR.

RSFSR citizens outside the republic are under the protection and patronage of the RSFSR and the USSR."

9. To present Part 1 of Article 37 in the following wording:

"RSFSR citizens enjoy all the socioeconomic, political, and personal rights and freedoms proclaimed and guaranteed by the RSFSR Constitution, the USSR Constitution, and the laws of the RSFSR and USSR."

10. To present the first sentence of Article 45 in the following wording:

"RSFSR citizens are guaranteed freedom of scientific, technical, and creative activity."

11. To present Article 48 in the following wording:

"In keeping with the law, RSFSR citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, rallies, parades, and demonstrations."

12. To present Part 1 of Article 49 in the following wording:

"In keeping with the law, RSFSR citizens have the right to form social associations and mass movements and participate in their activity."

13. To present Article 50 in the following wording:

"Article 50. RSFSR citizens are guaranteed freedom of conscience and belief, including the right of each person to choose freely, to spread religious and other convictions, to profess any religion or not to profess any, and to act according to their convictions under the condition of the observance of the laws of the state.

"Religious associations in the RSFSR are separate from the state. The state system for their formation is secular in nature.

"All religions and religious associations are equal under the law.

"Restriction of the rights of citizens and inflammation of hostility and hatred with respect to religion are prohibited."

14. To present Article 57 in the following wording:

"An RSFSR citizen is obliged to observe the RSFSR Constitution, the USSR Constitution, and the laws of the RSFSR and USSR, and also the constitutions and laws of the republics included in the RSFSR which are published within the limits of their authority."

15. To present Article 59 in the following wording:

"Article 59. Individuals encroaching on property are punished under the law."

16. In Part 2 of Article 71: to remove from the fourth paragraph the words "which are parts of krays."

to remove from the fifth paragraph the words "which are parts of krays and oblasts."

17. To present Article 76 in the following wording:

"Article 76. Laws and other acts of the USSR, and ukases and other acts of the USSR president adopted within the limits of the authority transferred to the USSR and RSFSR are in effect directly on the territory of the RSFSR.

"Acts of the USSR on the territory of the RSFSR which encroach upon the sovereign rights of the RSFSR are invalidated by the RSFSR."

18. To eliminate from Part 1 of Article 82 the words "and are parts of the kray."

19. To present Articles 83 and 84 in the following wording:

"Article 83. An autonomous okrug is a part of the RSFSR and may be a part of a kray or oblast.

"A law on the autonomous okrug is adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet upon application from the soviets of people's deputies of the autonomous okrugs."

"Article 84. Organs of state power and administration of the autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug retain the right to have relations with organs of state power and administration of the RSFSR."

20. To eliminate Article 88.

21. To present Points 11 and 12 of Part 3 of Article 104 in the following wording:

"11) The approval of the RSFSR procurator general, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and the head state arbitrator of the RSFSR;

"12) Election of the RSFSR Constitutional Court."

22. In Part 1 of Article 109:

to present Point 14 in the following wording:

"14) Establishes the incomes used for the formation of the RSFSR state budget";

to regard Point 23 as Point 25;

to augment Part 1 after Point 22 with new Points 23 and 24 with the following content:

"23) Resolves issues of early revocation of deputy authority in keeping with the RSFSR Law on the Status of RSFSR People's Deputies;

"24) Declares an all-Russian referendum scheduled by a decision of the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies or at the demand of no less than 1 million citizens of the RSFSR or no less than one-third of the overall number of RSFSR people's deputies."

23. To present Article 119 in the following wording:

"Article 119. The RSFSR Constitutional Court is elected by the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

"The procedure for the election and activity of the RSFSR Constitutional Court is determined by the RSFSR Law on the RSFSR Constitutional Court approved by the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies."

24. To eliminate Parts 2 and 3 of Article 120.

25. In Article 129:

To eliminate Part 2.

To present Part 4 in the following wording:

"The ministries and state committees of the RSFSR bear responsibility for the condition and development of the spheres and branches of management entrusted to them."

26. To eliminate from Part 1 of Article 134 the words "based on the state plan for the economic and social development of the RSFSR."

27. To present Article 158 in the following wording:

"Article 158. To include in the state budget system of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic as independent acts: the RSFSR republic budget, the budgets of the republics included in the RSFSR, budgets of autonomous oblasts and okrugs, and local budgets."

28. To eliminate Article 159.

29. To present Article 161 in the following wording:

"Article 161. The RSFSR state budget is developed by the RSFSR Council of Ministers and approved by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet."

30. To augment Part 3 of Article 164 after the words "RSFSR Supreme Soviet" with the words "or the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet."

31. To present 176, 177, and 179 in the following wording:

"Article 176. The highest supervision of precise and uniform implementation of laws in effect on the territory of the RSFSR by local soviets of people's deputies, their executive and administrative committees, and other organs of state and economic management and control and by enterprises, institutions, organizations, and associations regardless of their jurisdiction, social organizations and movements, officials and citizens is provided by the RSFSR procurator general and the procurators under his jurisdiction.

"Article 177. The RSFSR procurator general is appointed by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and approved by the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and is answerable to them.

"The procurators of the republics included in the RSFSR are appointed by the RSFSR procurator with the agreement of the higher authorities of the republic.

"Some procurators on the territory of the RSFSR are appointed with the agreement of the RSFSR procurator general."

"Article 179. Organs of the RSFSR procuracy comprise a unified system and exercise their authority regardless of any local organs, answering only to the RSFSR procurator general.

"In the activity for supervising the execution of Union laws that has been transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR and for protecting the sovereignty of the RSFSR and its interests in its relations with the USSR and other republics, the RSFSR procurator general works together with the USSR procuracy."

II. In order to bring individual articles of the RSFSR Constitution in line with the present law and to establish a unified terminology:

From Point 4 of Part 1 of Article 109, Part 1 of Article 110, Part 2 of Article 113, Point 4 of Part 4 of Article 115 and Part 2 of Article 117 eliminate, respectively, the words "RSFSR People's Control Committee," "RSFSR People's Control Committee," "chairman of the RSFSR People's Control Committee," and "RSFSR People's Control Committee".

in Part 1 of Article 110 to replace the words "RSFSR People's Control Committee" and "RSFSR Procuracy" with the words "RSFSR Constitutional Court" and "RSFSR Procuracy General," respectively, and in Part 2 of Article 113, Point 3 of Part 4, and Part 6 of Article 115, replace the words "deputy chairman" [zamestitel predsedatelya] and "deputy chairman" [zamestitelya predsedatelya] with the words "deputy chairmen" [zamestiteli predsedatelya] and "deputy chairmen," [zamestiteley predsedatelya] respectively.

to eliminate from Part 1 of Article 129 and Article 130 the words "Union-republic and republic."

III. To instruct the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to develop a draft RSFSR Law on the RSFSR Constitutional Court

and submit it for the consideration of the next Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

IV. The Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies affirms and respects the sovereign rights of the nations, including their right to self-determination, the right to free establishment of their own political status, and free provision of their economic, social, and cultural development.

V. Paying attention to the positive changes that are taking place and are related to the proclamation of the sovereignty of the republics included in the RSFSR, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs,

—welcoming their aspiration to build the RSFSR and USSR on principles of equality and mutual respect,

to instruct the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in conjunction with the highest organs of power in the RSFSR, with the participation of representatives of local power organs, to develop a draft federative treaty and submit it for the consideration of the next Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

VI. The present law goes into effect from the moment of its adoption.

[signed] Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet B.N. YELTSIN
Moscow, the Kremlin, 16 December 1990

Correction to Yeltsin Speaks to Irtush Residents

LD0101193491

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Yeltsin Visits Yakutsk To Discuss Sovereignty," published on the 31 December Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 69.

Page 70, first column, third subhead make read "Speaks to Yakutsk Residents" [correcting town name]

Column two, first partial paragraph, last sentence through paragraph two, sentence one, make read ...the city of Yakutsk. [new paragraph] [Begin Yeltsin recording]... [correcting town name]

Same column, first full paragraph, sentence twelve, make read ...and corresponding financing to popular education, but you have... [supplying additional words]

Western Republics

Gorbachev's Decree Finds Mixed Moldovan Reaction

LD0201173591 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT 2 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Fedor Angeli]

[Text] Kishinev, January 2. TASS—The overwhelming majority of Moldovans believe that the implementation of President Mikhail Gorbachev's December 22 decree on normalisation will restore peace in the republic and preserve its integrity.

Speaking in legislature, President Mircea Snegur of Moldova vowed to implement a legislative resolution on stabilising the situation in the republic in the light of Gorbachev's decree.

Standing legislative committees have begun devising concrete measures to implement the decree.

Work collectives in the Dniester region and areas populated by the Gagauz people have been divided over the decree. Some have demanded the resignation of Mircea Druk's government, blaming it for the bloodshed in Dubossary last November.

The interim committee of the Gagauz republic sent an appeal to Gorbachev, saying that the Gagauz people will seek the implementation of their right of self-determination within the law and count on political support from the USSR president.

The Gagauz people will comply with "your decree, pertaining to them, provided that the Moldovan legislature implements it immediately."

Meanwhile, supporters of the Moldovan Popular Front in the republican legislature and Soviet people's deputies from Moldova blasted Gorbachev's decree. Moldovan television and radio is encouraging this opposition. Soviet people's deputy Anton Gretzhdietry said Gorbachev decree interfered in Moldovan affairs.

Anti-Union Demonstration Reported in Moldova

LD0201175991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1730 GMT 2 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Kishinev, 2 January (TASS)—Several hundred Kishinev residents staged a demonstration in the town center this evening against the signing by the republic of a new Union treaty.

The demonstrators shouted anticommunist slogans and called for an all-out strike. As a result of this action, traffic was blocked for several hours in the town center.

Various strata of the population, parties, and public movements in the republic have different attitudes to the new draft Union treaty. Some support it unconditionally, others favor reviewing individual articles, while others categorically reject it.

The republican legislature has not yet given its final opinion on the issue. Mircha Snegur, Moldova's president, thinks that "on the issue of the Union treaty, the people have to say their word."

Ukrainian Sovereignty, New Currency Hopes Viewed

914A0234A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Dec 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Urchukin, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers: "A Coward Profits by Thinking, or Why the Ukraine Needs Its Own Currency"]

[Text] Kiev—**A political and economic crisis continues to mount. The thesis "to establish complete state sovereignty and to introduce our own national currency" has become fashionable in many republics. Various ways of overcoming great crises are known from history.**

Due to a proposal by F. Roosevelt, the United States was able to restore its economy within a short period of time after the 1929-1932 crisis and preserve a democratic social system through the creation of a monetary reserve system. Here is an example of an alternative decision in the purest meaning of the word. A Fascist regime was installed in Germany and all foundations of democracy were suppressed with the active participation of Hitler, who roused the spirit of nationalist supremacy of the German nation.

In Lebanon, a society was drawn into many years of internecine warfare leading to the self-destruction of the people, with the involvement of outside forces fanning the flames of enmity on the basis of contrasting the national elements of language and culture, interregional denominational peculiarities, and interparty rivalry.

It is not too late yet for the Ukraine, as well as for the Union as a whole, to choose its future in a balanced manner, and first of all to determine in a clear-cut manner its position on the introduction of its national currency and the structuring of new relations with other Union republics and the Union as a whole.

Many economists and scientists approach the introduction of a national currency in a simplified manner, reducing this to an inalienable attribute of the sovereign state and the function of protecting the internal consumer market. The efficient operation of a national currency is associated with the confidence of the entire population in the currency and its being guaranteed by gold, jewels, or hard currency. This is particularly important while stabilization measures are being implemented.

It is important, but is it possible? In the coming two years, the Ukraine will not have enough hard currency at its disposal, to say nothing of its own gold reserves, to guarantee the success of its national currency. The introduction of a national currency by the Ukraine may cause reciprocal actions by Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

Many economic contacts between enterprises will be disrupted when all republics introduce their national currencies. The inconvertibility of the territorial currencies and substantial fluctuations of their exchange rates will bring about a search for foreign banks for commercial brokerage services... to the republics. This will cause a considerable decline in production and growing unemployment. Attempts to find creditors abroad to ensure the stability of a national currency are unrealistic. To this end, $40 billion in foreign capital needs to be secured. The Keynes plan turned out to be of little use even in the case of Poland, whose population already held currency worth more than $20 billion.

The measures taken by F. Roosevelt in his time are more acceptable for the Ukraine, as well as for the Union as a whole. Taking into account the mistrust of the center by most of the populace, it is expedient to subordinate the USSR State Bank to an inter-republic organ of government with equal representation for all republics—the Federation Council. The first measure of the Federation Council to stabilize the monetary system and the exchange rate of the ruble should be to stop the printing of additional bills completely. As a reserve banking system of all Union republics, the USSR State Bank should be given the right of taxation in order to withhold 50 percent of the profits of all commercial and specialized banks with the attendant reduction of money in circulation. The proposed measures will make it impossible for the government of any Union republic to arbitrarily increase wages or procurement prices disregarding the revenues of their budgets or the increment of the production of consumer goods. In as little as half a year, money may become the most expensive commodity, and all republics will strive to give a maximum of economic freedom to all enterprises without resorting to restrictions.

Consumer booklets which have now been introduced in our republic will protect the internal consumer market of the Ukraine only temporarily. After a period of stabilizing the ruble's exchange rate, this rate will begin to increase slowly against the background of boosting the production of consumer goods, especially products and services for export. According to calculations, it will be possible to introduce the internal convertibility of the ruble in 1.5 years. The pace of this transition to internal convertibility will depend to a considerable degree on the official commercial rate of the dollar against the Soviet ruble.

The official commercial rate of 1.80 rubles to the dollar, introduced by a presidential decree, will create prerequisites for reducing imports and provide incentives for increasing exports and hard-currency reserves. The practice of the East European countries shows that a lower official commercial exchange rate of the dollar to the ruble has been established than is necessary in order to seriously stimulate production, however.

After the internal convertibility of the ruble is introduced and hard currency is accumulated, the Ukraine may be able to introduce its national currency in the future without disrupting economic relations and conditions for the operation of the market.

They say that a Cossack profits by thinking.... We should not rely on thinking alone. We need patient, creative work for the benefit of the future. Haste makes waste! The sowers of enmity should not be allowed on the people's field so that thistles will not bloom in the peoples' souls. After all, they do not sow wheat out of ferocious malice or in a drunken frenzy in any country of the world. The hard-working and inherently kind people of the Ukraine should say their kind word. This is a guarantee of genuine democracy, force, and wisdom.

Ukraine Donetsk Citizens Protest Import Decision

914F0094A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 25 Dec 90 p 2

[Letter from Plakhina, Boyko, Sayenko, Yarovenko, and 137 others signatures from Donetsk Oblast: "'A Plant Without Work, A Family Without Money'"]

[Text] Esteemed editors! Workers of the Khartsyzskiy Pipe Plant are appealing to you. The shop where we work specializes in producing large-diameter pipes for main gas and petroleum pipelines with plant-applied anticorrosive coating. It was built in 1982. The equipment is imported and costly. We had to master new occupations in order to service it. Incidentally, the raw material also comes from abroad—Belgium, Germany, Finland, Australia.

Things did not go too badly for us last year. We fulfilled the plan but for six months the collective has been rushing about—there is no high-pressure polyethylene or sevilene [as published], either domestic or imported. About 400 workers have been left practically without work or a means of making a living, and next year there will apparently be even more.

Under winter conditions with the supply system using coupons and passports, and especially with the introduction of ration cards, forced unemployment has been a heavy burden on the people's budget. All this created an extremely unstable and explosive atmosphere at the plant and the city.

Crime was on the rise and there were more frequent cases of theft and damage to the property of the shop that was equipped, we repeat, with costly equipment.

Our repeated appeals to the plant administration, people's deputies, the USSR Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, and even the president of the country availed nothing. And yet the national economy really needs our pipes! Let us just point out that they last for 50 years.

Since we cannot get imports, why have we not arranged for production of domestic materials before now? There was a decision on the part of both the State Planning Committee and the USSR Ministry of Petrochemical Industry. Could it be that we have too much hard currency?

Defunct Nuclear Plant in Ukraine's Crimea Eyed

914F0093A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 51, 22 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent A. Palm: "Bureaucratic Games: Hostages of the Crimean Nuclear Plant"]

[Text] Crimea Oblast—**It is now absolutely clear that the nuclear plant on the Crimean Peninsula is never to be. The 500 million rubles [R] spent on its construction is the price of hasty decisions. But it is not just that immense amounts of money were thrown to the wind. It has turned out that the ministries and departments left thousands of construction workers to their own devices.**

This is what was done, in particular, by the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry. It was as though a village of 20,000 had been deserted. The construction workers ended up without jobs through no fault of their own. There was time for the ministry leaders to be concerned about their people and their future lives. But that time had passed. They had done everything they could to entice people to the seashore and then abandoned them.

No, the construction workers and their families were not to blame for the fact that the very idea of building a nuclear power plant in the Crimea was a bad one. But why are they having to pay for other people's mistakes? There is no answer. There is indignation, irritation, and hostility on the part of the people who were actually left without a means of making a living.

True, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the Crimea came to their assistance, demanding that existing labor laws be observed. The trade unions demanded that the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry and the Ministry of Power and Electrification immediately solve the problem of acceptable use of the capacities of the nuclear power plant, pay the R18 million they owed to the construction collective, and offer them future work.

There is a construction project in the sewing factory settlement and there are other projects as well. If there is a settlement and construction base, roads, seashores, and people, it is necessary to take advantage of the situation and breathe life into the new health resort region. The more so since the traditional recreation spots in the Crimea are unmercifully overloaded and exhausted. There is very little left to do—it is up to the local authorities to take the initiative.

Ukrainian Rayon's Monument to Bendera Destroyed

LD0201220791 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1745 GMT 2 Jan 90

[Text] On New Year's Eve, the monument to Stepan Bendera was demolished by unidentified people in Staryy Ugrynov, Kalushskiy Rayon, Ivano-Frankovsk

Oblast. It was put here in October 1990 with the permission of the local authorities. The explosive device was so powerful that windows were broken in surrounding buildings and the small chapel nearby was damaged. Nobody was injured. An investigation is under way.

It was announced at a meeting in Ivano-Frankovsk on 1 January—on the occasion of the 82d anniversary of Stepan Bendera's birthday—that donations were welcome for building a new monument to the leader of Ukrainian nationalists.

New TV Channel To Operated in Odessa Region

LD2712112290 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 27 Dec 90

[Text] An autonomous television channel will begin functioning in Izmail, Odessa region of Ukraine, on the eve of the new year. The television channel will use satellite communication; for example, it will help receive world news of the CNN television network. The U.S. marketing concept [as heard] has offered 150 feature films for demonstration in Izmail, Kiliya, Reni and Bolgrad regions.

Jewish Newspaper's Founding in Ukraine Reported

LD2712112590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 27 Dec 90

[Text] The first issue of the SHALOM newspaper, which is being published by the local Jewish cultural society, has reached the readers of Kherson. Material on the activities of the society, as well as on the recently created center for the revival of Jewish culture and religion, will be carried in the new publication.

Belorussian Official Eyes Republic, Central Powers

91UN0615A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Vyacheslav Kebich, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondents M. Botyan and V. Roshchin; in Minsk, date not given: "You Cannot Turn a Law Into Bacon If Executive Power Does Not Work"]

[Text] *The leadership of the republics is assuming ever greater responsibility for resolving the developing difficult situations. Requirements for their competence, their perception of the crisis situation, and their search for ways to overcome it are increasing sharply.*

This is what our conversation with Vyacheslav Kebich, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Belorussia and USSR people's deputy, was about.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Vyacheslav Frantsevich, how do you see the situation in the "Vendee of perestroyka" from the height of your prime ministerial position? This is exactly how some "democrats" christened Belorussia in their time.

[Kebich] I would like not to take an issue concerning "the Vendee"; however, as far as the situation in the republic is concerned, it is difficult but not hopeless. Of course, a lot depends on the character of Belorussians—thoughtful, even-tempered, and tolerant. Both the leading cadres and the people have somehow been taught inherent discipline. Discipline is always indicative of the civil health of a society. As you know, however, everything can be impaired. I have no doubts that the "Vendee" will also fall if this purposeful assault on discipline and order continues. Previously, we always had high rates of growth of production, and now we almost do not.

Alas, we do not live on some remote island, and everything that happens in the country puts pressure on Belorussia as well. With some allowances in plus or in minus, we have a unified deformed economic space, the unified nonconvertible Soviet ruble that is backed up at present by goods worth, perhaps, only 15 kopeks; we have a unified financial and credit system and an equally unified imbalance in the economy.

What awaits us tomorrow? A tremendous budget deficit going into billions. We are not to blame for this. For decades, the economy of our republic has been shaped by the Union, and it has so happened historically that a multitude of material-intensive facilities have established themselves here. Now that they have increased prices for initial and raw materials, Belorussia is going to turn from an exporting into an importing republic. In other words, it will go bankrupt. I understand the leaders of the regions that try to replenish local budgets and solve the extremely neglected social problems by increasing prices for raw materials. How are we to interpret the position of the center? On the one hand, they preach the freedom of market-based prices whereas, on the other hand, they send down a directive: Prices for final, finished products may only be raised by a negligible percentage. At the same time, raw materials are going to become several times more expensive! Try and "fit" within these draconian conditions!

We look for salvation to just one thing: Federal taxes need to be introduced. If this intention materializes, if the Supreme Soviet of the Republic approves our program, we will reduce the budget deficit to 3.5 billion rubles. We may enter a market economy with this "ceiling."

We are now vigorously working on horizontal links. All of my deputies are staying in the Union republics. We are already relying less on the center, but we do want to have more order. Perhaps, the Belorussian Government is one of the few to have presented a plan forecast for 1991. In any event, we will finish this year without a decline of the volume of production.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] You have already touched on the topic of relations between the center and the

republics. In your opinion, how can their jurisdictions be delineated without encroaching on the interests of each other? In general, what structure of our Union do you foresee ideally?

[Kebich] Ideally, as you put it, it is already impossible to build a new Union. Time is inexorable. Unfortunately, the time has been missed. I will address once again what I have said at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet: Nobody should be lassoed into the Union. Let those who do not want to join not join. Incidentally, this is something that needs to be sorted out: Who precisely does not want it? Is it the people or the latter-day advocates of sovereignty who are more concerned with their "insignia"? I am convinced that if referenda were now held on this issue most of the peoples would say unambiguously: We do not want to secede.

As far as the concept of a new Union treaty is concerned, my position is clear-cut: Let us not force anything on the republics. Let every individual republic delegate to the Union what powers it sees fit. Absolutely different functions may be delegated to the Union depending on the economic potential of republics, political conscientiousness of the leadership, and other peculiarities.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] In this case, contributions by individual republics to the Union budget are going to be different, even incommensurable.

[Kebich] Naturally. If I delegate more powers, I accordingly "fork over" more for the performance of functions by the Union organs. I repeat, however: You should not force. There are types of operations the centralization of which is beyond any doubt, however. This is the guarding of borders, a common defense system, space, the power industry, the railroads, the maritime fleet, the defense of foreign-economic interests in foreign affairs, and a number of others.

For example, our republic is in such a situation that we may or may not give defense industry enterprises to the center. We will think about what is better. I assure you that some republics will definitely give them, however. They will be compelled to.

I am in favor of not waiting for the signing of the treaty by those who at present disagree with something. Let them think some more. Meanwhile, we are wasting time catastrophically.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] It appears that we are now logically approaching the question of power. What variants of it should exist in order for it to represent genuine power? As you see it, what experience of other countries could we put to use?

[Kebich] Let us reflect on this together. France has a president and a prime minister. This is one variant. In the United States, the President also heads executive power. All the mechanisms have been fine-tuned over there. As far as we are concerned, we are going through such a period that we have not yet arrived at, or matured enough [... strong presidential (only presidential) power. This is what I think. This is why we created two parallel structures, the huge apparatus of the Presidential Council—it is incomprehensible what it is supposed to engage in—and the Council of Ministers with its huge apparatus. (To be sure, the president has now announced the reorganization of a number of state structures).

Despite being a people's deputy, I believe that the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, a cumbersome structure inherited from the past, is unnecessary. Pardon me, but can anything be resolved professionally in this crowd of people where emotions prevail rather than reason? This is the Novgorod popular assembly at the end of the 20th century! This is why this organ needs to be dissolved. It is another question when to do it. There should be the Supreme Soviet with two chambers, the upper and the lower chambers, so to speak. A segment of deputies are to be elected by popular vote whereas the other segment may be elected or appointed by the republics. Only professionals may be members of the Supreme Soviet and work there permanently, excluding the "as a rule".

At present, it is difficult for me to say whether every republic may have the right of veto in the Federation Council of the president. Perhaps, it is impossible. We will run the risk of not making a single decision. Apparently, decisions will have to be made by a qualified majority. One more point: There should be an Economic Council to which representatives of the public could belong, along with scientists and specialists. This is how I see the supreme echelon of power in the future.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Does the prime minister of a republic have a lot of power at present?

[Kebich] Like any other power, that of a prime minister should be bolstered by a clear-cut mechanism for exercising it. This is exactly what is lacking. Imagine that in Minsk, a city of 1.7 million, there was no executive committee chairman for almost a year, and the work of the executive apparatus was paralyzed. They failed to procure potatoes, vegetables, and fruit. The citizens of Minsk found themselves on the brink of a very difficult situation with the supply of foodstuffs. Who gets the blame? Over many years, the people have gotten used to holding the upper echelon accountable, in particular, in the republic. How can I correct "the city fathers" however?

The chairman of the city executive committee is appointed by the city soviet and reports to it. Under the constitution, he also reports to the Council of Ministers. Here I am placing myself in his shoes when a choice is to be made, when he is to decide who to obey. It turns out that he should obey primarily the soviet. The soviet may relieve him at any time otherwise, and much faster than the Council of Ministers may do it.

Would you like an example? The city soviet introduced commercial prices for all types of wine and alcoholic beverages, increased them by factors of between two and

three, and those for top-grade cognacs by a factor of five. The state has a monopoly on this, however.

The government nullified this decision. The city soviet protested, however. They said that they are the full-fledged authorities of the city. I have to go to the Supreme Soviet of the republic in order to get a handle on the city soviet. Pardon me, but will I have enough energy and time to appeal to the deputies in every such case? I am convinced that the executive authorities should have an opportunity to put an end to such unauthorized activities while merely notifying the Supreme Soviet of it. Whether the latter will agree or not will be up to the Supreme Soviet. We will not overcome chaos otherwise. Look at this: Oblast, rayon, and rural soviets, virtually individual streets, have begun to crank out their own laws. What kind of laws can a rural soviet pass? There should be one, state law. In this case, the republic acts as a sovereign state. There should be a combination of executive and administrative power at lower levels. The soviet chairman should be the chairman of the executive committee presidium at the same time. In this case, he will not have to think about how to carry out a decision tomorrow when he makes it today. If we do not act on this as common sense dictates, no law will ever be carried out, which is what we are actually witnessing.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] In the beginning of our interview, we already touched on the issue of a transition to the market. As is known, in Russia the "500 days" program has been adopted. What is being done in Belorussia?

[Kebich] I am astounded by the childish naivete of the people who refer to switching to a market system effective the first of next year when I listen to them. This is not like playing checkers—hop and skip, and you got your piece crowned. The Shatalin program is built on the strictest discipline of execution, and this is what we do not have. So, 100 days have passed, but how do you go to the 101st if the previous stage has not been accomplished? This is it: the program collapses.

There are no great differences between the Union program and ours; there is no precise time frame either. What did the republic fail to agree with? Prices for regular furniture cannot be increased; it is not available for sale. We cannot allow an increase of prices for spare auto parts. They are not produced in Belorussia; given the monopoly, we would give even greater leeway to the money-grabbers of the shadow economy. There are a number of other distinct aspects as far as prices are concerned.

Incidentally, it is interesting how these prices were set. When we were told about freely set prices for seven groups of goods by the Union Government, we went along with it. No sooner had we returned home than 21 groups surfaced instead of seven, and it was said that prices for this list of goods would be set by the procurer and trade. The republic price-setting organs should not interfere. Pardon me, but what kind of dictate is this?

The government of the republic decided nonetheless not to relinquish control of the upper "ceiling" of prices. A price ceiling will be set for approximately 80 types of goods, depending on the vital need for them.

In bureaucratic parlance, there are a number of positions—about 10, we are now determining this precisely—on the prices of which we should strictly hold the line. There is a group of goods without which a person cannot get by. A subsistence minimum and social protection of the people should be ensured, though this is not a simple task. All of us are affected by excessive local favoritism. All republics try to shield themselves from others. Belorussia is also forced to rescue its consumer market, and it does so reluctantly. What is to be done, however? Lithuania, and subsequently the entire Baltic area, the Ukraine, and the adjacent Russian Federation oblasts increased procurement prices for meat one after another, and the cattle streamed there. What were we to do?

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] The devil's sabbath of prices is going on, however. For example, Estonia increased wages and prices sharply in its territory. A similar situation will emerge again.

[Kebich] Absolutely correct. Some economists also advise me: Increase prices by a factor of three, and increase wages by the same number of times. What will this end in, however? In a month or two, the neighboring republics will do the same. There will be skyrocketing prices again, as well as the disintegration of the state. I do not want to take part in this game.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Vyacheslav Frantsevich, you have referred previously to the excessive deficit of the republic budget next year. In conjunction with this, the following issue arises: How will social programs be implemented? Are you securing funding on your own or putting your faith mainly in the center?

[Kebich] With regard to the center, defense and the agro-industrial complex will be supplied on the basis of Union state orders, as well as 90 percent of health care, education, and culture, and 30 percent of the housing program. To be sure, with the qualification "conditionally" because it still has not been determined how much will be given and at what rates. Moscow is giving a lot of what the republic needs to eliminate the consequences of Chernobyl, except for foreign currency. May we only succeed in using up these funds.

The rest is in keeping with the saying that rescuing the people drowning is up to those drowning themselves. The government of the republic has a program that makes it possible to provide social guarantees for all, and in particular for the low-income strata of the populace. There are certain "ifs," however. If 100 percent of the turnover tax is contributed to the republic budget (rather than 70 percent, as the USSR Ministry of Finance

proposes). If we also get to keep 40 percent of the depreciation allowances. If taxes on the profits of enterprises are set at 55 percent regardless of their affiliation. It is clear that this is not a boon for labor collectives, but I hope that they will understand the situation. This is a one-time measure, for one year only.

There is one thing, however, that I would like to note. We cannot approach everyone the same or indiscriminately in our tax policy. If an enterprise does everything in order to ensure the social security of its employees, I have no right to levy taxes on it equal to those paid by enterprises that spend none of their profits for social needs. A differentiated approach is necessary. Moreover, we are creating an entire system of tax relief to avoid what used to be the case: He who pulls his weight gets more weight to pull.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] What role do you foresee for the foreign-economic relations of the republic in a market situation?

[Kebich] The most serious one. We have things to sell. At present, we insist that the government of the republic be given the right to export products independently. The center sort of agrees, but, nonetheless, places obstacles in our path day after day. We propose: Let us determine together a group of goods, for example, strategic goods, that we cannot trade in, and give us freedom to do the rest.

I will give you a discouraging example. During a trip to Thailand, a prominent local businessmen approached me with a request to sell mineral fertilizer. He said that the one million tons he was buying was not enough for him. I asked who was supplying the fertilizer. It turned out that the Union was. Is this not news? The republic mines and furnishes to the country 60 percent of potassium fertilizer; someone sells it abroad, but Belorussia does not receive a single dollar! This is a paradox.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] To your mind, with what content should our revolutionary slogans "Land to the peasants" and "Plants to the workers" be infused?

[Kebich] Land may and should be given to those who want to have it, of course, free of charge, for use in perpetuity, with the right to will it, but without the right to sell or buy it. We still have not appraised the land, we do not have a land cadastre. This is one issue. The second is that there are only 0.6 hectares of arable land per inhabitant in the republic. If those who so wish are given 50 hectares of land each (smaller lots are unprofitable) then there will not be enough land for everyone. Everything needs to be thought out well in this sphere.

Even at present we produce 115 kilograms of meat per capita annually, however. This statistic is similar to those in civilized countries. To be sure, a reform in rural areas ought to be implemented and superstructures need to be reduced to a minimum. We should be very careful with experimentation. We have messed things up much too much in the past. Do we need a ministry of agriculture? Tell me of a country in the world that does not have it! Nonetheless, the stagnation "reformers" contributed to the collection of jokes in their time. They have created a new radioactive element with a half-life of two years, and have called it "Agropromium" [Agroindustrial Committee-ium]. As a result, officials proliferated rather than foodstuffs.

As far as plants are concerned, people who work at enterprises have long deserved to buy out the enterprises and take possession of them for a minimal fee (virtually for free—this is what I want to stress). Otherwise, what kind of privatization is it going to be if the collective of, say, a tractor plant will be able to buy it out only over 25 to 30 years? Since nothing can be altogether free of charge we should set the lowest possible price for the buyout.

First attempts at privatization have already been made in the republic. For example, in Vitebsk the city administration for foodstuffs sales has decided to buy out the stores. The money has already been paid. The necessary paperwork is now being considered by State Arbitration. We will sell housing. Low-income and socially unprotected individuals will receive it free of charge, and we will sell it to other categories of the populace for 50 percent of the minimal residual value. Twenty-five percent of this will be paid on as a lump, and the rest will be paid over 10 years, without paying rents. The soviets will determine the price of housing taking into account the prestige of the location of an apartment, the floor it is on, and amenities. This is one of the variants.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Tell us something about yourself.

[Kebich] Do you want to know what stagnation period I am from and what kind of apparatchik I am? Here we go. I was born in a rural area. I graduated from a polytechnical institute, and went through all the rungs of the ladder, without skipping any, here at the automatic lines plant in Minsk—from a technologist to a deputy chief engineer. From there, I went as director to the imeni Kirov Plant where I succeeded in making the enterprise exemplary in seven years. Later I was elected secretary of the Minsk City Committee of the party, incidentally, on the personal recommendation of Petr Mironovich Mashorov. He frequently visited our plant and knew me well. We miss leaders such as Masherov a lot at present! I also worked as head of department at the Central Committee and second secretary of the Minsk Oblast Committee. I headed the Republic Planning Committee for five years, and now I am here, at the Council of Ministers.

My hobbies? I read a lot of the press and scientific publications. I get around to reading fiction sometimes, though less and less recently. I love fishing very much. When the mushroom season comes there is no keeping me away from mushrooms. If only I had time!

Perhaps, this is ill. As far as work is concerned, I still achieve in the greater scheme of things, though I am frequently dissatisfied with myself.

I would like to end on an optimistic note, however. Very much may be accomplished in our republic. The output lines of plants may be changed. Foreign investment may be attracted. Technology may be upgraded. Research intensive production may be developed. Agriculture may be restructured, and people may be fed. There are other opportunities as well, and I must take advantage of them to the fullest.

Caucasus

Increased Tension in South Ossetia Reported

91US0188A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Dec 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Hoping for Wisdom"]

[Text] **Worker R. Bazayev has called us on our feedback line from Belgorod. He is Ossetian, and he has requested that we report events in South Ossetia in more detail. There have been other similar requests. We are publishing a report by our special correspondent from the location of the events.**

Major General G. Malyushkin, deputy chief of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops for the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, described the situation which has recently developed in Tskhinvali and Dzhavskiy Rayon as tense. On the surface, life in the city is normal. Enterprises and shops are open. You do not see armed soldiers or combat vehicles on the streets during the day. However, as soon as you start talking to the people you grasp the level to which passions have risen here, and understand how misleading the quiet pace of life on the street is.

In the state-of-emergency region the situation is uneasy at night—between 2200 and 0700 hours—when the curfew is in effect. As Major General Malyushkin communicated, as of today, 18 December, 46 people have been detained for curfew violations. There have been attempts to smuggle weapons to Tskhinvali. On the night of 17-18 December, a military patrol was attacked. Fortunately, there were no casualties. The criminals fled. In rayons adjacent to the state-of-emergency zone, cases of attacks by unknown perpetrators on trucks with cargo for Tskhinvali and Dzhavskiy Rayon have been registered. This has given the local authorities grounds to refer to the threat of an economic blockade. On the whole, the situation around Tskhinvali and Dzhavskiy Rayon is marked by the activity of self-styled "guardians of order" who increase the nervousness of the local populace. This is why the people's deputies of South Ossetia demand that a state of emergency be imposed throughout the entire territory of South Ossetia.

Major General Malyushkin believed this measure to be unnecessary. He expressed his confidence that the Georgian MVD would have enough resources to establish a regular supply flow of all necessary freight to the state-of-emergency region and to ensure the citizens' safety. The general stressed that the USSR MVD Internal Troops accomplish their task of protecting the rights of citizens and safeguarding their lives in South Ossetia in cooperation with the law-enforcement organs of the Republic of Georgia. In the opinion of the general, the mutual understanding of the command of the USSR MVD Internal Troops and the Georgia MVD is complete.

On 17 December, Major General G. Kvantaliani, deputy minister of internal affairs of Georgia, was appointed commandant of the city of Tskhinvali and Dzhavskiy Rayon. On the night of 17-18 December, cadets from the Higher Militia School in Tbilisi were on patrol together with the units of the USSR MVD Internal Troops.

We should note that in the autonomous oblast itself this fact was received with ambiguity. In the evening, I happened to witness the appearance of a delegation of workers from the enterprises of Tskhinvali in the office of First Deputy Chairman of the Oblast Executive Committee Ye. Dzagoyeva. The delegation expressed their concern with the appointment of a representative of the Georgian MVD as commandant.

Yelena Pavlovna told me: "Given the existing situation, I believe that a stable mood of the people may only be ensured by having the USSR MVD Internal Troops as a neutral force. There is hope that the efforts to resolve the conflict will be crowned with success as long as the troops remain here."

Dzagoyeva familiarized me with the Appeal to the USSR People's Deputies signed by the people's deputies of the South Ossetian Soviet Republic. The appeal contains specific proposals for settling the conflict, as well as a request to establish a special commission of USSR people's deputies to study political processes and the socio-economic situation, work out a political-legal assessment, and take appropriate measures.

Major General B. Voronov, department chief at the USSR MVD, also discussed attempts to bring the opposing sides together at the negotiating table. In particular, he discussed the intention to create an observer commission of USSR people's deputies which could, for its part, monitor the situation in South Ossetia, as well as facilitate the development of a compromise solution. As Major General Malyushkin stressed, however, tension in the region may be completely eliminated only when a firm legislative foundation is developed for resolving these issues.

On 19 December, a telegram sent to the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR president, and the USSR minister of internal affairs by Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, and T. Sigua, chairman of the Republic of Georgia

Council of Ministers, was published in the newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA. In particular, the telegram reads: "The behavior of the USSR MVD Internal Troops is outrageous. They have conspired with the Ossetian extremists. They man checkpoints together with them, inspect and search the Georgian population only, exceed their authority, and confiscate service weapons of employees of the Republic of Georgia MVD. In light of this, the Presidium of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet demands: 1) To subordinate the USSR MVD Internal Troops stationed in Tskhinvali and Dzhavskiy Rayon to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet and the commandant appointed by the Republic of Georgia MVD, or altogether pull them out of there. 2) To take measures to put an end to the illegal activities of the self-appointed "government," and arrest the criminals. To bring in the Georgian militia to the city of Tskhinvali and Dzhavskiy Rayon.

"The government of the Republic of Georgia and its people will resort to extreme measures unless these demands are met promptly."

It is easy to see that there is a certain difference between the statements of USSR MVD Internal Troops representatives and the position reflected in the telegram of the Georgian leadership. I will refrain from comment. I will only say that these contradictions are in themselves a reflection of the difficult and confused situation which has developed in South Ossetia and, particularly, in the state-of-emergency region.

Abkhaz Authorities Launch New Newspaper

PM0201162591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Report by L. Khaykin under the rubric "Tickertape": "ABKHAZIYA For All"]

[Text] Sukhumi—A new daily newspaper—ABKHAZIYA—has been launched in Sukhumi. Its founders are the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Soviet Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers. The USSR State Committee for the Press has issued the newspaper with a registration certificate.

The aim of the new publication is to report in detail on the problems of the region's social and economic development and the cultural and spiritual development of the peoples populating Abkhazia and to strengthen international friendship.

Economic Supplement Registers as Separate Paper

NC2812150690 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 27 Dec 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] SEHER [MORNING], an economic supplement to KOMMUNIST, has been registered with the republic's State Committee for Publications [title as heard] as a separate newspaper. The creative collective of the supplement and the publishers of KOMMUNIST are the founders of SEHER.

The newspaper will be published in color, in Azeri and Russian, five days a week. It will be distributed [words indistinct] in 1991. What will be published in SEHER? Nezaret Suleyman-zade, chief editor of SEHER, answered this question in KOMMUNIST on page four [no further details given].